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Abstract  
This thesis is about the Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea. Throughout the literature on mining 
and communities, there is a split between the technical and the social. Technical mining – the 
engineering, environmental, planning and operations – do not ordinarily consider communities 
beyond the technical aspects of community relations – housing, employment, transport – rather 
approaching communities in a sanitised, corporate manner. There is plenty of discussion about 
environmental aspects of mine closure already, but it is important to have an extended discussion 
and create a space for debate about the roles of mining companies in developing sustainability 
plans that are for communities, not just the environments they exist in. The Ok Tedi mine has a 
unique institutional aspect that has grown with the mine – the Ok Tedi Mining Complex – which 
is inhabited by various governmental and non-governmental organisations. The mine closure and 
sustainability planning process under the OTMC is unique to Ok Tedi mine, as there is no other 
mine in PNG that is guided by the same legislation, norms, and cultural frameworks. The OTMC 
is dominated by the stakeholder relationships of the organisations under its auspices, and the 
outcomes of these relationships directly affect the outcomes of development planning. This 
thesis examines the development of the OTMC, and assesses the way it shaped the relationship 
between the main stakeholder organisations - Ok Tedi Mining Limited, PNG Sustainable 
Development Program Ltd., PNG national government, Ok Tedi Development Foundation, 
communities of the Community Mine Continuation Agreement regions, Fly River Provincial 
Government – has influenced the development of mine closure as a function of sustainability 
planning, the ongoing funding streams available for programs, and the development and 
implementation of programs aimed at encouraging sustainable livelihoods. This involves two 
case studies of livelihood promotion programs – Agriculture and Food Security, and Artisanal 
and Small Scale Mining. The dissertation is an original contribution to knowledge because there 
has been no systematic examination of the Ok Tedi Mining Complex as an institution, and there 
have been significant developments transforming the way that the stakeholder organisations 
relate to each other concerning mine closure and sustainability planning.  
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Chapter One – Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The North Fly District in Western Province was one of the last places in Papua 
New Guinea to be colonised. This remote and mountainous region is home to a number 
of tribes, whose way of life relies on their social and physical environment for 
subsistence and ritual. The local name of ‘Ok Tedi’ holds significant import; 
principally as the name of the biggest river in the district apart from the Fly River itself, 
and subsequently as the name of the mining company, whose activities caused 
significant environmental destruction of the river. The Ok Tedi mine would become 
one of the longest operating, most politically, socially, and environmentally contentious 
mines in Papua New Guinea. Eventually the Ok Tedi mine will close, so planning for 
the political, social, economic and environmental future of the communities in its 
impact regions is of critical importance.  
This thesis examines how the development of the Ok Tedi mine as an institution 
has shaped the development of sustainability and post mine closure planning. To 
achieve this, a suitable framework for analysis was followed. This framework, 
Historical New Institutionalism, was chosen as it argues that organisational actors are 
constrained by institutional factors in both in their objectives and outcomes. 
Sustainability planning by the Ok Tedi mine’s stakeholder organisations for community 
post-closure livelihood development faces institutional limits on both the scope and the 
outcome of planned projects. As this thesis is concerned with the impact of the Ok Tedi 
mine and its closure on the North Fly District, I will be restricting my analysis to this 
geographic area, with some reference to the rest of Western Province.  
The literature engaged in this research is from two broad areas: the general 
sustainability and mine closure literature relating to the global trends in that research; 
1 
and political economy, anthropology, and sociology of mining in PNG, with discrete 
literature on the Ok Tedi mine. My research is placed within the PNG literature more 
than the sustainability literature.  
The research objective of this thesis is to examine the Ok Tedi mine as an 
example of an institutional complex; specifically examining the development of 
stakeholder organisations, compensation and benefit streams, and particular community 
livelihood projects. The thesis intends to demonstrate that sustainability planning for 
post-closure community livelihood development has constraints that are shaped by all 
of the institutional factors, from legislation, to stakeholder organisations, to geography.  
1.2 Theoretical Approach  
The theoretical framework for analysis proposed by Historical New Institutionalism 
(HNI) is used in this thesis. According to HNI, institutions refer to ‘formal rules, 
compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship 
between individuals in various units of the polity and economy’ (Hall 1986: 19). HNI is 
primarily concerned with non-state networks of rules, laws, organisations, and relations 
between actors in political life. Steinmo (2001: 7554) argues that institutions are ‘in the 
broadest sense, simply rules’ and that they are foundation of all political behaviour, 
structuring politics because they define participation, shape actors’ strategies and 
influence their preferences. Thelen and Steinmo (1992:2) argue that HNI ‘work[s] with 
a definition that includes both formal organisations and informal rules and procedures 
that structure conduct’ DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 8) contend that HNI represents a  
…rejection of rational actor models, an interest in institutions as independent variables, 
a turn toward cognitive and cultural explanations, and an interest in properties of 
supraindividual units of analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations of direct 
consequences of individual’s attributes or motives.  
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HNI can explain what the rational-actor or functionalist accounts of 
organisations cannot: why ‘administrators and politicians champion programs that are 
established but not implemented; managers gather information assiduously, but fail to 
analyse it; experts are hired not for advice but to signal legitimacy’ (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991: 3). HNI does not see the individual actor or organisation in a vacuum, 
rather it is like an island, in an archipelago of other institutions, surrounded by an 
institutional sea.  
The key to the HNI analysis is the ‘notion that institutional factors can shape 
both the objectives of political actors and the distribution of power among them in a 
given polity’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:6). Steinmo argues ‘rather than being neutral 
boxes in which political fights take place, institutions actually structure the political 
struggle itself’ (Steinmo 2001: 463). The approach analyses ‘the whole range of state 
and societal institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and that 
structure their relation of power to other groups’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 2). Hall 
(1989:19) argues that  
Institutional factors play two fundamental roles in this model. On the one hand, the 
organization of policymaking affects the degree of power any one set of actors has 
over the policy outcomes… On the other hand, organisational position also influences 
an actor’s definition of his own interests, by establishing his institutional responsibility 
and relationship to other actors. In this way, organisational factors affect both the 
degree of pressure an actor can bring to bear on policy and the likely direction of that 
pressure. Such analysis can be applied to both inside and outside the state.  
Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 9–10) argue that the HNI accounts for both the input 
side and output side of political decisions and agency are influenced by institutions:  
By shaping not just actor’s strategies … but also their goals as well, and by mediating 
their relations of cooperation and conflict, institutions structure political situations and 
leave their own imprint on political outcome. … The institutions at the center of 
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historical institutional analyses … Can shape and constrain political strategies in 
important ways, but they are themselves also the outcome (conscious or unintended) of 
deliberate political strategies, of political conflict, and of choice.  
The HNI framework provides the most appropriate way to package the complex 
and often-contradictory aspects of the Ok Tedi mine and its stakeholder organisations. 
The research will answer essential questions about the role in mine closure and 
sustainability planning of the stakeholder organisations in what I call the ‘Ok Tedi 
Mining Complex’ (OTMC). OTMC is the name of the complex array of institutions 
(laws, agreements, policies, procedures, and so forth) that motivate and contain the 
behaviour of numerous organisational actors. The OTMC is an enduring embodiment 
of the rules, norms, established patterns of behaviour and ongoing corporate culture 
that is not entirely rooted in the individual actor or organisation. Discussion will centre 
on the future mine closure as an event that will remove the rationale for the existence of 
the institutional complex. 
The OTMC’s stakeholder organisations and other political actors involved are 
guided by the formal and informal rules that have built up over the past 40 years (see 
Figure 1.1 in Appendix VI). The OTMC’s main stakeholder organisations are PNG 
Sustainable Development Program Ltd, Ok Tedi Development Foundation, the national 
government, and the impacted communities. The construction of sustainability as a 
culture within the stakeholder organisations of the OTMC is of primary concern of this 
thesis. The emergence of the OTMC through various political, regulatory and cultural 
channels means that the Ok Tedi mine is uniquely placed for ensuring an enduring 
focus on sustainable development post closure.  
The HNI approach is important for examining the sustainability and mine 
closure planning. The basic premise of this thesis is that the institutions are not rational 
or functional, and influence particularly the government organisations. My argument is 
4 
that individual agency of the community members is constrained by the rules and 
norms of the Ok Tedi mine, as is the agency of organisations existing at village, 
regional, district, and provincial level. The development of rules, regulations, and 
cultures of the political and social institution of the Ok Tedi mine mediates the 
relationships and decision making of all political actors.  
The growth and change of the Ok Tedi institution over time reflects the process 
of continual piecemeal, and occasionally more explicit, efforts to review and reorganise 
the variety or organisations within it (March and Olsen 1989: 69). These changes have 
been a result of administration changes within OTML from the inception of the mine as 
equity shareholders changed, to the large-scale transformations of the Mining (Ok Tedi 
(Ninth Supplemental) Agreement) Act 2001 (9SA). The institutional reforms in the 
early 2000s were the result of significant pressure from external organisations, although 
with good intentions, the follow-through of many of the initial ideas and motivations 
for the 9SA have been less than successful for the community.  
OTML implicitly acknowledges there is an institutional complex that exists 
through their corporate slogan “More than a Mine:” James Assan, village leader from 
Konkonda confirmed a belief in the wider mine impact area community that  
You see, the thing is the government has put in very little, very little in terms of the 
livelihoods of the people. And I think it is true to say that Ok Tedi is more than a mine 
and I think Ok Tedi has done that … In terms of services, infrastructure developments, 
where the government should have provided that infrastructure but there is nothing 
there. So Ok Tedi more or less played the role of the government here in the Western 
Province (Garret 2013).  
The OTMC is an evolving institution, as even over the course of this research 
major changes occurred. The national government on 18/09/2013 appropriated the 
majority shareholding PNGSDP had in OTML, effectively cutting it off from its 
5 
income stream. PNGSDP was forced to stop funding existing community livelihood, 
healthcare, education, and regional development programs throughout PNG and has 
been significantly diminished in scope ever since.  
1.3 Literature Review  
This section addresses the placement of the research within the existing literature on 
mine closure and sustainability, and mining in PNG.  
Mine Closure & Sustainability  
Mining does not notionally fit into the scheme of sustainable development. Mining is 
capital intensive, environmentally destructive, and can be exploitative of labour. Mine 
closures throughout the world have been prime examples of the limitations of mining to 
bring sustainable development to communities that surround mining projects (Cochilco 
2002). Mine closure is one of the most pressing issues to confront mining companies 
and governments in resource-based economies around the world. From the tin mines of 
Cornwall to Queenstown in Tasmania, to Panguna Mine in Bougainville (Spriggs and 
Denoon 1991), the closure of mines has led to significant economic downturns, 
environmental degradation, and social dislocation. Mine closure is traumatic for 
communities and local or provincial governments. It can cause a decline in whole 
regions unless managed in a sustainable way (Hegadoren and Day 1981; Conner 2003). 
To understand how mine closure fits into sustainability, an investigation of 
what constitutes sustainability needs to be undertaken. The idea of sustainability came 
to the forefront of academic discourse in the 1980s. The United Nations World 
Commission on Environment and Development’s (WCED) Our Common Future2 
report in 1987 popularised the idea that development and environment are not mutually 
2 The report is commonly referred to as the Bruntland Report after the chairman former Norwegian Prime Minister 
Gro Harlem Brundtland.  
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exclusive, and that they can be sustainable. The report (WCED 1987: 41) defined 
sustainable development as:  
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains 
within it two key concepts:  
1. The concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's
poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and 
2. The idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social
organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs 
Creating a situation where an inherently destructive and environmentally 
damaging activity can lead to benefits for communities and the environment into the 
future seems incompatible. The focus of mine closure policy in advanced industrialised 
countries is on decommissioning and rehabilitation of physical assets, rather than 
policies for the conservation of communities and livelihoods (Laurence 2002; 
Limpitlaw and Hoadley 2006; Kemp et al. 2007). There is still a perception throughout 
the industry that social aspects of mine closure are not core to closure, rather they are 
supplementary. The Western Australian Government’s mine closure guidelines reflect 
this in the document’s approach sustainable development from only the ecological or 
environmental aspect, rather than the socio-cultural. The Australian and New Zealand 
Minerals and Energy Council and Minerals Council of Australia 2000 guidelines state 
in their stakeholder involvement section part 1.5 that ‘wherever practical, work with 
communities to manage the potential impacts of mine closure’ (emphasis added p. 4). 
This quote indicates that if it is not “practical” for the company to plan for impacted 
communities post-closure, then it is not expected. The idea that community 
sustainability planning could be perceived to be optional by the mining industry is not 
surprising. Communities that surround mines are often located in remote regions, far 
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from existing services and government infrastructure (O'Faircheallaigh. 1992, 
Madebwe 2004). The shifting away from mine towns to fly-in fly-out operations 
signals a desire for mining companies to mitigate their obligations and responsibilities 
to the surrounding communities by never providing them services or infrastructure in 
the first place that would create a dependency and subsequent negative impact at 
closure.  
Over the past decade, there has been increasing integration of social 
considerations in mine closure planning into mines throughout the world.  The 
International Institute for Environment and Development’s Mining Minerals and 
Sustainable Development (MMSD) project influenced the resources industry in a 
significant way. The report Breaking New Ground brought to the forefront the 
importance of sustainable development in the mining sector. Richard Jackson (2002) 
contributed a report on capacity building for community development leading up to 
mine closure in PNG which concluded that mine closure planning in PNG was not very 
good, but at the time there was ‘very little evidence that mine closure [was] being 
approached in any better way anywhere else in the world’ (2002: 35). The main mine 
closure-related outcomes of the MMSD project were that social aspects of 
sustainability had to be integrated into a whole-of-life mine closure conception. 
Outlined in the report was the “good practice” of mine closure planning centred around 
five sustainable aspects (MMSD 2002: 243–244):  
• Future public health and safety are not compromised, 
• Environmental resources are not subject to physical and chemical 
deterioration, 
• The after-use of the site is beneficial and sustainable in the long term 
• Any adverse socio-economic impacts are minimized, and 
• All socio-economic benefits are maximized. 
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In the World Bank and International Finance Corporations 2002 report, It’s Not 
Over When It’s Over: Mine Closure Around the World highlight the areas of greatest 
importance for mining companies, governments, and communities in the process of 
mine closure. This report encourages triparty dialogue and early preparation for the best 
closure outcomes, but it also recognises the need for legal frameworks (Sheldon et. al 
2002: 10) 
Without a good legal framework for mine closure, mining companies do not know their 
obligations and potential future liabilities, and mining communities do not know their 
rights or responsibilities. The absence of a comprehensive legal framework for mine 
closure can also lead to inefficiencies and confusion among government units at the 
central regional and local levels.  Unless they know they know the lines of authority 
and responsibility, they will not be able to ensure that mine closure takes place 
properly and that adequate monitoring occurs after closure 
In the early 2000s, the World Bank’s agenda for sustainability emerged as a 
desire to modernise PNG’s mining industry and reform the bureaucratic and legislative 
frameworks that governed the resource sector. The lack of a mine closure policy meant 
that Misima Mines planned closure without any PNG specific legal framework. This 
absence of a national framwork lead to the first technical assistance (TA) loan and 
World Bank advisors working alongside PNG counterparts to develop a range of new 
policies. The outcome of this process was a draft Mine Closure Policy (2005), which to 
this day has not become legislation. At the conclusion of the TA package was the 
splitting of the Department of Mining into the Mineral Resources Authority (MRA), 
responsible for regulation of the sector through managing mineral licences and 
inspections, and the Department of Mineral Policy and Geohazard Management 
(DMPGM) responsible for legislation and policy. 
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Sustainable mine closure is one of the most important social issues facing 
resource-rich areas of the world. The social impacts of mine closure on communities 
have been examined extensively by academics (Veiga et al. 2001; Byford 2008; 
Halvaksz 2008); The main focus of the mine closure literature that is of relevance to 
this thesis is sustainable community development and the relationship between mining 
companies and the communities they exist within. Understanding essential tension that 
lies at the heart of relations between the mine and the community means examining the 
rights of people and the obligations of companies. Since OTML started operations, 
there has been a paradigm shift in the obligations companies have to the communities 
around them.  
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become a core tenet of good 
business practice, and by extension corporate citizenship has meant that companies are 
seen as being part of the community rather than setting themselves apart (Chaloping-
March 2006; Kemp 2009). In the last 20 years, CSR has become a salient issue for 
mining companies around the world. CSR has been defined as ‘...a concept whereby 
companies decide voluntarily to contribute to a better society and a cleaner 
environment’(CEC 2001: 5), or ‘[t]he responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on 
society’ (EC 2011: 6). CSR goes beyond legal obligations or society expectation of 
corporate behaviour towards communities (Falck and Heblich 2007:247); it implies a 
moral obligation to ensure that communities are not negatively affected by the practices 
and activities of the company during its everyday business. The ethics of resource 
development in the context of indigenous cultural lands provides a significant challenge 
to CSR. Where communities are relocated (Connell and Howitt 1991) or their 
environment is significantly impacted by mining operations (as at Ok Tedi mine, 
Freeport’s Grasberg mine (Leith 2008)), companies face increased challenges to 
designing post-closure corporate-community development livelihood projects that 
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adequately address the key aspects of sustainable development. Lertzman and 
Vredenberg (2005:244) argue ‘…it is unethical to sacrifice the viability of Indigenous 
(or other) cultures for industrial resource extraction. It is ethical to engage with 
Indigenous peoples in a manner consistent with their wishes, their cultures and means 
for material survival’. It is necessary to involve communities in developing plans for 
sustainability (Veiga et al. 2001; Butler et. al. 2012; Gilberthorpe and Banks (2012). 
The traditional communities impacted by resource development are not static, however, 
so the strategies of the company and other stakeholders in their CSR plans must be 
dynamic. Rivers (1999:4) states  
At the beginning of the mine project, the host landowner community may be viewed as 
traditional. Before ten years have elapsed this community will have been transformed 
by the process of economic differentiation, migration in and out, employment and 
unemployment, the rise of new forms of politics, new kinds of households, all the 
factors that accompany development and when combined create a sharp sense of 
difference between people where none existed before. 
CSR encourages companies to think sustainably about their operations, rather 
than just about profit. The CSR programs at Ok Tedi mine are extensive, but they did 
not come from beneficence, they were part of a negotiated compensation package to 
the communities for environmental impacts resulting from the mine. For many other 
mines, they come out of significant pressure to improve the mine operators’ image 
(Imbun 2007). CSR is about making sound sustainable policy for both employees of 
the company or immediate contractors and local people., Stakeholder involved closure 
planning is a core part of the sustainable policy for any mine.   
Mining in PNG  
This section will address the significant aspects of the debates around non-renewable 
resource developments in Melanesia through discussing the main academics involved, 
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and the main locus of discussion. In the literature about mining in Melanesia, and PNG 
in particular, there are a number of academics and commentators who are frequently 
engaged in debates. Mining in PNG has a turbulent history. All the major open-cut 
mines in the country have had complications predominantly with the indigenous local 
and non-local people who live in the areas surrounding the mines.  
The responses of people to the impacts and effects of mining, from the 
Bougainville Crisis in the late 1980s (Filer 1990) to the continuing social problems 
around Porgera mine (Human Rights Watch 2011) contribute to a sense that the PNG 
resource sector is continually in conflict with surrounding communities. Mines are 
responsible for the change in the lifestyle of many local and downstream communities 
because of the environmental and economic impacts of their existence on the 
indigenous people’s lands. Large-scale mining projects can agitate and inflame a range 
of conditions that previously exist in the locations where they are developed. 
Introduction of a monetary economy, conflict over landowner royalty payments, health 
care, education, guns and drugs all contribute in differing ways to affect the local 
communities and create the varied responses they have to the mining companies.  
When discussing resource development in Melanesia, the most contested is the 
discussion over the resource-based conflicts. The most enduring debates surround the 
role of Panguna mine’s operator Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) in the 
Bougainville conflict. There are a number of positions within the debate, and these 
have wider implications than just to Panguna. Colin Filer (1990, 1991) situated the 
conflict in the disintegration of social structures, and that conflict was inevitable 
because of the specific location, and a pre-determined timeline. Filer generally argues 
that the root of conflict and the responses to mining are from within the landowning 
community or communities. If the Bougainville conflict has demonstrated anything, it 
is that landowning communities are far from homogeneous, in character or action. 
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Despite the fact that his assertion of the possibilities of hostility from the Ok Tedi 
communities not materializing in violent conflict, but rather sustained complaint and 
litigation, his analysis contributes an important message about the inevitability of 
conflict in Melanesian mining contexts. Inequitable distribution of compensation in 
societies with limited capacity to mobilise cash payments into meaningful development 
outcomes, or at least outcomes which would satisfy all in the community rather than 
elites or older landowners, causes an essential tension intra-community and extra-
community.  
Banks (2005; 2008) and Banks and Ballard (2003) have linked the Melanesian 
resource conflicts with a broader discussion of the “Resource Curse”, most notably 
pushed theoretically by Collier (2010), Bannon and Collier (2003) and Auty (1993; 
2001; 2007). The general arguments about the resource curse do not bear weight under 
the particular context of PNG. Banks (2008) argues that the presence of a mine or other 
resource development in a community does not fundamentally alter the causes of 
tension within a community: ‘Social relationship, identities and land are the things that 
matter in Melanesia, and to believe that conflicts of any kind, even “resource” conflicts, 
can be primarily about anything else is an illusion’. This sentiment is in line with the 
notion that conflict in the Highlands of PNG is centres around three things: pigs, 
women, and land (Weiner et al., McLeod and Yala 2002; Goldman 2011; Lewis 2011). 
By rejecting the proposition that PNG conflicts are the same as other resource conflicts, 
there is a greater scope for intensive discussion of the source of conflict and how to 
avoid it.  
The Ok Tedi mine’s communities have a special case here: they historically 
were not interested in accumulation of pigs for ritual slaughter, bride price, or big-man 
competitive leadership. Rather their leadership was based on passage through a long 
initiatory cult, where possession of esoteric knowledge and seniority was the source of 
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authority (Hyndman 1994b; Jorgensen 1981). It has been speculated that this was 
because of the absence, or at least significantly reduced significance, of sweet potato 
swidden agriculture in favour of taro cultivation (Watson 1977). There have only been 
rare occasions when large-scale violence has occurred around the Ok Tedi mine, but at 
most times it has involved the “other” – expat workers and accusations of “petty 
apartheid” leading to the razing of the Tabubil Golf Club (Brunton 1988),  
The economic/environment debate, which arises particularly around Ok Tedi, is 
a central. The argument between the economic side and environment side is that Filer 
(1990; 1997c; 1998, 1999), Banks (2002, 2004), Filer and MacIntyre (2006), King 
(1997) Ballard and Banks (2003) that the conflicts at Ok Tedi mine are rooted in 
economic imperatives – that the environment is viewed as an economic resource, that 
the conflict’s spatial aspects reflect that economic opportunities are unequal. Kirsch 
(1993, 1996a), Hyndman (1994a; 1994b) and O’Faircheallaigh (1992a) argue that it is 
environmental, that the connection to land and the special aspects of culture that relate 
to environmental things are why people were so upset. My attitude towards this issue is 
to position somewhere between. It aligns with the argument Jackson (2003:4) states, 
that ‘Economic issues in such a society are environmental issues and vice versa. It is 
virtually impossible to disentangle which is which, or to extract cultural and value 
systems from the ‘natural’ system in which they have evolved’. However, this thesis 
weights economic concerns higher than the environmental concerns and the reason for 
this position is that this thesis takes the notion that the economic consequences of the 
mine shed more light on the essential political issues of the Ok Tedi mine than the 
environmental. The mine has been polluting the Ok-Fly River system for almost 30 
years, but the community response has changed significantly over the life of the mine. 
It is the basic assertion of this thesis that this is due entirely to community perceptions 
of economic disparities between those closest to the mine and those further away. My 
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experience has been that people are not as concerned about the environmental aspects 
of Ok Tedi mine if they can extract economic benefit – e.g. access to town or alluvial 
gold. The communities are much more upset if there are environmental impacts without 
accompanying economic benefits, but they are willing to forfeit the environment for 
economic benefits even knowing what the impacts can be depending on how old they 
are. The younger generation seem to prioritise environment over economy. Explaining 
why there has been a shift with younger people less willing to sacrifice access to water, 
fisheries, plants could be because of increased access to economic opportunities.  
The main writers on the Ok Tedi mine over the mine life have come from 
diverse backgrounds, from people engaged directly in the feasibility and development 
of the mine (Jackson (1982, 1993, 2002), Pintz (1984)), academics engaged with the 
communities (Kirsch (1995, 2002, 2007, 2014), Hyndman (1984, 1994a), Crook 
(2007a)), and academics engaged to do consultancies directly or indirectly (King, 
(1995), Burton (1992, 1993a, 1993b), Filer (1984, 1991), Banks (2013)). The positions 
I find most interesting are the company-side perspectives, about the development of the 
Ok Tedi mine as an institution; therefore, Pintz (1984) and Jackson (1982a, 1993, 
2003) provide rich background for this thesis. Jackson’s work is interesting because of 
his focus on OTML in the period before there was substantial international focus on the 
Ok Tedi mine as a result of the mid 1990s court case.  
The recent writing about the Ok Tedi mine has centred on the Community Mine 
Continuation Agreement processes in 2001 and 2006/7 (Adler, Brewer and McGee 
2007; Sharpe and Offor 2008; Kalinoe 2008; Menzies and Harley 2012; Offor and 
Sharpe 2012) to the Mine Life Extension process of 2009–2012 (Popotai and Ofosu-
Amaah 2013). There have been fewer academic publications on the politics and 
economics of the mine, due to the diminished interest in Ok Tedi mine since the exit of 
BHP in 2001 (but see Jorgensen 2006; Tönnies 2008; Banks and Gilberthorpe 2012, 
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2013; Banks et al. 2013). The Ok Tedi mine is still an important topic of discussion in 
the PNG news media and blogosphere (for example the Namarong Report (Martyn 
Namarong), PNG Attitude (Keith Jackson), PNG Mine Watch, and the Masalai 
(Emmanuel Narokobi)). The Ok Tedi mine is still a large contributor to the PNG 
economy and PNGSDP was one of the largest non-governmental funding sources for 
PNG community development projects3.  
OTML’s involvement in community development is an emerging topic of 
interest for academics. Between the OFSMP and the works of Banks and Gilberthorpe 
(2012), little academic attention had been paid to the programs; rather it was internal 
OTML, OTDF and PNGSDP reports that kept a record of the successes and failures of 
community development projects. The Ok Tedi mine has been the subject of numerous 
grey matter reports over the past 13 years. The vast array of published and unpublished 
reports by OTML (2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2008c, 2008d, 2009c, 2009j), PNGSDP (2010), 
OTDF (2005, 2006b), and the National Government on the Ok Tedi mine, its 
surrounds, population, community development and other topics are quite abundant.  
The Ok Tedi mine has sustained a lot of criticism from various academics and 
the public over the years, both within PNG and elsewhere. Most of the criticism 
surrounds the downstream environmental impacts of the mine. While this is an 
important aspect of the critical response to the Ok Tedi mine, it is only peripheral to my 
argument. Therefore, I acknowledge the significance but choose not to write about it 
extensively, as other writers have worked with communities immediately facing issues 
in the lower Ok Tedi (Kirsch 2002, 2007, 2014).  
3 Until September 2013  
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1.4 Research Objectives  
There is a significant gap in knowledge about the practical application of sustainability 
and community development policies in the Ok Tedi mine impact community, and this 
thesis seeks to redress this through the analysis of the sources of funding and exploring 
two case studies of sustainable livelihood programs at the Ok Tedi mine.  
My analysis discusses the development and exercise of the institution that 
constitutes the OTMC, and is primarily focused on the various community, company, 
and development organisations that inhabit the OTMC’s sphere of influence. The 
analysis provides a way to understand the complex network of relationships between 
the organisations, provide an approach to understand the development of the policies, 
plans, and projects focused on post-closure social sustainability. There are particular 
aspects of the Ok Tedi mine, that when compared to other mines in the country and the 
world, make it an interesting study in sustainability. This dissertation is original as 
there is little exploration of mines as institutions (Leith 2008), and how they can affect 
the policy preferences and political agency of organisations.  
Examine the development of the Ok Tedi Mining Complex as an institution  
Chapter 2 engages the theoretical basis of this thesis. The chapter examines the 
institutional development of the OTMC. It is an extended discussion of the selected 
history of the Ok Tedi mine that relates most to sustainability and mine closure. It 
surveys the history from the initial Kennecott Copper Corporation exploration era, 
through the feasibility and operations, up until the end of 2012. It tracks the 
progression of OTMC-specific legislation, legal action, stakeholder organisations and 
policies. The chapter essentially sets the chronology of the institution, and delineates 
between some of the key political actors under the institution’s influence. It identifies 
critical shifts in the institutional development of the Ok Tedi mine in reference to 
community relations and engagement.  
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Investigate the expansion of the recognised mine impact area, and assess its 
influence on mine-community relations  
Chapter 3 examines the growth and expansion of the communities recognised 
by the OkTedi mine over the different stages of its life. This involves identifying the 
size and extent of the impacted community and an exploration of the varying 
membership of communities and the idea that there is no homogeneous “landowner” 
voice. The communities as political actors, not just a single political actor, is 
established and analysed. The chapter presents the communities of the Ok Tedi mine’s 
impact area as actors in the mine closure and sustainability planning process. It 
executes an examination of the physical geography of Western Province and its 
contribution to the impact on communities. The chapter progresses through an analysis 
of the communities (demographics, culture, specific impacts, specific concerns voiced), 
then analyses what the effects of distance from the mine and demographics contribute 
for mine closure and sustainability policy at the Ok Tedi mine. The focus in this 
chapter is primarily on the North Fly District, as my primary field research was carried 
out in that district. The chapter will give a general overview of concerns for the Middle 
and South Fly regions.  
Analyse the political relations between the main stakeholder organisations and 
actors at Ok Tedi to evaluate the influence on sustainability in post-mine closure 
community development policy  
Chapter 4 is about the politics of planning for Western Province, in particular 
the North Fly District. This chapter debates the details of the stakeholder organisations, 
the substance of available plans, and the influence that the OTMC has on determining 
the scope outcome of the planning process. The chapter will investigate the way 
planning is conducted through relations between the major stakeholder organisations of 
the Ok Tedi mine for the communities in the mine impact region. The chapter, through 
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this examination, illuminates the fundamental issues of sustainable development in 
Western Province.  
Chapter 4 illuminates the complex web of political actors involved in Ok Tedi 
mine’s operation. The legislative framework that the Ok Tedi mine exists in, as well as 
the agreements made between various organisations, contributes to the unique set of 
challenges and obligations. The organisational histories and relations also add to the 
way the Ok Tedi mine’s closure planning process proceeds. It details the historical 
basis for post-mine closure livelihood planning at the Ok Tedi mine and contextualises 
it as part of an overarching sustainability planning process. The nature of mine closure 
as a subset of sustainability rather than a method is examined. This includes 
investigation of the pre-closure planning process at Ok Tedi mine. The additional 
contextualising section on the Misima mine’s closure is included to give a wider 
context to the Ok Tedi mine’s closure planning process. The chapter is about the 
political and power relations centred on the Ok Tedi mine. Analysis of the mine closure 
and sustainability planning process are informed by the historical discussion of the 
relationship between stakeholders. The chapter has a brief historical analysis of the 
relationship between the stakeholders and then talks about the configurations of power 
and influence that the actors, both internal and external, exercise on the Ok Tedi mine 
institutions. How the actors relate in the myriad of ways is important to understanding 
why the Ok Tedi mine’s sustainability and mine closure planning process occurs in the 
way it does. It also informs the ongoing development of policies and projects for 
implementation in the mine impact areas. This chapter primarily deals with the power 
relations up to the end of 2012, with an addendum section on the developments 
(nationalisation) of 2013.  
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To illuminate the financial basis for the Ok Tedi mine post-closure community 
livelihood policies, and examine the practical application of livelihood strategies in the 
mine impact area  
The stakeholders in the Ok Tedi mine are putting in place programs in order to 
build capacity to sustain local livelihoods, which are intended to ameliorate the 
negative effects of the closure on the local people. The two case studies will show how 
proper management of community programs can create a basis for positive 
relationships between locals and mining companies. Lessons for other mines to 
implement appropriate technology policies, agricultural practices, and persistence 
concerning locals are made apparent. This thesis seeks to understand the process of 
mine closure at Ok Tedi with specific reference to planning and funding of service 
provision and livelihood programs in the post-closure period for local landowners and 
non-landowning groups living in close proximity to the mine town of Tabubil. It leads 
to a dialogue about the importance of community and livelihood to development in 
remote areas and their experience of structural changes in the local economy. 
Communities and livelihood are important to sustain, and thus should be central to 
mine closure planning but in many mines this is not the case. Exploring why it has 
become a central point for the Ok Tedi mine’s planning process is the main aim of this 
thesis.  
OTML’s involvement in community development is an emerging topic of 
interest for academics. Between the OFSMP and the works of Banks and Gilberthorpe 
(2012), little academic attention had been paid to the programs; rather it was internal 
OTML, OTDF and PNGSDP reports that kept a record of the successes and failures of 
community development projects. The Ok Tedi mine has been the subject of numerous 
grey matter reports over the past 13 years. The vast array of published and unpublished 
reports by OTML (2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2008c, 2008d, 2009c, 2009j), PNGSDP (2010), 
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OTDF (2005, 2006b), and the National Government on the Ok Tedi mine, its 
surrounds, population, community development and other topics are quite abundant.  
The Ok Tedi mine has sustained a lot of criticism from various academics and 
the public over the years, both within PNG and elsewhere. Most of the criticism 
surrounds the downstream environmental impacts of the mine. While this is an 
important aspect of the critical response to the Ok Tedi mine, it is only peripheral to my 
argument. Therefore, I acknowledge the significance but choose not to write about it 
extensively, as other writers have worked with communities immediately facing issues 
in the lower Ok Tedi (Kirsch 2002, 2007, 2014).  
Chapter 5 integrates and assesses the multiple sources of benefit sharing and 
compensation funds available and going to the communities. The cash flows and trust 
funds all contribute to the ability to fund programs to support communities, but the 
proof of expenditure in improving lives is unequal across the funded regions. The role 
of the provincial government in this inequity contributes to the analysis.   
Chapter 6 includes a historical case study of the food security programs and 
comments on the problematic areas of planning sustainability around agriculture and 
livestock. The chapter aims to give an update to the food security issues brought up in 
the Papua New Guinea Food and Nutrition 2000 Conference papers by David Wissink. 
Since that conference, there has not been a large amount written on Ok Tedi's food 
security situation in the intervening 13-year period. This chapter is about the evolving 
relationship between the organisations of the Ok Tedi Mine Complex around food 
security programs and projects. It covers four short case studies of agricultural, 
livestock and fishery development projects to illustrate the challenges of food security 
and livelihood promotion in the North Fly.  
Chapter 7 presents a case study of artisanal mining as a livelihood and the 
involvement of stakeholders in provisioning assistance to communities. The chapter 
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deals primarily with artisanal alluvial gold mining along the Ok Tedi. It discusses the 
context and exercise of artisanal and small scale mining and the post-closure 
development strategy for the Ok Tedi mine. It seeks to answer questions about whether 
formalising the process and encouraging increased productivity effect the practise and 
participation in artisanal and small-scale mining along the Ok Tedi. How can a locally 
and independently developed sustainable livelihood strategy be improved through 
stakeholder policy development? The chapter situates the ASM activities and projects 
within the landscape of post-closure livelihood development policy that is promoted by 
the Ok Tedi organisations.   
Chapter 8 concludes the research and provides recommendations for future 
research.  
1.5 Research approach and methodology  
I was drawn to study mine closure and sustainability policy at the Ok Tedi mine after 
completing an honours thesis on Melanesian responses to mining, which compared 
Freeport McMoran’s Grasberg mine to the Ok Tedi mine. I thoroughly enjoyed 
researching about Tabubil and the communities surrounding the mine, so proposed a 
study to the Resource Management in Asia Pacific Program, and found out that an 
intended research project on the Ok Tedi mine’s closure had been abandoned in the late 
planning stage the previous year due to management changes at OTML. My research 
filled an already identified gap in knowledge about OTML’s planning for closure. I 
commenced my doctoral candidature in January 2009.  
I had no existing relationship with OTML, OTDF, or PNGSDP, but was given 
introductions to OTML by my supervisor Colin Filer and PNGSDP by my honours 
supervisor Ted Wolfers. I subsequently established beneficial working relationships 
with the stakeholder organisations. I was afforded unexpected access to the 
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organisations, particularly OTML. Initially the mining company rejected my 
application for research, however this decision was later revised and my application 
accepted. Without OTML's support, this research would have been impossible to 
conduct, as it required them to be transparent and open to criticism. Although an 
Australian Postgraduate Award and fieldwork funding from the then Resource 
Management in Asia Pacific Program supported my doctoral candidacy, OTML 
supported my research with accommodation, transport, and food. OTML provided 
accommodation in P Donga and other mine dongas within Camp 3 in Tabubil for a total 
of six months over the fieldwork period 2009–2012. OTML arranged some of my 
internal and international air travel on their business charter aeroplanes. I attended the 
company safety induction process and was given a contractor pass to access buildings, 
intranet, and facilities, and was given office space to work in within the Community 
Relations department. I was allowed to attend meetings and invited to accompany 
OTML and OTDF officers, who were more than accommodating and encouraging of 
my research, on their daily trips interacting with the impacted communities between 
Kiunga and Tabubil. These trips included helicopter flights to the west bank of the Ok 
Tedi to village meetings for the Mine Life Extension community consultations. I was 
not privy to the full scope of activities of OTML or OTDF, however I was able to 
observe many everyday processes of the organisations and their interactions with the 
impacted communities. When requested, they also incorporated my research activities 
into their schedules, taking me on fieldtrips across the North Fly district. Despite my 
partial dependence on OTML and OTDF in Tabubil, I was under no pressure to come 
to specific conclusions from either organisation. I was transparent with OTML from the 
very beginning about my motivation for the research and my disinterest in particular 
historically controversial aspects of Ok Tedi mine – for example I made it clear that I 
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was not going to get involved in landowner claim issues4, and I was not an 
environmentalist so would only tangentially address environmental aspects of the Ok 
Tedi mine where they related to artisanal mining. As I was involved with the three 
main stakeholder organisations I gained a variety of perspectives on their projects and 
plans, so I was not solely adhering to OTML’s agenda.  
While conducting research, I kept field notes of my observations of OTML, 
PNGSDP, and OTDF’s community relations activities. Data collection included semi 
structured interviews conducted in English, and qualitative surveys of community 
activities5 and evaluation of the stakeholder organisations’ community livelihood 
programs. Some of the interviews were with focus groups mainly as part of the 
qualitative surveys conducted, but the majority were informal interviews with 
individuals and small groups in meetings and other informal settings. In addition, I 
collected documentary sources including OTML and OTDF raw data on community 
development and relations from the shared server drive, including confidential and 
unpublished reports, complaint letters, compensation and benefit stream payment data, 
CMCA population census data (and much more).  
As I was most often accompanied by either OTML or OTDF officers during 
surveying and community interactions (as at times they served as translators from tok 
ples), this relationship raised ethical questions as to the perceived independence of my 
research. I mitigated against that by informing the informants that I was from the 
Australian National University and it was personal, not company, research. Human 
ethics protocols oblige that confidentiality of informants is maintained, so I have not 
attributed quotes to informants unless they were interviewed in a formal setting. I chose 
to do semi-formal discussions and meetings with relevant people because conducting 
4 For example the Sissimakam village claim on Mt Fubilan, and the Kimka Sepiyan Sub Tribe vs Biul Kirokim court 
action.  
5 See chapter 7 and Appendix V  
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formal, recorded interviews with OTML would not have provided me with the candid 
and far ranging discussions that occurred. As a result of forming personal friendships 
and working relationships with workers from OTML, OTDF, and PNGSDP, I was very 
conscious to not exploit those relationships for the collection of highly privileged and 
sensitive information.  
1.6 Conclusion 
The next chapter of this dissertation examines the history of the OTMC in detail, 
ranging from the early 1960s to 2012. 
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Chapter Two – History of Ok Tedi Mining Complex  
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter is concerned with setting out the chronology of Ok Tedi Mining Complex 
(OTMC) in order to understand the mine closure and sustainability planning. The 
historical eras of the Ok Tedi mine’s development neatly sets out the progression of 
mine closure and sustainability planning, as throughout the progression of the project, 
at critical junctures there have been shifts to ensure the project delivers on a social level 
not just an economic level. The historical context of the OTMC gives a framework to 
the rest of the discussion throughout the dissertation. This framework is important 
because of the complex character of the different periods of the OTMC so far. 
Gathering the basic history of the most important episodes of the Ok Tedi mine’s 
project life informs the challenges of today.  
Since the late 1960s, when initial gold prospecting by Kennecott in the rugged, 
mountainous lands of the Faiwolmin and Wopkaimin, the Ok Tedi mine has provided 
hope for development as well as tangible benefits to the immediate area. Tabubil has 
far better services than the rest of Western Province, as they are largely subsidised by 
OTML. OTML has over the last 30 years has taken the role of de-facto government in 
the North Fly District (Jackson 1992; OTML 2006c), controlling all the economic 
aspects of the town and surrounding areas, creating a total dependency of the local 
populace on its services. The mine will not be around forever so the main stakeholders 
in the closure are putting in place plans and projects to attempt to create sustainable 
livelihoods.  
The history of The Ok Tedi mine is inextricably linked to the State of PNG. 
Demonstrated throughout this chapter at every critical juncture in the history of The Ok 
Tedi mine, the governments of PNG have been there assisting or thwarting OTML and 
its stakeholders. From the early Kennecott exploration, the national government has 
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fluctuated significantly in its relationship with the mine operators. Government 
intervention has been a constant problem for the smooth workings of The Ok Tedi 
mine. As is shown by the Kennecott era, the negotiating tactics of the government 
almost sunk the project before it started. The 1980s saw manoeuvring by the national 
government to assume what should have been provincial government control of aspects 
of socioeconomic development in the project area, and give permission to go ahead 
without a tailings mitigation scheme. The 1990s saw the national government 
supportive of The Ok Tedi mine to the point of alleged collusion against detractors in 
regards to the downstream impacts from tailings and the court case brought by Slater 
and Gordon on behalf of communities for compensation, and the provincial 
government demands for closure. The 2000s saw the Morauta Government negotiating 
withdrawal of the majority shareholder BHP and set up of a new development 
company, PNGSDP, to distribute benefits to communities within Western Province and 
throughout the country. In addition, the growing provincial government demands to 
take over PNGSDP and criticism of OTML disrupted relations. The 2010s have seen a 
shift towards a more hostile national government, especially since September 2012.  
This chapter will only briefly address the aspects of OTMC history that are 
relevant to the argument of this thesis. There are numerous other aspects of Ok Tedi 
history that are interesting but they are not directly relevant to this thesis.  
2.2 1968 – 1975 Kennecott Period  
The Kennecott period of The Ok Tedi mine’s history starts in 1968. Kennecott 
was involved in exploration activities across New Guinea. An exploration boom was 
occurring across PNG, with Kennecott beating out Placer Exploration Pty Ltd for the 
prospecting license for the Star Mountains by a mere five days (Pintz 1984: 32). In 
June and July 1968 Kennecott Copper Corporation (Kennecott) exploration geologists, 
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Doug Fishburn and John Felderoff, two field assistants, and three PNG assistants 
discovered in a tributary of the Ok Tedi large sulphide crystals, indicating a rich ore 
body was nearby. The source of the stream was the patchily vegetated Mount Fubilan, 
which became the focus of Kennecott's attention. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the 
area around Kiunga developed marginally, with rubber plantations and the construction 
of the Kiunga to Rumginae Road facilitating movement of goods and people around the 
area. Many villages moved closer to the road alignment and away from traditional sago 
swamps and hunting grounds in order to be part of the cash economy (Jackson 1979). 
In the northern end of the district, there was little in the way of activity, beyond the 
exploration camp at Tabubil. Kennecott engaged with the local community, in building 
and funding education and health facilities, funding agricultural programs and hiring 
local workers (Jackson 1983:138). By October 1972, exploration core samples showed 
indications of a large copper ore body, gold enriched cap, and skarn. Exploration halted 
because of an extended drought in 1972. The significance of the El Nino weather 
events in the upper reaches of the Fly River presented another layer of challenge to the 
already difficult logistical location of the mine. Kennecott did not renew the 
exploration work when the drought broke, as they wanted to work out an agreement 
with the government (Jackson 1982a: 53). Kennecott’s role as a corporate citizen meant 
that their withdrawal met with great disappointment by the communities in the Tabubil 
hinterland, as the mine was perceived as the community’s ticket to development, as 
they felt ignored by the colonial government (Jackson 1982a).  
PNG achieved self-government from Australia in 1973 on its pathway to 
independence, with Michael Somare leading the government. Kennecott and the newly 
formed transitional government entered into extended development negotiations until 
March 1975. The government did not agree with Kennecott’s assessment of the Ok 
Tedi ore body as marginal. After the successful renegotiation of the Bougainville 
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Copper Agreement in 1974, the government was in a position to demand favourable 
outcomes. The result of the negotiations was an impasse, with Kennecott withdrawing 
after the prospecting license lapsed on March 13 1975. Pintz argues that the main 
reasons for Kennecott withdrawing were outside influences: the company’s risk averse 
policy after the Chilean Government nationalised its El Teniente mine; having to sell 
off Peabody Coal; the financial problems facing the US copper industry; and Richard 
Nixon’s copper policy6 (Pintz 1984: 45). Ok Tedi was a bridge too far for a company in 
financial difficulties.  
Additionally, after its losses with the Chilean Government, Kennecott pushed 
for outside arbitration in negotiations, which the PNG government took as a slight on 
its sovereignty (Pintz 1984). Jackson argues it was the superior and shrewd negotiation 
tactics by the government and their advisers that warded off unfavourable investment 
terms. The most significant aspects that Jackson attributes to the breakdown of 
negotiation are BCL’s profit announcement, Bougainville Copper Agreement 
renegotiation, the self-governance of PNG and the naivety of Kennecott in thinking the 
government were not as sophisticated as they were. Overall Jackson maintains 
‘…Kennecott’s venture in Ok Tedi was subject to an unusual set of circumstances 
external to the company’s normal experience. Bad luck, however, was compounded by 
a considerable degree of bad management’ (Jackson 1982a: 69). Kennecott never fully 
explored Ok Tedi after suspending exploration in 1972, so did not have a full picture of 
the extent of the resource. This resulted in hesitation that ultimately made Kennecott 
less willing to accept the terms the government was proposing despite there being a 
small gap between the two positions. Kennecott believed they were indispensable to the 
government. Pintz and Jackson argue Kennecott believed that the government had no 
6 As part of the campaign to crush the socialist Allende government in Chile, US President Richard Nixon’s position 
is stated in National Security Decision Memorandum 93 (1970), whereby his “explicit order [was that] the United 
States would sell off part of its copper holdings, flooding the market and depressing worldwide prices” so as to 
damage Chile’s copper export based economy (Muñoz 2008: 86).  
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alternative developer interested in Ok Tedi and that the mine would not be developed 
without them. Kennecott made advances to many companies in Australia, including 
Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd (BHP), and in the United States about joining the Ok Tedi 
project but, other than Newmont, the ‘negative reaction of these companies may have 
led Kennecott to assume that if the government did not come to terms there would be 
no one else to continue the project’ (Pintz 1984: 45). Jackson states ‘…Kennecott really 
did believe that no other reputable mining company would agree to operate the Ok Tedi 
project on the terms the government was expecting them to accept. It was Kennecott or 
no one, they believed, and they told the government so’ (Jackson 1982a: 66). They 
were wrong.  
2.3 1975 – 1981 Feasibility and first supplemental agreements  
The main elements of this period were the development of a consortium, led by BHP, 
to develop the ore body, the negotiation of the mining agreement, the feasibility 
process and the first two supplemental agreements. The importance of this era to the 
overall mine closure and sustainability planning is that it established The Ok Tedi mine 
as unique within the mineral framework of PNG, subject to its own legislation and 
special relationship with the national government. Globally, 1975 was a bad year for 
commodities. Copper and gold had shed much of their value in the preceding year. 
Copper dropped from highs of US$1.45/lb to 61c/lb. Under these conditions, the 
government still felt that Ok Tedi was a deposit worth developing. In 1975, the 
government set up Ok Tedi Development Company (OTDC) and started negotiating 
with BHP and others as consortium partners. By the end of the 1970s, gold prices had 
tripled, topping out at US$850/oz.7 making the leached gold capping on the peak of Mt 
Fubilan an attractive bonus and reducing the marginality of the project. The increased 
7 Silver Thursday - 27 March 1980  
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projected profitability of the project meant both company and national government 
could afford more benefits to communities surrounding the project (Jackson 1983: 
139).  
Principal Agreement.  
The Ok Tedi mine agreement stood to be the first major policy undertaking for the 
newly independent state to implement its vision for a national mineral policy regime8. 
This came in the form of the Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement) Act 1976 Chapter 363, 
known generally as the Principal Agreement. The Principal Agreement was made 
between the State of Papua New Guinea and Dampier Mining Company Ltd (Damco), 
a wholly owned subsidiary of BHP (Jackson 1982a). The Principal Agreement is a state 
agreement9 ratified by the parliament of PNG consisting of two elements – the 
agreement between the State and Damco, and the legislation that gives it legal force.  
The Principal Agreement afforded protections and flexibility that the then 
current Mining Act did not allow for, including environmental or regulatory functions 
(Kawi and Golman 2001: 145). Jackson (1982) and Pintz (1984) explain in detail the 
history of how the national government and OTDC reached this agreement. The unique 
legislative framework for The Ok Tedi mine was the start of its development as an 
institution, as all relations by other institutions and organisations with the mine are 
mediated by this agreement and the subsequent additions to it.  
The most significant clause that would contribute to The Ok Tedi mine’s 
unique status within PNG’s mineral framework was Clause 3.1:  
This Agreement is to have the force of law and apply notwithstanding anything to the 
contrary in any other law in force in Papua New Guinea made after the commencement 
of this Agreement and shall affect this Agreement –  
8 Other smaller mining projects were under the Mining Ordinance Act 1937 until the Mining Act 1977 was passed  
9 Panguna Mine in Bougainville was also under a state agreement: the (Renegotiated) Bougainville Copper 
Agreement.  
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(a) unless the contrary intention appears, either expressly or by 
implication in that law; or  
(b) except as provided by this Agreement  
  
This clause has meant that ever since, Ok Tedi has not been required to follow 
the subsequent Mining Act of 1977 or 1992, or the Environmental Planning Act of 
1978 or the Environment Act of 2000. This has allowed the mine to create its own 
environmental regime in conjunction with the national government that sees 
environmental pollutants at levels that are above the levels allowed in the 
environmental legislation.  
Clause 42 provides the conditions under which the Principal Agreement may 
be subject to change or supplementation.  
42.1 The Parties may from time to time by agreement in writing add to, substitute for, 
cancel or vary all or any of the provisions of this Agreement, the Special Mining 
Lease, any Lease for Mining Purposes, or any lease, license, right or grant granted 
hereunder or pursuant hereto or to any programme, proposal or plan approved 
hereunder for the purpose of more efficiently or satisfactorily implementing or 
facilitating any of the objects of this Agreement.  
This has meant that, where a problem arises, it can be rectified by a 
supplemental agreement rather than having to be dealt with under other mining or 
environmental legislation. This legislative flexibility has worked in OTML’s favour at 
times, but at other times has not been in its interests. The flexibility to change the 
Agreement at will rather than a time bound renegotiation, such as existed with the 
Bougainville Copper Agreement, was a specific advantage. This would prove to be a 
critical feature of The Ok Tedi mine’s continued operations, but also make it subject to 
continuing government intervention much more than mines developed under the later 
Mining Act of 1992.  
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Critical amongst the clauses, not at the time of original agreement but into the 
future, was the clause relating to compensation for environmental damages. Clause 
29.12 states:  
Notwithstanding that a plan or proposal has been approved by the State, the Company 
shall compensate for any loss suffered by any person or persons as a result of the 
Company’s operations resulting from any damage (whether to land, anything on land, 
water or otherwise), or interference with any right to use land or water existing prior to 
the date hereof caused by disposal by the Company of the overburden, tailings or other 
waste.  
The intended physical and environmental impacts of the mine were supposed 
to be minimal and quarantined to the mining leases. Pintz clarifies ‘Although, 
superficially, this clause appears quite formidable, in view of the Ok Tedi project’s 
physical setting ... proof of liability (e.g. “result of companies [sic] operations”) would 
be hard to demonstrate’ (Pintz 1984: 63–64). However, this clause is the basis for the 
claims of compensation for garden damage, overbank flooding, and undrinkable water 
the downstream communities have brought against OTML since 1987. These claims 
were all legitimate considering this broad and seemingly unlimited clause for 
environmental compensation. The Ok Tedi agreement is ‘silent about ongoing 
obligations for maintenance of environmental facilities and structures, such as tailings 
dams and waste dumps, once actual mine operations have ceased’ (Pintz 1984: 64). 
Globally, at this time, mine closure planning or regulation was still in its infancy, so the 
lack of mine closure regulations or framework within the Principal Agreement should 
not be harshly criticised, but rather noted as evidence of a lack of mine life cycle 
planning by both mining companies and national government regulators that was 
common practise at the time.  
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Subsequent to the Principal Agreement, a number of other consortium partners 
joined BHP (30 percent) and the State of PNG (20 percent) in OTDC:  
• Mt. Fubilan Development Company Propriety Limited, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of AMOCO Minerals Company (30 percent)  
• Kupferexplorations-Gesellschaft (Trans: Copper Exploration Company) 
(20 percent) : 
o  Metallgesellschaft AG (trans: Metal Company)  
o  Degussa AG  
o Deutsche Gesellschaft Fuer Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit 
(Entwicklngs-Gesellschaft) mbH (Trans: German Society for 
Economic Co-operation (Development Company)) (Source: 1SA, 
2SA)  
The feasibility of The Ok Tedi mine required extensive research and drilling. 
The original ore grade and deposit size assumptions based on Kennecott’s exploration 
to 1972 were much more conservative than the subsequent Behre Dolbear explorations 
(Pintz 1984: 52). With expanding proven and probable resources, the project became a 
more attractive investment to all stakeholders. The process of feasibility studies, 
negotiation, and government approvals is examined at length in Jackson (1982) and 
Pintz (1984), but there are important aspects to note. The feasibility process took 31 
months. There were a number of studies conducted by OTDC and OTML, including 
the primary feasibility study, the environmental study (by Maunsell and Partners), and 
the socio-economic impact study (Jackson, Emerson and Welsch 1980). The feasibility, 
environmental, and impact reports all worked off the assumption that the impacted 
communities were confined to the immediate area around Tabubil, the mine site, and 
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the Ok Ma tailings dam10. The downstream impact of eroded waste dumps and tailings 
overspill were thought to have the most impact on the Ok Tedi above Ningerum, with 
the areas above the Ok Ma tailings dam, and the main creeks of Ok Mabiong, Ok 
Ningi, and Ok Gilor proposed to suffer 100 percent destruction of existing vertebrate 
aquatic life (Jackson, Emerson and Welsch 1980: 164–165).  
2.4 1982 – 1990 Construction, operations, and provincial issues.  
Kiunga and Lake Murray District Development Agreement  
Since the establishment of the Western (later Fly River) Provincial Government in 
1977 economic development opportunities had changed little for the people of the 
Kiunga (North Fly) District, resulting in a growing movement for a separate Min 
Province11 (Jorgensen 1996). The Kiunga and Lake Murray District Development 
Agreement12 (KLMDDA) in was established in 1981 as a response to the lack of 
capacity in the provincial government to bring services to North Fly District. This 
agreement was an acknowledgement that the devolution of power and decentralisation 
of political and economic functions to the province had ‘not evolved to the point of 
accommodating the implementation of a major project in a remote region’ (Pintz 1984: 
126). This agreement ceded administration of the North Fly District to the national 
government in exchange for K500,000 for housing projects and K1 million per annum 
on development projects (Little and Regan 1987). By wresting administration of the 
North Fly District from the FRPG and Western Provincial Administration (WPA), the 
national government was able to exercise clearer control of the project region. An 
advisory board was set up to oversee the implementation of the projects, the Kiunga-
10 Subsequently there were cultural impact study (Barth and Wikan 1982) and the progress and impact study reports 
(Jackson and Ilave 1983; Filer, Ilave, Jackson and Townsend 1984).  
11 Warren Dutton, then Member for North Fly, advocated for Min Province. The proposed province would unite the 
two Mountain Ok/Min districts of Western Province and West Sepik (North Fly (Kiunga Sub-Province) and 
Telefomin)  
12 From 1983, Telefomin District was under the Telefomin District Development Agreement, with K2 million for 
construction of a high school at Telefomin and K500,000 for development. See Jorgensen 1996 for discussion.  
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Lake Murray Districts Planning and Development Committee (Later renamed the 
Kiunga-Lake Murray Political Advisory Committee) headed by Yonggom man Isidore 
Kaseng, deputy premier of Western Province (Jackson 1993: 60).  
When the KLMDDA was renewed in 1986, it required that a trust fund be set 
up sequestering the North Fly’s share of mine royalties to be put in trust to use them for 
maintenance of development projects (Little and Regan 1987: 6). The KLMDDA was 
in effect until 1991 when the North Fly came back under the administration of the 
WPA and FRPG. The net result of the agreement was a legacy of the North Fly being 
under an OTML focussed governance structure and administered (in effect) by the 
mining company. The application of this agreement effectively stalled the development 
of the provincial government institutional structures in their infancy, leading to a 
dysfunctional government culture in the province during the 1980s and 1990s. The lack 
of capacity in the provincial government to carry out its own strategic and 
infrastructural plans to 2013 is testament to the wide reaching affects the KLMDDA 
had on the development of Western Province. However, it is hard to prove that the 
absence of the KLMDDA would have resulted in Western Province having more 
accountable or efficient public organisations.  
Construction and Operations  
Mine construction proved to be extremely challenging and problematic for OTML. 
Over the course of the 1980s, numerous catastrophes (natural and manufactured) 
caused a series of temporary closures and interruptions to operations. Unruly 
politicians, cost overruns, confrontational relationship with construction giant joint 
venture BechtelMKI, labour disputes, an unhelpful El Nino causing the Fly River to be 
impassable and a landslide prone topography – everything that could go wrong, did. 
However, by the end of the decade The Ok Tedi mine was the biggest contributor to 
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national government revenues in PNG after the abandonment and closure of the BCL 
Panguna mine in 1989. The local people’s hopes for development were firmly pinned 
on the development of the mine.  
A number of unfortunate and unavoidable events had the potential to make the 
mine completely unviable. The project’s construction began in June 1981, but 
immediately there were problems. The road contractor employed for the extension of 
the Kiunga-Ningerum road to Tabubil, Pivot (PNG) Pty Ltd, went into liquidation on 
27 June which meant delays as the road plant equipment was part of their assets 
(Jackson 1993: 9). The government had concerns about Pivot’s bid because it ‘reflected 
ignorance of the area’ (Pintz 1984: 137) considering they had quoted at K16,000 per 
kilometre but in reality the actual cost was double that figure (Jackson 1993: 170). This 
was the first in a long line of construction headaches that plagued the Ok Tedi mine’s 
construction. The Ok Menga Hydro project, which was to supply power for the overall 
project, ran into serious problems due to the structural issues with managing 
overburden and flooding, leading to it being dropped from the Stage I construction 
programme. This meant that until the hydro construction was re-started 1987, the 
project was reliant entirely on a diesel power plant and the Yuk Creek Mini Hydro, 
rather than the 53MW peak Ok Menga (Jackson 1993).  
Rainfall around the Ok Tedi mine site is approximately 10,000mm/year. In 
early July 1982, it was the absence of adequate rainfall that proved problematic for the 
construction of the mine. A strong El Niño event meant shipping was unable to proceed 
to Kiunga, due to low water levels especially at the Kawok Rock Bar. Without supplies 
of diesel, cement and other construction materials, the project was halted. The Kiunga-
Tabubil road benefitted from the dried out conditions enabling the first convoy to reach 
Tabubil mid-July.  
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The abandonment of the Ok Ma tailings site was the most serious and 
consequential decision. On January 7, 1984, a landslide of approximately 35 million 
cubic metres (Fookes and Dale 1992) affected the Ok Ma tailings dam foundations, 
burying them and the other equipment associated with it. This failure was the last straw 
in a long line of feasibility, cost, and capacity problems for the dam. The national 
government was not keen on the idea of changing or modifying the project to proceed 
without a tailings dam, as environmental impacts on the Ok Tedi and Fly River were at 
the centre of the concerns about the project from the start (Pintz 1984: 91–94). The 
project approval was contingent on many factors in the feasibility stage, but the tailings 
dam was non-negotiable (Jackson 1993: 25). Considering the environmental impasse 
after the landslide, the government had two options – stick to their guns about the 
tailings dam and delay the project or cancel it entirely (costing millions of kina in lost 
revenue), or proceed without a tailings dam (untold environmental impacts) – either 
way they would be blamed for the outcomes (Jackson 1993: 29). A catastrophic failure 
of the tailings dam in the future was an unacceptable risk for OTML and the national 
government. In the end, the national government, despite lengthy and loud 
disagreement, decided to permit OTML to proceed with the Interim Tailings Scheme  
(ITS). This scheme was to put tailings into the Ok Mani, which flows into the 
Ok Tedi. At the time, it was allowed because the impact of gold processing for Stage 1 
was predicted to be minimal, but OTML was prepared to close the mine after this rich 
capping was exhausted. The national government, wanting to extract a promise to 
progress to Stage 2 copper processing used the tailings dam as leverage, allowing the 
ITS to become the permanent tailings solution. This was formalised in the Mining (Ok 
Tedi Sixth Supplemental Agreement) Act (6SA) passed on the 28th February 1986. 
Cause 29 of the Principal Agreement was amended to add:  
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29.14 (a) Except for the Company’s obligations (i) with respect to the Chemical and 
Metal Levels referred to in paragraph (b) below, (ii) to pay the cost of the 
Environmental Study described below and referred to in Change Notice No. 32/4.3; 
14/29.2 delivered by the Company to the State on the 28 February 1986, and (iii) with 
respect to the disposition of tailings, with obligations are set forth in the Approved 
Proposals, including the maintenance of the existing interim tailings system or the 
application of any other appropriate manner of treating such tailings in compliance 
with the Approved Proposals, every capital spending obligation of the Company in 
respect of facilities to mitigate the impact of the Company’s operations on the Fly 
River below the confluence of the Ok Tedi and Fly River down to and including the 
delta of the Fly River (the “River System” , including without limitation, in respect of a 
permanent tailings facility and the northern waste dumps, a stable dump in accordance 
with the intent of the Approved Proposals as was in effect on 28 February 1986 (herein 
referred to as the “Northern Waste Dumps”) shall be suspended until 1 January 1990, 
provided the that the foregoing shall not limit the Company’s obligation to comply 
with Clause 29.15 [emphasis added]  
Throughout the modification to Clause 29, there is the establishment of the 
environmental regime that was supposed to enable the government and company to 
mitigate damaging downstream impacts of the lack of tailings and waste dumps. Clause 
29.15 enabled OTML to dump waste rock into the Harvey Creek and Taranaki waste 
dumps as long as the company ‘reasonably expects’ that there will not be more than 
100 million tonnes of eroded waste rock flowing into the Fly River from the Ok Tedi 
within a month.13 It was not just the tailings scheme that failed, the most important 
contributing factor to the environmental impacts between the mine site and the Ok 
Menga was the failed waste dumps. The Ok Mani valley is testament to the sheer 
volume of waste rock that the mine site has put into eroded waste dumps. As seen in 
13 This was an increase from the previously agreed and negotiated limit of 60 million tonnes in Clause 3.1 of the 
Approval of Proposal 1980.  
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Plate 2.1 in the Appendix I the Ok Mani valley does not look like a conventional 
highland river valley anymore. The Ok Mani was always identified as a tributary that 
would receive significant amounts of waste rock, with Jackson indicating that the Ok 
Mani might take on the appearance of the Jaba River in Bougainville (Jackson 
1982a:130).  
The changes to the facilities to manage tailings and waste rock in the 6SA are 
the most serious and far reaching of the Ok Tedi mine institution’s influence on 
decision-making and outcomes. All the decisions of the stakeholders involved in the 
legislation were enabled by the nature of the mine. The same tailings regime would 
never be given to any other mine subsequently14, but for The Ok Tedi mine it was 
within the scope of their special legislative state that they could do it. It did not make it 
the right thing to do for the mining company, the state, or the downstream 
communities. All would suffer the consequences and fallout of the fateful legislative 
changes in the 6SA.  
The first indication that the downstream effects of the mine would be more 
significant than initially intended came when the Vancouver Ridge collapsed on August 
22, 1989, undermining the toe of the Taranaki waste dump. This sent 170m tonnes of 
rock, equivalent to 85% of the waste rock dumped between 1985 and 2000, into the Ok 
Tedi headwaters, significantly increasing the already felt impacts mine wastes were 
having on downstream communities (Kirsch 1991 Pickup and Marshall 2009). In notes 
from OTML, a tailings lease to cover the whole of the Ok Tedi was considered before 
the commencement of garden compensation and legal proceedings (Ransley 2006b) but 
was never progressed.  
14 BCL was allowed to operate without an adequate tailing solution. It has been speculated by that the tailings and 
waste rock situation at Panguna was a contributing factor to the communities discontent with BCL and subsequent 
hostilities leading to mine abandonment (Solomon 2011). Satellite photos reveal delta shaped land-growth created 
in Emperor Augustus Bay on the western side of Bougainville, and it is the result of residual tailings and waste 
rock deposition over the last 30 years (Banks et al 2005).  
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The Lower Ok Tedi Fly River Development Trust  
The Lower Ok Tedi Fly River Development Trust (FRDT) was initiated in January 
1990, with K2.5million in funds, indexed annually to a maximum of 5 percent, for 
community development projects to address development challenges facing people in 
the Ok-Fly River system. The FRDT was the first of the development organisations of 
the Ok Tedi Mining Complex and provided a testing ground for projects. Although the 
FRDT was established under an agreement between the national government after the 
passing of the Mining (Ok Tedi Seventh Supplemental Agreement) Act 1986, it was 
entirely run by OTML, who provided less than adequate follow up for projects, The 
FRDT covered 103 villages along the river system (see Table 2.1 in Appendix III), 
which contained about 30,000 people at the time (Filer 1997a:70–3). The FRDT was an 
important step in recognising the social impacts of the mine on the locals and 
addressing them with development projects.  
In terms of sustainable development, many of the community projects required 
ongoing support and maintenance, but there was not the post-implementation follow up 
required. Projects identified by OTML for implementation were often water and 
sanitation projects like water tanks and wells, village development projects such as 
community halls, and other small-scale development projects mentioned in the Ok Fly 
Social Monitoring Project Reports (Burton 1993a; 1993b). Many of these projects were 
deemed by the communities to be not well implemented, inappropriate, and unsolicited 
(Burton 1991, Burton 1993a, Lawrence 1995). When on fieldwork in the villages of 
Wogam, Bumbin, and Wurimkanatgo, I observed old FRDT projects. They were in a 
state of disrepair. The lack of follow up and maintenance on existing projects over the 
life of the FRDT meant that the majority of funds did not produce sustainable 
development for the people they were designed to service. The FRDT was formally 
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ended when the Ninth Supplemental Agreement was passed in 2001 (Banks 2002; 
Michael Namalok pers. comm. 2010).  
Signing of MOA – landowner equity and royalties  
Resulting from the 1988 National Premiers Council and subsequent Namaliu 
government mineral policy reform debates, the Development Forum process became 
part of the national government’s policies for community involvement in 1988 
(McGavin 1993; Filer and Imbun 2009). Ok Tedi in 1990 went through the process of 
negotiating a Memorandum of Agreement for the distribution of royalties between the 
FRPG and the SML landowners from Atemkit, Bultem, Finalbin, Kavorabip, as well as 
the LMP landowners from Wangbin and Migalsim. This established the codified 
relationship between the institution of the landowners and the national and provincial 
governments through the split of royalties. The issues raised by academics have 
surrounded the legitimacy of development forum agreements that are selectively 
enforced, as ‘signing of the agreement is done by clan or tribal leaders who are illiterate 
elderly men who do not even speak English, let alone other official Papua New 
Guinean languages, Pidgin and Hiri Motu’ who sign by using ‘a thumb imprint or the 
making of the “X” on the paper using a pen’ without consideration or understanding of 
the obligations and responsibilities of the agreement (Kawi and Golman 2001: 144). 
This argument does not give sufficient credit to the sophisticated negotiation tactics 
and conceptual understanding that the Ok Tedi mine area landowners have, as at the 
point of the 1991 MOA the landowners had ten years of experience engaging with 
OTML. The landowners were just as likely not to fulfil the undertakings of the MOA 
as the national government, as there were other factors that hampered the expeditious 
implementation of agreed plans and promises. The funding arrangement will be more 
fully explored in Chapter 5, but it is worth noting the importance of it historically as the 
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first acknowledgement of the rights of the communities in the mine’s province to a 
larger share of the benefit streams of Ok Tedi mine into the future.  
2.5 1991 – 1995 Downstream Impacts  
One of the main aspects of The Ok Tedi mine is its impact on the communities 
downstream. The failed waste dumps and tailings increased the amount of sediment in 
the river significantly, increasing overbank flooding and causing dieback in sago 
swamps, especially in the lower Ok Tedi and Middle Fly. A growing body of research 
(Kreye and Castell 1991; Kirsch 1991; Rosenbaum and Krockenberger 1993) argued 
there were significant downstream impacts. The impacted communities and 
environmental NGOs stated the case against OTML at the International Water Tribunal 
(1992) and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro (1992) to highlight the environmental and social impacts of the mine.  
OTML took many years to recognise and compensate the communities for the 
downstream impacts. A significant contributor to this change in OTML was the 1990s 
court case in the Victorian Supreme Court in Australia. The campaign against BHP 
over environmental damages and compensation was fronted by two Yonggom men 
from the Lower Ok Tedi area Alex Maun of Ieran village, Rex Dagi of Iogi village, and 
a man from the South Fly Gabia Gagarimabu of Severimabu village. In the court of 
public opinion, the Ok Tedi litigants won hands down, recasting BHP from ‘The Big 
Australian’ to ‘The Big Polluter’. The substance of that litigation is better covered in 
the literature from Stuart Kirsch (1996; 1999; 2000; 2002; 2007a, 2007b, 2014), Low 
and Gleeson (1998), Kalinoe and Kuwimb (1997), Banks and Ballard (1997), Gordon 
(1995), and Imhof (1996).A critical difference between the perception of the motivation 
behind the litigation between Kirsch and others (King 1997; Banks 2002a), Jackson  
(2003), highlights the economically peripheral place that the Yonggom people of the  
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Lower Ok Tedi hold in terms of development in the North Fly. Jackson (2003: 5). 
states:  
The problems for the Yonggom, in this respect, were two-fold: First that OTML 
activities did not increase the potential for the Yonggom to participate in the new 
economy using their own land; and second that OTML did do damage to that land and 
thus its potential for subsistence production. While OTML’s presence could be taken 
advantage of through migration by those who had skills and labour to sell, those who 
remained in the villages were disadvantaged by their distance from markets compared 
to others in the region. Well before any sedimentation occurred, it was evident that the 
Yonggom on the west bank of the Ok Tedi would have difficulty participating in the 
new economy. But then their position was made all the more unbearable by 
sedimentation and die back.  
The communities were justified in seeking compensation for environmental 
damage, but the essential basis of their claim was that the environment is economic – as 
there are no other resources for the people to draw on for livelihood. Approaching the 
court case in this way, it becomes apparent that communities believed it important that 
they were involved in the economic and social development that the other communities 
closer to the mine participate in. The FRDT was clearly not bringing enough 
development opportunities.  
The impact of the litigation on the OTMC was that it changed the corporate 
community nexus. OTML CR manager Yaru Pohei acknowledged there was a 
significant change in the way OTML interacted with communities after the court case, 
from the basic environmental and community relations officer level up to management 
(pers. comm. 2010). The impact on OTML and the national government can be seen in 
their attempt to have the Eighth Supplemental Agreement (8SA) passed, for which they 
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were found in contempt of court15. The alleged unconstitutional collusion (Kirsch 
2014:97–98) between BHP and the national government in drafting the Eighth 
Supplemental Agreement, comes down to the role of the national government in the 
OTMC. It is a three role relationship as regulator, tax beneficiary, and equity 
participant (Pintz 1984) and the source of many of the conflicts of interest.  
2.6 1995 – 2001 RESA and LOTA  
Restated Eighth Supplemental Agreement  
The Mining (Ok Tedi Restated Eighth Supplemental Agreement) Act 1995 (RESA) 
was the result of the backlash against the original 8SA. The 8SA contained provisions 
that would have made it illegal and subject to prosecution to pursue or assist in the 
litigation in foreign courts of compensation, but this was removed from the RESA and 
passed as the Compensation (Prohibition of Foreign Legal Proceedings) Act of 1995. 
The RESA provided a K110m package to the downstream communities on the proviso 
that they withdraw from the litigation. The communities covered by RESA are 120 
villages along the Ok-Fly River system (see Table 2.2 in Appendix III), and have a 
population over 60,000. The communities opted into the RESA compensation package 
because there was no guarantee that they would win the legal action, Kirsch asserts this 
was ‘deceptive… because the agreement stipulated that compensation payments could 
be reduced or eliminated altogether to pay for any additional expenditure on tailings 
containment…’ (Kirsch 2007:30). The reality was that the company paid out 
compensation according to their undertakings in the RESA, without any sequestering.  
In 1997, OTML’s shareholder structure was 20 percent Inmet, BHP 60 percent 
and State of PNG 20 percent16.  
15 Subsequently overturned.  
16 Amoco had left the consortium and the RESA removed any enduring liabilities.  
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Figure 3.1 – Ok Tedi Mining Limited shareholding 1997 (OTML 2013)  
In 1998, pursuant to Clause 5 of the RESA modification to Clause 11, Inmet 
Mining and BHP gave the State 2 percent and 8 percent respectively to contribute to 
community ownership17. This was to be held by the Mineral Resources Development 
Company (MRDC) on behalf of the people of Western Province through its subsidiary 
Mineral Resources Ok Tedi No.2 Ltd (MROT#2).  
  
Figure 3.2 – Ok Tedi Mining Limited shareholding 1998 (OTML 2013)  
Lower Ok Tedi Agreement  
The out of court settlement would come on the 7 June 1996 with the signing of the 
Heads of Agreement between a number of complainants (Maun, Dagi etc.) and the 
companies (OTML, BHP). The LOTA was enacted on the 9th May 1997 between 
OTML and 15 lower Ok Tedi communities. The communities involved in the LOTA 
were: Ambaga, Atkamba, Bige, Bongobun, Demasuke, Dome, Ieran, Iogi, Kawok, 
Komopkin, Konkonda, Kwiape, Miamrae, Sarae, Senamrae. The substance of this 
agreement is K40m extra compensation for the communities of the lower Ok Tedi, and 
that a trust was being set up to manage the development funds that were part of the 
settlement. In return for the extra compensation and trust mechanism: ‘The 
17 Kirsch (2007) incorrectly attributes the equity requirement to the out of court settlement agreement.  
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Communities generally shall not disrupt, interrupt or obstruct the operations of the Ok 
Tedi mine, including without limitation, the tailings and waste mitigation scheme in the 
area of the Lower Ok Tedi, at any time during the life of the mine’ (Clause 7.3). This 
commitment was in addition to agreeing to pursue consultation with company, 
provincial and national governments ‘should any issue arise between the Communities 
and the Company’ (Clause 7.2) and recognising ‘the benefit of the mine to local 
communities, Western Province and Papua New Guinea’ (Clause 7.1). Although this 
bound the communities legally, it did not stop them from being in conflict with OTML.  
The LOTA can be seen as a basis for the CMCA trusts that would come 
subsequently. The Alice River Trust (ART) was the first of the community engaged 
trust mechanisms. The FRDT was always a ‘top down’ development tool, whereas the 
ART was intended to have significant input from the communities it covered.  
OTML committed to investigating a Mine Waste Management Project, despite 
the comments from community members in the lower Ok Tedi against dredging and 
pipelines (Kirsch 2007). The dredge project started in 1998. A sediment storage facility 
was established at Bige and Dome, with stored sediments stabilised and revegetated 
(Butler et al 2012). The dredge removed a significant amount of sediment from the 
Lower Ok Tedi, reducing riverbed aggradation and suspended sediments further south 
in the Middle Fly. Butler et al (2012: 624) report that ‘Dredging has improved physical 
aspects in the Lower Ok Tedi and the Fly River, and has resulted in dieback recovery in 
the Lower Ok Tedi and fish habitat recovery in the vicinity of D’Albertis Junction’. 
BHP changed significantly its stance on The Ok Tedi mine. It went from being a core 
part of its international portfolio, to being a millstone around the company’s neck. In 
1999 the World Bank produced an environmental risk assessment of the Mine Waste 
Management Project, which produced a less than favourable assessment of the 
downstream impacts regardless of which option was chosen (ranging from doing 
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nothing to immediate mine closure) (Klaus to Morauta 2000). BHP managing director 
and chief executive officer Paul Anderson stated in 1999 ''With the benefit of these 
reports18 and 20/20 hindsight, the mine is not compatible with our environmental 
values and the company should never have become involved'' (Burton 1999).  
2.7 2001 – 2006/7 Ninth Supplemental Agreement  
When BHP decided it was to withdraw from the majority shareholding in OTML, the 
government and OTML were faced with the possibility of closure. The period 2001 to 
2007 is a period of increasingly consultative approaches for the OTMC, when some of 
the most interesting recent developments contributing to the mine closure and 
sustainability planning of the Ok Tedi mine occurred. The single most important aspect 
of the period is the Mining (Ok Tedi Mine Continuation (Ninth Supplemental) 
Agreement) Act 2001 (9SA). The agreement has four key components:  
• Community Mine Continuation Agreements  
• PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd.  
• Ok Tedi Development Foundation  
• Mine Closure and Decommissioning Code  
Community Mine Continuation Agreements  
The Community Mine Continuation Agreements (CMCA) were established in 2001 in 
the 9SA. The CMCAs are legally binding under two schedules of the 9SA. The first 
schedule of the 9SA is the Mine Continuation Agreement (MCA) and the second 
schedule is the CMCA. The CMCA is a social licence to mine, as it is based upon the 
premise that the communities impacted by the Ok Tedi mine should have a say in 
whether it should continue to operate. Social licence to mine is a relatively new 
approach, with ‘stakeholders demanding that companies align themselves more closely 
18 Human Health and Ecologial Risk Assessment and World Bank Tailings Reports.  
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with the tenets of sustainable development, of which increased community 
participation in decision-making is a central goal’ (Prno and Slocombe 2012). OTMC 
was an early adopter of the social licence to mine, as it was part of the exit strategy of 
BHP Billiton. This process essentially was about the communities agreeing that mine 
closure would not be in their best interests. By engaging the communities and leaders 
in a process where they were informed of the options and then given the opportunity to 
sign on to continue the mining project, it became one of the first mines in the world to 
facilitate community involvement in the decision making process.  
The CMCA constitutes agreement from eight regions: Nupmo, Tutuwe, Wai 
Tri, Middle Fly, Suki Fly Gogo, Dudi, Manawete and Kiwaba, and the six mine 
villages Atemkit, Bultem, Finalbin, Kavorabip, Migalsim and Wangbin. Originally, the 
four South Fly regions signed the CMCA as one group. These communities cover 156 
villages and over 100,000 people in Western Province (see chapter 3 for extended 
discussion of the CMCA trust regions). The MCA and CMCA afforded indemnity 
against future environmental litigation, as the CMCAs were meant to be the final word 
on environmental compensation. Clause 4.4 states ‘The Community Mine Continuation 
Agreements represent the final and binding agreement between the parties thereto on 
compensation and benefits payable to such of them as are affected by the Project’ and 
Section 5 states:  
(1) Subject to subsection (3) neither the State nor any Government 
Agency may take, pursue, or in any way support Proceedings against a BHP Billiton 
Party in respect of an Environmental Claim relating to the operation of the Project.  
(2) This section may be pleaded by a BHP Billiton Party as an absolute 
bar and defence to any Proceedings taken by the State or a Government Agency in  
breach of its terms  
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This meant that the communities had to negotiate based on the fact this was 
the only compensation they were going to get for downstream effects (in addition to the 
RESA funds already given).  
The CMCA process started in July 1999 with the first round of community 
consultation awareness conducted by OTML from the Mine Area to the Middle Fly 
(Kalinoe 2008). This consultation was informed by the Human Health and Ecological 
Risk Assessment studies carried out between 1997 and 1999 on the downstream 
impacts of the mine. There were numerous rounds of community consultation about the 
mine continuation, with emphasis on the environment, community development, and 
negotiation process. Patrols were conducted at different times for different things in 
different regions. At the time when the compensation negotiations with the Nupmo and 
Tutuwe regions, the South Fly regions were still being consulted about signing the 
Heads of Agreement, which the Nupmo and Tutuwe regions had signed 5 months prior 
(OTML n.d.: 2). This ad hoc approach is attributed to the reality that the CMCA was an 
innovative exercise in informed consent, on a much larger scale than any mining 
company in PNG had conducted before. Managing community patrols, consultation 
and negotiation in the 146 villages and 6 regions was challenging for the company, the 
government, and OTML had no guide as to how to organise the process.  
Kalinoe (2008) and Kirsch (2007) raised concerns about the actual legitimacy 
of OTML’s claim of informed consent. The community members canvassed stated that 
there was not enough time to discuss the content of the CMCAs, nor did they feel that 
the national government or OTML adequately listened to the communities. None of the 
regions except the Middle Fly were given the draft CMCA for lawyers to see, and 
when the lawyers proposed changes to the CMCA they were told it was not possible 
and the only part for negotiation was the schedule about compensation packages 
(Kalinoe 2008: 34). This constitutes a lack of full disclosure, meaning that the 
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communities went into the CMCA negotiations blind, and with little ability to exercise 
informed consent. This lack of transparency was coupled with the CMCAs recognising 
anyone who purported to represent their community:  
Section 8 (1) The signature or other execution of a Community Mine Continuation 
Agreement by a person representing or purporting to represent a Community or clan, 
or that person’s delegate, binds all of the members of that Community or clan to that 
Community Mine Continuation Agreement notwithstanding –  
a) That there is no express authority for that person to sign or execute the 
Community Mine Continuation Agreement on behalf of the members of the 
Community or clan; or  
b) That not all representatives of the relevant Community or clan have signed or 
otherwise executed the Community Mine Continuation Agreement;  
c) That not all members of the Community are parties to the Community Mine 
Continuation Agreement; or  
d) Any requirement of the Underlying Law  
Kirsch (2014) claims that the majority of communities were divided about the 
CMCA, and that many of the people who claimed to be representatives and signed the 
CMCAs became persona non grata in their communities. There were no proper 
elections of representatives, so this is possible, and the fact that community members 
did not see the substantive CMCAs before negotiating rendered 8.1(a) redundant, as no 
person purporting to represent a community would upon seeing this clause withdraw 
from signing. The problematic CMCA clauses continue with the next clause (8.2) 
stating that the signature  
…binds each person on behalf of whom that person purports to be acting, and where a 
person purports to be acting on behalf of the whole of that person’s Community or 
clan, that person’s acts and deeds bind each existing and future member of that 
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person’s Community or clan, including, without limitation, children and persons who 
are subsequently born into, or who subsequently join, that Community or clan.  
Binding communities in perpetuity to agreements that are signed by people 
who were potentially not elected or supported as representatives of the communities 
they purported to represent was a considerable downside for the CMCAs. There was 
not enough transparency and accountability in this regard.  
The CMCA was not just about gaining consent, it was also about 
compensation. The communities and OTML negotiated compensation packages at the 
commencement of the process, with the standard operating procedure for communities 
being to ask for tens or hundreds of millions of kina, and OTML stating that was not 
within their budget and offering a vastly lower sum. An example of this was the 
Tutuwe (Highway) community negotiating their package. OTML started with an offer 
of K7.5m and Highway communities responded asking for K50m on 18th May 2001, 
with the final agreed compensation being K15.3m after five rounds of negotiation on 
5th October 2001 (OTML n.d.) The total compensation package in the 2001 CMCAs 
across all CMCA regions was K176m (OTML 2005d). The scale of the compensation 
agreement was larger than the previous RESA compensation, but complemented rather 
than replaced it. At the same time as the CMCA was conducted, Slater and Gordon19 
brought a class action on behalf of the communities in the Lower Ok Tedi and Middle 
Fly charging that BHP had not fulfilled its commitments from the 1996 settlement, and 
that the CMCA was not legitimate. The documentary Colour Change, released in 2012 
by Amanda King and Fabio Cavadini of the Australian based Frontyard Films, details 
some of the complaints community members had, and demonstrates how communities 
were even through the CMCA process convinced that BHP and OTML were short 
changing them by tricking them into signing onto the CMCA when Slater and Gordon 
19 Rex Dagi registered a writ on 11th April 2000 in the Victorian Supreme Court.  
52 
 
                                                 
said it was not in their interests. The documentary shows evocative scenes of people 
shouting about wanting the court case to go ahead, but never actually engages with the 
other side of the story – never talks to any senior representatives of OTML or BHP 
about the content of their compensation package – merely allowing the communities’ 
claims that it is inadequate to be the unchallenged truth. The harm that the tailings had 
done to the river is undeniable; however, the method of cherry-picking environmental 
facts and framing OTML as a universally bad organisation with no care for the 
communities is not constructive criticism. Colour Change also fails to mention the 
Bige dredge site, the Mine Waste Tailings Project, the CMCA Review, or the two 
development organisations that the 9SA established. The court case eventually was 
withdrawn because of a lack of plaintiffs, as the vast majority of villages in the impact 
regions signed onto the CMCA.  
While there were many things about the CMCA process that were less than 
fair or transparent, OTML conducted wide consultation and awareness, involving and 
listening to the communities in a new way. Improvements to the methods of 
consultation were needed, and the reviews by independent observers involved in the 
process informed OTML’s future consultation practises for the CMCA Review. The 
CMCA process signalled a change in OTMC to include the communities, however 
marginally, in decision-making, rather than exclude them completely.  
PNG Sustainable Development Program Limited  
BHP-Billiton’s desire to exit The Ok Tedi mine necessitated that it divest itself of its 
52% stake in OTML. This was facilitated by the establishment of a development 
company to take BHP’s 52 percent equity in OTML to use for the current development 
of Western Province and PNG and the future financing and support of Western 
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Province post-mine closure. Figure 3.3 shows the equity participation in OTML that 
resulted from the 9SA.  
  
Figure 3.3 – OTML ownership 2002 (OTML 2013)  
PNG Sustainable Development Program Limited (PNGSDP) was formed to 
indemnify BHP Billiton from any further litigation over environmental concerns, so the 
52 percent shareholding was transferred in 2002. PNGSDP featured a technocratic 
workforce, made up of former government bureaucrats and international advisors. BHP 
retained rights to appoint the chairperson and the members of the board. Australian 
Ross Garnaut was appointed chairman from 2002 till he resigned in 2012. PNGSDP, up 
to September 2013, allocated funds based on: a one-third development fund, of which 
one-third is used for the development of Western Province, with the remaining two 
thirds for development projects in the rest of PNG; and the two-thirds Long Term Fund 
which is invested and to be spent after The Ok Tedi mine closure (PNGSDP 2011). As 
of 2010, the Long Term Fund had USD1 billion of funds. This is projected to grow 
substantially by 2024 (if closure is then). PNGSDP funded a myriad of development 
projects throughout Western Province, much of the time in Non-CMCA areas, such as 
the Morehead region, as the projects in the CMCA regions are usually funded through 
the CMCA trust system. PNGSDP and OTML have a common Board Chairman, 
Professor Ross Garnaut until 2012. Sir Mekere Morauta took over as chairman in 2012.  
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Ok Tedi Development Foundation  
Ok Tedi Development Foundation was established through Schedule 1 Clause 6 of the 
9SA. The idea for a development vehicle to continue delivering OTML’s 
socioeconomic programs beyond closure to the mine impact areas was originally 
proposed in July 1999 (OTML 2007: 5). The organisation was originally a part of the 
OTML Community and Business Support – Regional Development Department and 
managed by David Wissink. OTDF was seen by some within PNGSDP and OTML as 
more of a public relations arm of OTML than a development organisation. Its role was 
to oversee the use of CMCA trust funds and encourage economic development in the 
trust regions. OTDF was responsible for administering the CMCA trust development 
projects that are nominated by the Village Planning Committees. It seeks counter 
funding and support from PNGSDP and other international development agencies such 
as Japan International Cooperation Agency and Australian International Centre for 
Agricultural Research. By becoming independent of OTML, OTDF became more 
community development oriented than when it was a department of OTML. By 
handing over the responsibilities for agricultural and other community development to 
OTDF, OTML’s focus on core community relations responsibilities, such as 
negotiations, meetings, and payments was enabled.  
Mine Closure and Decommissioning Code  
The Ok Tedi Mine Closure and Decommissioning Code 2001 (MCDC) set up the 
regulatory framework for the mine closure planning. This will be explained fully in 
Chapter Six.  
2.8 2006/7 – 2012 CMCA review, ‘New Era’.  
The developments of the Post-CMCA review and New Era focussed heavily on 
developing a better mine closure strategy for The Ok Tedi mine. The relationship 
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between PNGSDP and OTML strengthened, and the spin out of OTDF as a separate 
zero tax entity enabled it to exercise autonomy. The exit of Inmet as a shareholder in 
2011 due to concerns about mine life extension (MLE) was a significant change to the 
ownership of OTML and the post Inmet time is referred to by OTML as the ‘New Era’.  
CMCA Review  
By 2005 it was recognised that there had been significantly more environmental impact 
than originally stated under the CMCA. In particular, the emergence of acid rock 
drainage as an environmental issue meant the downstream communities’ expectations 
of environmental impacts were exceeded (Adler, Brewer and McGee 2007:5). The 
CMCAs state in Clause 27 ‘To the extent that the environmental effects of the 
continuing operation of the mine exceed the Environmental predictions, the parties 
shall meet to discuss revision of the payments under Clauses (17) and (18), taking into 
account the environmental effects in excess of those contemplated in the environmental 
predictions’ The CMCA Clause 21 relating to the review of the agreement states that 
‘Subject to this Agreement, the parties may after the expiration of five years from the 
Termination Date, meet to review the operation of this agreement’. The way that the 
CMCA review was conducted was very different to the original CMCA. OTML 
removed itself from the centre of the consultations – instead, they hired independent 
facilitators Tanorama and The Keystone Centre. This was dubbed ‘A New Way 
Forward’, and had as its symbol a set of steps, illustrating the process the stakeholders 
and communities would go through to achieve informed consensus.  
The core of this change was the shift from a ‘divide and rule’ strategy, 
whereby OTML previously had engaged with select few villages and leaders, as seen 
by the low figure of 50 meetings for the 2001 CMCA (Lagisa 2007). The CMCA 
Review had at its core the CMCA Working Group, a democratically-elected forum for 
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dialogue, negotiation and decision-making made up representatives from the 8 regions 
and 6 mine villages, OTML, PNGSDP, FRPG, WPA, women and youth, church and 
environmental non-government organisations (Sharp and Offor 2008). Each village 
selected representatives, who in turn voted for regional representatives. The system led 
to a three-tier engagement – village-regional-working group. This was intended to be a 
feedback whereby discussions at the Working Group level were transmitted down to 
villages, and villager concerns were transmitted up by village and regional leaders. The 
inclusion of women was notable as they had not been included in the original CMCA 
process. The process was guided by principles of ‘integrity, respect, transparency, 
responsiveness, equity, adequacy of information, fairness, timeliness, and participation’ 
(OTML 2005c: 12). The process was also subject to accountability, as there were 
procedures set up in order to faithfully record the complaints, comments, and other 
details of each meeting for review (OTML 2005c).  
The process took from February 2006 to June 2007. The CMCA review 
brought up many different problems the communities believed were essential to better 
implement the promises of the CMCA. During the 2006/7 CMCA review the package 
was increased to K1.1bn to be distributed to the different trusts. Women were included 
more in the CMCA negotiation process, and the outcome was a 10 percent Women and 
Children’s fund included in the CMCA updated package (Offor and Sharp 2008).  
One of the significant parts of the CMCA review was the mine impacted 
community’s desire for OTDF to be made independent from OTML. The process of 
creating the independent OTDF and devolving responsibilities to the new trading 
entity, Ok Tedi Fly River Development Program (OTFRDP), was a process that took 
three years from the CMCA review to final implementation in June 2010. OTDF has 
four shares, and is managed by CEO Ian Middleton. OTDF manages the CMCA trusts 
on behalf of the CMCA communities, and OTFRDP is the operations side, dealing 
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directly with communities and contractors to implement sustainable development 
projects. OTFRDP took over OTML functions that were not core business and that 
OTML did not want to be involved in directly anymore, such as Tax Credit Scheme 
project implementation (which will be explained further in chapter 5). The changed 
status to a zero tax entity with an independent operational structure from OTML has 
facilitated a different corporate culture within OTDF and OTFRDP. OTML and OTDF 
work in concert, but there are significant differences in the way that OTML and OTDF 
relate to the communities. OTML is seen by some within OTFRDP as just ‘coming to 
the communities once or twice a year and handing out money’ (OTFRDP officer pers. 
comm. 2010), whereas OTFRDP spends extensive amounts of time doing development 
extension work and facilitating the basic desires of communities.  
The Mine Waste Tailings Project was started in 2007 as a result of the 
increasing level of acid rock drainage forming pyrite in the skarns of Mt Fubilan, which 
exceeded the environmental predictions of the original CMCAs. The project involved 
removing pyrite from tailings and piping it down to Bige to manage and store to 
prevent acidification of the Ok Tedi. (Butler et al 2012).  
Inmet Withdrawal, ‘New Era’  
The Inmet Mining Corporation was a Canadian mining corporation that produced 
copper, zinc and gold. It was originally the Metall Mining Group, part of the German 
Consortium. The company was known for (until 2011) holding an 18 percent stake in 
the Ok Tedi mine. Due to its opposition to OTML’s plans to extend the life of the mine 
due to pressure from Canadian anti-mining advocacy groups (Carrère and Holtby 
2011), Inmet decided to divest from OTML. Initially, Inmet traded its shareholding for 
a 5 percent net smelter return royalty in 2009, but in 2010 decided to sell back the 
royalty to OTML for US$335m in January 2011, OTML then cancelled Inmet’s block 
of shares according to the Notice of Redemption and Acquisition of Shares by 
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Company on 28 January 2011 (Registrar Companies PNG 2011). This made PNGSDP 
a 63.4 percent shareholder with the State of PNG holding 36.6 percent, of which 
MROT#2 held 12.2 percent (PNGSDP 2012).  
  
Figure 3.4 – OTML equity participants in 2011 (OTML 2013)  
Mine Life Extension  
In 2009, OTML decided to pursue Plan D, a program to examine the feasibility of 
extending the mine life. Plan D was essentially the pre-feasibility for extending the 
mine life. This process meant engaging with stakeholders in the mine and gauging 
support for continued operation beyond the 2013 closure. As cited earlier, Inmet was 
not interested in mining beyond 2013 and opted out. The other shareholders, State of 
PNG and PNGSDP, saw the benefits that extending the life of the mine could bring – 
from staged closure to more minerals. The economic conditions were extremely 
favourable for copper and gold, so a program of Mine Life Extension (MLE) feasibility 
was undertaken. This involved a significant amount of engineering, environmental and 
community consultation in order to extend the working life of the mine by up to 12 
years. The basis for OTML’s MLE proposal was:  
• Smaller mine  
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• Less revenue (60%)  
• High cost  
• Stable waste dump is technically possible  
• Low environmental impacts with stable waste dump compared to 
closure in 2013  
The initial community consultation started in February–March 2009 with 
village patrols to 156 villages in the CMCA. The communities were updated about the 
mine closure planning, and it was reported that:  
…an over whelming majority (90 percent) of the villages did not want the mine to 
close. Their reaction was that ‘it was too late for the mine to close and it should keep 
going. There was too much impact already and they need the compensation to survive 
and there was not too many other alternatives’ It could be seen as communities 
wanting to enjoy the improved package for a longer period (OTML 2009g: 3).  
The initial Plan D patrols were conducted in June–July 2009. In Nupmo Trust 
region, for example, there was generally positive reaction to the prospect of extending 
the mine life, but people wanted it to be a new agreement, not an extension of the 
existing CMCA (OTML 2009h: 14). The reception of the communities in the Plan D 
consultations meant that OTML was confident it could move towards a more formal 
consultation process, called the Community Mine Continuation Consent Process 
(CMCC). The process was guided by principles in order to assure that OTML’s 
charter20 was respected. These principles were the same as the CMCA review: 
‘integrity, respect, transparency, responsiveness, equity, adequacy of information, 
fairness, timeliness, and participation’ (OTML 2009g).  
20 OTML’s charter was “Shared Purpose, Shared Goals, Shared Values and Shared  
Success” (OTML 2006: i)  
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The MLE process was subtitled ‘A Genuine Opportunity’. The process 
involved a different method of community engagement to the previous CMCA 
negotiations. The communities were asked to elect representatives, alternates, and 
women’s representatives for the three-tier community consultation process. The 
election of representatives and their alternates was in August 2009 via a formal process 
at village meetings and were confirmed by OTML. The use of newly elected 
representatives rather than relying on the already elected Village Planning or Ward 
Development committee members reflected a belief within OTML that they could not 
rely on existing political structures to effectively disseminate information about MLE. 
However, in many cases, the existing elected committee officials were put forward as 
MLE representatives (especially in the Mine Area Villages). The negotiations and 
decisions were made at the regional level rather than the delegate level, a change from 
the previous CMCA Review. This ensured that every village had representation in the 
negotiation.  
The communities were briefed on the most up to date information through 
delegates, regional and village meetings. The delegates meetings had three regional 
representatives, plus women’s’ representatives, from each CMCA trust region. The 
delegates meetings generally were held over two days in Tabubil, with stakeholder 
representatives from OTML, PNGSDP, OTDF, FRPG, WPA, national government 
departments of Treasury, Finance, National Planning, Mineral Resources Authority, 
and Mineral Policy and Geohazard Management. I attended the delegates’ meeting in 
March 30/31 2011. The meeting list of who attended can be seen in Appendix IV. The 
village meetings were conducted across all of the CMCA villages. The first round of 
official MLE village meetings were conducted in May 2010, and the final round, prior 
to negotiations, in February–March 2012. The villages were informed of the MLE 
feasibility progress through Komuniti Nius newsletters from OTML that were handed 
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out and explained, presentations by OTML CR officers and other stakeholders, such as 
PNGSDP or OTDF. The village meetings were conducted in Tok Pisin, English, Hiri 
Motu and tok ples where there were available translators21 The village meetings took 
between two and three hours to conduct. The first 30 minutes were where the facilitator 
ran through the previous meetings, the rules of the MLE meetings, and future plans for 
meetings, then the OTML CR officers talked about the content of the Komuniti Nius 
newsletter and any other relevant developments since the last contact with 
communities. This could take anywhere up to an hour. This was followed by a question 
and answer session whereby community members stood up and asked OTML, 
PNGSDP, or the facilitators for clarification, pointed questions about development, or 
made comment about the process. This was followed by the facilitator reading out the 
minutes taken paraphrasing the questions and comments community members made for 
the record for everyone to agree on.  
External observers were engaged to assess the MLE community consultation 
process. The external observers changed over the course of the MLE consultation 
process. John Kawi, Dr Beno Boeha, and Ila Geno were all at times external observers, 
who through their respective distinguished careers were well placed to give reports on 
the transparency and procedures of the community mine continuation consultation 
process. Some comments and recommendations for the CMCC process were that the 
communities should be given access to information so they can come to the meetings 
well prepared (Boeha and Geno 2011: 31), however the logistical challenge of 
delivering materials to every single village before the respective meetings was 
immense. External facilitators were engaged to enable the process to go smoothly and 
adhere to the CMCC’s principles, with every person’s opinion given adequate time to 
21 For the VM3 meetings in Nupmo Trust area Lalamana Gaegae, the Walawam village representative, accompanied 
the OTML officers to translate to Ningerum. Joe Boikoun, OTML CR officer from Ningerum Station assisted with 
translation to Awin at Ningerum Tamaro.  
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be expressed and responses formulated by stakeholders. Tanorama, the organisation 
that had supported during the 2006/7 CMCA review, facilitated the CMCC process 
with experienced and well respected facilitators Martin Brash and Kori Maraga leading 
sessions.  
At the conclusion of the consultation process, negotiations were made at the 
regional meetings in Tabubil as Community Mine Continuation Extension Agreements 
(CMCEA) between OTML and each of the eight CMCA regional trusts and the six 
mine villages. This negotiation was finalised in December 2012. The representatives 
from six trust regions decided on expanding the Women and Children’s component of 
the CMCEA regional benefit package up from the existing CMCA amount of 10 
percent, but varied in total amount between trusts up to a maximum of 18.24 percent of 
the total benefit package (Popotai and Ofasu-Amaah 2013: 19). In 2014, the CMCEA 
and MLE was formalised as a supplemental agreement, the Mining (Ok Tedi Mine 
Extension (Eleventh Supplemental) Agreement) Act 2014.  
One criticism of the process is that the independent environmental advisor, Dr 
Jerry Tamate, used the same terms of reference to assess OTML’s environmental study 
as the environmental study itself used. There were a number of complaints from the 
delegates that there was ‘no difference’ between the independent advisor’s report and 
the report given by OTML’s environment manager Michael Ridd. Some delegates  
indicated they did not believe that the independent advisor’s report was 
rigorous and scientific to the standard they expected, and thus it was hard to trust. The 
independent environmental advisor had a session without any other stakeholders during 
DM322. At times, the advisor did not address the questions of the delegates adequately. 
A Middle Fly delegate (Richard Zumoi) said to the advisor that the wells that he and 
his community had dug near to the Fly River had become contaminated with overbank 
22 The external observers, myself and a Project Coordinator, Department of Mining, Autonomous Bougainville 
Government Simon Jaintong were present for this session.  
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flooding, and the advisor responded that they should dig their wells further from the 
river – obviously not appreciating that the Middle Fly is flat and prone to flooding.  
Another instance was when a Lower Ok Tedi delegate drew a metaphor about 
how the Fukushima Daichi Nuclear Plant’s radiation would stay around for a long time 
and whether the chemicals in the Ok Tedi would make people sick for generations in a 
similar fashion. The independent advisor completely misinterpreted the question and 
talked about acid rain clouds coming from the nuclear plant probably not affecting 
PNG23.  
Overall, however, the process was inclusive and thorough. The community 
members and MLE representatives I spoke to all stated that they felt privileged to have 
a genuine opportunity to voice their concerns about MLE, and that OTML treated most 
of their comments with the appropriate amount of respect. Their chief complaint was 
not aimed at OTML directly, but rather at the development agencies PNGSDP and 
OTDF, as many people stated that development was not happening, and that accessing 
funding for development was too hard, too opaque, and that the VPCs were not 
transparent in their dealings with project proposals. The process of a three-tiered 
system of meetings meant that OTML avoided any accusations of coercion or trickery 
that they had encountered from Slater and Gordon during the 2001 CMCA process. 
They also fully addressed the informed consent criticism of Kalinoe (2008) by giving 
the communities as much information about the process, and refusing to move on to 
negotiations before everything was on the table to review by the communities. The 
evolution of the CMCC process from the initial meetings in July 1999 to the present 
was created by the unique environment of the OTMC, and has made OTML one of the 
most community engaged mining companies in the world.  
23 Despite the fact that there were no reported acid clouds or rain from the Fukushima Daichi Nuclear Plant.  
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2.9 Post 2012  
On September 18th 2013, the National Parliament passed an amended 9SA and the 
Mining (Ok Tedi Tenth Supplemental Agreement) Act 2013 (10SA). The substantive 
change to the 9SA was to change Section 4 of the Principal Agreement to say ‘(a) 
anything to the contrary in any other law in force in the country, other than the Mining 
(Ok Tedi Tenth Supplemental Agreement) Act 2013’. The second part of the amended 
9SA refers to the repeal of Section 5. This was the section indemnifying BHP Billiton 
over environmental claims and barring the State from participating in any legal action. 
This was a key section of the 9SA allowing BHP Billiton to leave OTML freely. 
Subsequent to this change, litigation has been brought against OTML regarding 
riverine tailings by South Fly communities (Namarong 2014)  
The 10SA cancelled the shareholding of PNGSDP and reissued them to the 
State of PNG (Section 4(1) a and b). It stated in Section 6 ‘Notwithstanding anything to 
the contrary in any Act, the State has the necessary powers restructure PNGDSP and its 
operations to ensure that PNGSDP applies its funds for the exclusive benefit of the 
people of Western Province’. PNGSDP brought a case against the national government 
in the Singaporean High Court, and unsuccessfully attempted to have the case 
arbitrated by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.  
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Figure 3.5 – OTML equity participants in 2013 (OTML 2013)  
2.10 Conclusion  
The history of the OTMC gives insight into the workings of the corporate mentality, as 
well as the grounding of the mine closure and sustainability planning that guides the 
mine into the future. The growth and development of the CMCA consultation process 
from opaque to fully transparent and accountable, and with it the corporate culture of 
the organisations involved, is a measure of the ability of institutions to change 
substantially in response to internal and external pressures.  
The mining company has changed internally since the early to mid-1990s in 
fundamental ways. The OTML of 1995 is not the OTML of 2009–2013. OTML had to 
change its corporate culture after becoming a by-word for flagrant widespread 
environmental destruction during the class action litigation in the mid-1990s for 
environmental damage, and since that period, OTML has dramatically changed its 
internal and external relations to engage communities in a meaningful way.  
The importance of the political situation at the time determined how both the 
political elites and the grassroots community members viewed the mine. Throughout 
the whole history of OTMC, it has been demonstrated that the national government’s 
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priorities have heavily influenced the working of the mine. When the mine has been in 
its doldrums, particularly around the time of the court case, the national government’s 
support and help ensured that the mine did not close. Until recently, the government 
had taken a ‘hands off’ approach to The Ok Tedi mine. However, political fortunes can 
change as quickly as the weather in Tabubil. The most recent attack on PNGSDP and 
cancelling of their shareholding, making OTML a state owned enterprise, will have 
untold impacts on the OTMC.  
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 Chapter Three – The Communities of the Ok Tedi Mining 
Complex  
3.1 Introduction  
The residents of the impacted regions are from overlapping communities, ranging from 
family units to wider tribal and language group affiliations. Recognizing the diversity 
of the communities and membership of groups within the impacted regions and 
hinterland of the Ok Tedi mine is important to sustainability planning leading up to 
mine closure. The mine closure and sustainability planning process and implementable 
policy outcomes are designed to manage the closure of the Ok Tedi mine in a way that 
does not disadvantage the surrounding population. These people rely, at present, on 
The Ok Tedi mine to provide or subsidise infrastructure, transport, health, economy, 
and education. The Ok Tedi Mining Complex (OTMC) stakeholder organisations 
provide varying levels of financial and in kind support to communities, which will be 
detailed in chapters 4 and 5.  
The Ok Tedi mine's impact area is the largest of any mine in PNG. It covers 
approximately one third of Western Province's landmass (30,000km2) (See Map 3.1 in 
Appendix II). In assessing the relationship the communities have to the mine, and the 
extent they have been impacted and affected by the environmental, economic and social 
changes to their life worlds, the aim is to understand the complexity of planning and 
sustainability for the stakeholders and communities alike. Assumptions, aspirations, 
expectations, and reality all play a significant role in the development of good policy. 
As Jorgensen (1996:198) states ‘…the Ok Tedi project transformed the Mountain Ok 
region from an obscure backwater to the centre of economic development in the 
western part of the country’. At Ok Tedi there is an element of ‘action at distance’ – 
those people who reside in the mine’s impact area and who perceive a negative 
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consequence of the mine versus those who are directly impacted by actions of the mine 
(Burton 1991). These impacts, which affect numbers of people, can be environmental, 
economic or social effects.  
There is a definite difference between the impacts and effects felt by 
communities in the Ok Tedi mine's impact area. Initially in the original impact reports 
(Jackson, Emerson and Welsch 1980) this impact region was minimally defined. These 
reports only covered the actual immediate area around the mine site and associated 
facilities of Tabubil Township, Ok Menga hydro and Ok Ma tailings dam. The 
expansion of the impact area from 10–12 villages to an impact corridor stretching from 
the mine site town to the Gulf of Papua and covering 156 villages in total was due to 
the tailings management system failing in construction in the early 1980s and the 
subsequent environmental impacts down river and 6SA allowing the mine to proceed to 
production without a new tailings management system. The importance of discussing 
the total expanded impact area of the mine as opposed to just discussing the North Fly 
area is that it gives context to the CMCA and MLE discussions.  
As a stakeholder group, the communities that surround the Ok Tedi mine possess 
one commonality that binds them together – their relationship with the Ok Tedi mine. 
They span across two provinces (Western and West Sepik/Sandaun), four districts 
(Telefomin, North Fly, Middle Fly, and South Fly) and numerous local level 
government areas. The argument contained in this chapter is that the communities of the 
Ok Tedi mine’s impact area should not be treated as one group, nor in a hierarchy. It is 
of equal importance for impacted communities as non-impacted communities to have 
access to services and economic opportunity. This is especially evident in the North Fly 
District where communities while not directly impacted by river degradation or roads 
are influenced by the lack of consistent access to services and amenities. This will be 
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demonstrated through analysis of the grievances of individual communities within the 
North Fly District’s Ok Tedi mine impacted areas.  
The different degrees of influence on communities inform policies, plans, and 
projects enacted in the communities. The extent and magnitude of the communities 
influenced by the mine because of downstream environmental degradation and other 
economic and social consequences is of central importance to understanding the 
challenges facing the design and effective implementation of plans to ensure post 
closure sustainability. However, when the mine closes, how can the level of services be 
maintained when there is no mining company to support them? This dilemma faces the 
residents of Tabubil and surrounding communities. The problem is that there are so 
many uncertainties, as closure was slated to be in 2013 but under MLE it was extended 
to 2025 as stated in the OTML Detailed Mine Closure Plan 2009.  
 Over the course of fieldwork research between 2009 and 2012, I was able to 
visit a number of villages in the North Ok Tedi, Highway, and Mine Villages. The 
village visits were part of the normal OTML Community Relations (CR) 
communications patrols or OTDF agricultural/livestock site checks. In 2012 I 
accompanied the North Ok Tedi Mine Life Extension community consultation team on 
their village meetings. The types of information I collected on these village trips were 
observations of the interaction between OTML/OTDF/PNGSDP and the communities, 
community complaints, assessing the housing and public facilities (schools, water 
tanks, churches), and general development level. This information was important for 
analysing the relationship between organisations and groups in the Ok Tedi Mining 
Complex.  
The geographical area covered in this section is the most socially and 
economically affected, but not the most environmentally affected. The observations 
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made in villages at meetings, report data and statistical data make up the bulk of the 
information in this chapter. The statistical data used within this chapter relies on:  
• 1980, 1990 and 2000 National Population Census conducted by the 
PNG National Statistical Office (NSO)  
• 2007 CMCA Population Census and 2011 CMCA Population Update 
carried out by OTML  
• 2009 Western Province Socio-Economic Urban Survey by PNGSDP  
• 1984 Population Survey of the Border Census Divisions of Western 
Province conducted by Pula and Jackson  
Using this data, a demographic profile of the people within the Ok Tedi impact 
area, as well as an idea of the people outside this impact area and how they are 
influenced by the mine’s presence and downstream environmental consequences can be 
addressed.  
3.2. Broad geographical and political divisions in the CMCA  
The physical aspects of the Ok Tedi mine impact area are critical to mine closure and 
sustainability planning. The geography, hydrology and geomorphology of Western 
Province are the reason for the wide scale of the impact area. The Ok Tedi mine is 
located atop Mount Fubilan, a formerly 2134m peak of the Star Mountains, 18 
kilometres from the PNG–Indonesian border (Pintz 1984: 16). The position of the mine 
within its geographic setting, including its proximity to the Indonesian border, 
underscores the importance of the mine to both the local and wider PNG community. 
Western Province, where The Ok Tedi mine is situated, forms the majority of the 
border with the Indonesian Province of Papua and has a land mass of 98,189km2 (NRI 
2010: 51). Western Province is the largest province in PNG. It accounts for one third of 
the total landmass of the eastern (PNG) half of the island of New Guinea.  
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Each of the CMCA trust regions in the Ok Tedi mine impact area have 
significantly different geographical aspects to them, however there is one commonality: 
The Ok-Fly River system. Water is of great importance in Western Province as two 
major rivers, the Fly and the Strickland, and PNG’s largest lake, Lake Murray, provide 
food and transport for the people and animals. The rivers start in the mountains in the 
north of the province. Mt Fubilan, the location of the Ok Tedi mine, is the source of the 
Ok Tedi. The Ok Tedi, Wai Tri, Ok Ti, Ok Deri or Alice River is a fast flowing river 
(Burton 1993). The annual rainfall for the catchment of the Ok Tedi ranges from 
11,000mm at the Folomian Mill site on Mt Fubilan, to 7000–8000mm at Tabubil, to 
3000mm at Kiunga. The main tributaries of the Ok Tedi are the Ok Ningi, Ok Gilor, Ok 
Mabiong, Ok Mani, Ok Menga, Ok Ma, Ok Iluk, Ok Munga, Ok Tarim, Ok Birim, Ok 
Taub and Ok Mart. The hilly topography means that many of the river valleys are steep 
and deep. The Ok Tedi is not very wide above Ningerum with the main river channel 
being no more than 10m across. Below Ningerum to Bige, the river is a braided channel, 
shifting with every flood. Below Bige to the D’Albertis Junction, the river and the 
surrounding countryside is level, with a wide floodplain. D'Albertis described it as ‘full 
of rocks’ (D’Albertis 1880) (See Plate 3.1 in Appendix I). The most significant feature 
of the Ok Tedi is that it has always been a fast flowing and high sediment load river.  
The regions of the North Fly District located in in the catchment areas of the Ok 
Tedi and its tributaries are Mine Area, North Ok Tedi, Highway and Lower Ok Tedi. 
These regions correspond roughly to the CMCA trust regions respectively – Mine Area 
Village Trusts, Nupmo Trust, Tutuwe Trust and Wai Tri Trust. The CMCA trust regions 
correspond directly to the tribal identity of their residents rather than the location – some 
villages presently on the Kiunga-Tabubil Highway are under the Nupmo Trust.  
The Ok Tedi combines with the Fly River at the D’Albertis Junction. The Fly 
River below this junction has a wide main channel and a number of oxbow lakes and 
72 
 
freshwater lagoons, the Bosset Lagoon being one of the largest. The Kawok rock bar on 
the Fly River above the D’Albertis Junction is a significant barrier to shipping 
concentrate down the Fly River especially during El Niño Southern Oscillation events 
(droughts and dry spells), as ‘if the river drops to three metres over the Kawok rock 
bar, then most vessels operating on the Fly River will not be able to arrive and those 
already in Kiunga will not be able to leave’ (TPNG 31/10/1992). In 1972, 1976, 1982, 
1993, 1997 (Barr 1998). In 2004 (OTML 2004d) there were dry spells significant 
enough to stop shipping to and from Kiunga, with the 1982 drought affecting 
construction of the Ok Tedi mine and the 1997 one leading to a 5 month shut down of 
production (Pintz 1984; Barr 1998). During the most severe droughts in 1982 and 1997 
large swathes of the sago swamps in the lower Ok Tedi and Middle Fly dried out and 
burnt (Barr 1998). The area is also affected by the Madden-Julian Oscillation (Mathews 
et al 2013), and from rain data taken from the OTML environment stations in Folomian 
(Mill) to Obo (Middle Fly) a clear picture of the oscillation of the rainfall in this area is 
shown. Plainly shown is evidence of the 1997 drought through all stations and the 1972 
and 1981/2 droughts in the Tabubil station (Figure 3.1 in Appendix VI)  
Between Kiunga and the Fly River Delta, there is only a 50 metre descent 
across 800 river kilometres (Banks 2002: 47). Along the length of the Fly River there 
are vast numbers of sago swamps supporting local wildlife and communities. The 
Strickland River is the source of the waters for the Middle Fly District’s major water 
feature, Lake Murray. The communities in this part of the river are represented through 
the Middle Fly CMCA Trust. The Middle Fly communities comprise the people living 
along the banks of the Fly River and its lagoons. The people along this stretch of the 
river generally are from the Boazi and Zimakani tribal groups. The population has 
remained reasonably static compared to the North and South Fly (see Table 3.5 in 
Appendix III). The larger villages of this region are Obo and Bosset.  
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The Fly River meets the Strickland River at the Everill Junction. The Strickland 
system is sourced high in Enga Province with some flows coming from the Porgera 
mine via the Lagaip River. South of the Everill Junction, the Fly is wide with flat plains 
and swamps surrounding it. Suki Creek is a tributary and there are a number of large 
river islands such as Stuart Island, before the Fly Delta, and Kiwai and other large 
islands in the Fly Delta. The delta is 56km wide where the Fly River empties into the 
Gulf of Papua. There are four CMCA trust regions in the South Fly District. These trust 
regions relate to the position within the South Fly District – Suki Creek area, south 
shore of the Fly River Delta, north shore of the Fly River Delta, and Fly River Delta 
Islands. The trusts respectively are Suki Fly Gogo Trust, Dudi Trust, Manawete Trust, 
and Kiwaba Trust.  
Sometimes in South Fly regions, because they are so far away from OTMC 
organisations, strange things can happen. In Manawete, the region covers the North 
Shore of the Fly Delta there was a population explosion after the CMCA review. The 
extreme population increases seen in Manawete were called into question by OTML’s 
Socio Economic Research and Education Extension unit within CR Department, stating 
bluntly that ‘In 2009, the total population were [sic] 17212 compared to 12901 in 2008. 
The increase is extremely suspicious and unrealistic’ [their emphasis] (OTML 2009i: 
6). This was confirmed when OTML did a validation on the 2009 figures in South Fly, 
finding in Manawete 2,393 ‘ghosts’ on the CMCA census lists (OTML 2010b: 8). This 
was put down to VPC and village recorders getting carried away and not removing 
deceased and illegitimate people from the rolls, in addition to OTML CR not 
monitoring the situation closely enough and swiftly dealing with irregularities.  
The Non-CMCA areas of Western Province are of peripheral importance to 
OTML in mine closure planning, but are of a central importance to other stakeholders. 
The FRPG, PNGSDP, and Christian Missionary organisations (Montfort Catholic, 
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Evangelical Churches of Papua) all have a stake in ensuring that post-closure of the 
mine the provision of services to the people of the Non-CMCA areas do not decline. 
The North Fly District Non-CMCA areas include the whole of Olsobip Rural and 
Kiunga Urban LLGAs, as well as portions of Kiunga Rural and Ningerum Rural LLGs.  
In Middle Fly and South Fly there are many communities not included in the CMCA 
but these communities are a significant distance from the mine area so the economic 
and social changes are not present or at least less problematic. Outside the CMCA, the 
difference in population growth in communities can be seen with a representative slice 
of Olsobip and Ningerum Local Level Government (LLG) villages. Population growth 
within the Ningerum LLG Non-CMCA areas has been less than that of the CMCA 
areas (see Table 3.1 in Appendix III). These villages have always been outside the 
recognised Ok Tedi impact areas. The decreases of population particularly in the 
Olsobip LLG indicate that there has been significant shift from these villages to 
Tabubil probably due to the close proximity and kin network ties with local inhabitants. 
One other possible reason for this is that there are not the services available for 
maternal and general health that are available in the CMCA villages. As seen in the 
North Fly Health report (2009) the non-OTML/non-NGO run health centres do not 
have the same level of services as those in villages within the CMCA areas.  
For localisation and training and local business development, the Principal 
Agreement states in Clauses 30.6 and 32.3 ‘…in so far as is practicable give first 
preference (for employment and assistance) to landowners in and other people 
originating from the Kiunga and Telefomin sub-provinces of the Western Province.’ 
This was what gave rise to the Preferred Area Districts (PAD) and the provision of 
projects for those areas. The non-impacted communities of Western Province were not 
given any specific provisions for preferential treatment under the PA beyond the 
Preferred Area Districts. It was in the Principal Agreement that the Kiunga and 
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Telefomin Districts acquired the right for ‘preferred’ sourcing of services and 
employees. The benefit of having local labour and contracting services was supposed to 
be to develop local skills and capital. The program was well used in the construction of 
the mine, as there were many unskilled or low-skill labouring jobs involved. Initially in 
the construction of the mine from 1982, the total labour force during this period was 
about 3500 with roughly 60 percent drawn from the local area (Jorgensen 1984). By 
1985, this had been dramatically reduced to about 1900 workers (Harold Dugiu pers. 
comm. 2012). The establishment of local landowner businesses – for example, Tabubil 
Engineering, Starwest, Azobelle, and WangBult Stores – were all developed and 
assisted by OTML under localisation and business development programs. The 
downside for many of the local businesses is that their sole contract is with OTML, and 
they are not yet competitive with other national businesses.  
Local Politics  
 In the North Fly there was little historical interest in politics24, The lack of 
politics reported in the North Fly (Burton 1997b) is attributable to the fragmented 
social relations and traditional processes of authority, especially within the Mountain 
Ok areas. The way the traditional male initiatory cults worked was a process over 
years, in which the most senior men had the most esoteric knowledge, and by extension 
they had authority over their clans (Barth 1987). The role of men and women has 
changed in the mine area. Where previously men were responsible for security, garden 
clearing, and decisions, men now have no place, as there is no risk of tribal warfare, 
people in the mine area rarely plant large gardens and decisions are left mainly in the 
hands of elected leaders, rather than being the product of community wide discussion 
(Polier 1994). The lack of this guiding traditional structure means that there is a more 
24 This has changed in more recent years with the emergence of a younger politically active generation 
jockeying for power in the village planning committees and ward development committees. 
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divisive political game going on. The younger generation of people who have lived 
their entire life with the mine seem more politicised than the older generation. It is 
changing from apolitical or at least apathy about politics to a more politicised 
generation. The breakdown of traditional initiatory structures has left the younger 
landowner generation subject to more generic power structures. These people are less 
likely to respect the older traditions because of their uninitiated status.  
At the most basic level of the political organisation spectrum is the various 
region and village-based committees. A range of the committees is responsible for 
development in their communities. There are also committees and groups associated 
with women’s and youth issues. Village planning is the responsibility of two different 
committees – the Village Planning Committee (VPC) and the Ward Development 
Committee (WDC). The WDCs are a feature of LLGs across PNG. The VPCs were set 
up to facilitate the relationship between OTML and the villages. The difference 
between these two committees is important because one (VPC) deals with the funds 
available through OTDF and other trusts. The chairman of the VPC wields 
considerable power because of the responsibilities over CMCA trust development 
funds. 
3.3 Mine Area Villages  
The people around the Ok Tedi mine are known collectively as the Mountain Ok25, 
who range from the east with the Oksapmin, who border the Strickland Gorge, to the 
west the Sibilmin (Ngalum) who are over the border in the Papua Province of 
Indonesia. The Mountain Ok people are confined to the Star Mountains valleys (such 
as Eliptaman and Ifiltaman) and the northern and southern slopes, which are the 
catchment for the Fly and Sepik Rivers. The original inhabitants of the area of Mt 
25 This term was first coined in 1964 by Healey in his PhD dissertation The Ok Language Family of New Guinea to 
describe the linguistic similarities of the people of the area between the Fly and Sepik Rivers.  
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Fubilan are the various tribes and clans of the Min or Mountain Ok. This broader group 
is characterised by a common language group (except the Oksapmin) (Healey 1964), a 
common cultural ancestress called Afek, and an associated male taro initiation cult 
(Brumbaugh, 1990; Brutti 2000; Hyndman 1990; Jorgensen 1980, 1990; Quinlivan 
1954). The cultural centre of the Min people was the Telefolip to the north east of Mt 
Fubilan. The Mountain Ok people occupy an area of approximately 10,000 square 
kilometres and number around 20 – 25,000 (Jorgensen 2006: 238). The Mountain Ok 
people share some commonalities as Fredrik Barth points out:  
In most outer respects, [the Mountain Ok] population is reasonably homogeneous: 
technology, subsistence and economy are closely similar, based on shifting horticulture 
with an emphasis on taro, extensive hunting and collecting and streambed products, and the 
raising of domestic pigs. Languages are closely cognate, physical type is indistinguishable. 
House type and dress are so similar that, apart from a few details, photographs from one 
village could be used to illustrate life in another (Barth 1987: 2)  
A significant commonality seen in most of the Mountain Ok people’s religious 
practices is the Afek26 cultural ancestor myth. Afek is believed to have arrived in the 
area 300+ years ago from the east. The myths surrounding her travels across the 
mountains make up a large part of the ‘dreaming tracks’ that criss-cross the landscape. 
The story of Afek has been passed down orally via ‘Afek Sang’ (sacred myths) 
(Jorgensen 1981; Jorgensen 1990b: 49; Brumbaugh 1990). Where she travelled various 
streams, sinkholes and spirit houses were created, marking the land with significant and 
sacred sites (Quinlaven 1954; Brumbaugh 1990). Afek’s teachings were central to the 
male initiation religious cults and taro fertility cults that constituted the core of 
Mountain Ok peoples’ religious and sacred secret activity (Craig and Hyndman 1990).  
26 Afek is known by various other names: Karigan, Fukunkon, Fitipkanip and Yuwan. This is due to the nature of 
her journey across the mountain landscape through many different groups of people 26 Spirit houses  
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The Wopkaimin are the landowners of the Ok Tedi mine site. Mythical 
underground tunnels which link the villages of Bultem and Telefolip, which both have 
significant yolam26 houses built by Afek, with Bultem having a futanman (Brumbaugh 
1990). Mt Fubilan is a significant site in the general mythology of Afek, as it is the land 
of the dead and the place where she left her brother’s corpse (Jorgensen 1998). The 
map (see Map 3.1 in Appendix II) shows the parishes (villages) the land belonged to at 
the time of colonial expansion into the Wopkaimin lands (Hyndman 1994a). The six 
parishes, Iralim, Migalsim, Kamfaiwolmin27, Kavorbaang, Fetiktaman and Beinglim, 
show the extent of the Wopkaimin tribe across the area around Mt Fubilan. In 1975, 
just prior to independence, Jeff Ransley conducted the last colonial patrol in the first 
Wopkaimin parishes, counting 694 people (Hyndman 1994a: 214).  
Identifying the villages likely to have the most direct impacts from the mine 
was not a clear process, as villages relocated, merged, and dissolved between the first 
kiap patrol to the headwaters of the Ok Tedi and the feasibility study. The identification 
of potentially impacted villages depended on the placement of the mining leases for 
The Ok Tedi mine project and associated infrastructure leases – the mine site, mill, 
tailings lease, Tabubil and the Ok Menga hydro scheme. M. Eggleton did the original 
Land Investigation Report for Tabubil and Mount Fubilan in 1968–70, along with a 
map (Appendix II Map 3.2) that clearly shows the rough location of the boundaries 
between Bultem, Wangbin and other villages, however individual village/hamlet 
boundaries were never precisely identified (Welsch 1979).  
An assertion by Pintz (1984:128) that ‘…everyone within a radius of 150 
kilometres seemed to be asserting some sort of claim over the area…and that…Land in 
Melanesian society is a highly emotional issue, and the history of Ok Tedi is no 
27 Kamfaiwolmin parish villagers are not Wopkaimin – “Back when the kiap (patrol officer) first came to the Kam  
Basin we were fighting the Kamfaiwolmin. We have many wasi sung (war stories) that tell how we drive the  
Kamfaiwolmin out of the Kam Basin to Lake Sokilmik (Lake Wangbin)” (Hyndman 1994:207)  
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exception’ (Pintz 1984: 127–130) contextualises the complexity of identification of 
landowners in this area.  
Complicating the situation of landowner identification is that village groups are 
not always as static as maps illustrate. Welsch (1979:51–2) outlines the splitting of 
Finalbin village from the other Iralim parish (Bultem) villagers, after a drunken dispute 
in Tabubil in 1977, leading Finalbin to settle on the western side of the Ok Tedi and 
refuse to allow the east side Bultem villagers access to their land. He also asserts that 
prior to government control, the villages of Atemkit (Gigabip) and Kavorabip were part 
of Iralim parish, but split off into a separate parish. Jackson (1993:70) confirms that the 
inclusion of Atemkit and Kavorabip was because of the villagers’ membership of the 
Fikalinmin, Kinugsengaiun, Kaiokaiamin and Ablemkaimin clans.  
The originally identified impacted communities are those that are within the 
direct influence of the originally planned tailings dam, mine site and milling facilities.  
Welsch (1979:) identified ‘areas likely to receive most direct impact’. The areas were:  
• Mt Fubilan and the area around Hongkong camp plus access to Tabubil  
• Tabubil township site  
• The Ok Mani drainage where coarse waste will be dumped  
• The proposed tailings area along the upper Ok Ma (Munga) and 
[possibly the Lower Ok Ma (Menga)  
• The proposed Ok Menga hydro area, above the gorge  
• Lands along the Ok Tedi south of Ok Mani which will probably be 
affected by changes in the Ok Mani (#3)  
• The proposed Kiunga-Tabubil road to the east of the Ok Tedi  
The seven villages in six parishes he proposed would be directly impacted 
were: Kawentikin, Atemkit, Kavorabip, Bultem, Finalbin, Wangbin and Miglasimbip. 
These are census villages of the Star Mountains Census Division (Welsch 1979:5).  
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In Jackson, Emerson and Welsch’s (1980) Impact of the Ok Tedi Project 
Report, the villages identified as immediately impacted by the mine and associated 
leases were divided into two groups:  
1. Finalbin, Wuritengkit (New Kumguit), Okteditau and Wangbin  
2. Bultem, Migalsimbip, Boliwogam and Nioksikwi28  
The absence of Atemkit, Kavorabip and Kawentikin from the latter list of 
potentially impacted villages was amended subsequently. The final land that was 
covered under mining leases29 was the land of six villages of this area: Atemkit, 
Kavorabip, Bultem, Finalbin, Wangbin and Miglasimbip. Kawentikin was seen as not 
having a legitimate claim as its current location is at the far eastern side of its land.  
This region is not a CMCA trust region, but rather a geographical grouping of 
the mine villages. Each village within the geographical group signed separate CMCA 
agreements with OTML. They do not receive the same compensation as the other 150 
villages in the CMCA, as they are already receiving benefit streams from OTML in the 
form of royalties, dividends, and lease payments (further detailed in chapter 5). They are 
Wopkaimin and Kamfaiwolmin people and census figures show a significant increase of 
these people living in the Mine Area villages since 2001. This table shows the growth in 
population from 1980 to 2011.  
TABLE 3-1  
Mine Villages  1980  1990  2000  2007  2011  
Atemkit30  98  94  115  261  292  
Bultem  106  645  570  421  939  
Finalbin  51  198  615  370  412  
28 See Map 3.3 and 3.4 in Appendix II  
29 The various leases will be further examined in Chapter 5  
30 Atemkit listed as Atembit in 1980 and 1990 
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Kavorabip  74  106  110  334  494  
Migalsimbip  73  282  500  578  476  
Wangbin  34  226  422  358  489  
Total  436  1,551  2,332  2,322  3,102  
The specific challenges of the mine area are vastly different to those faced by the 
rest of the impacted communities. These people are cut off from some of their lands by 
the implementation of the mining leases. The land has significant industrial assets 
located on it – the mine, the mill, roads, and pipelines – as well as significant informal 
settlements.  
Mine closure and the issues of sustainability of livelihoods and community are 
important to the Mine Area Villages. They are represented through a variety of different 
mechanisms and organisations. They key political organisational entities of importance 
to the six mine villages are:  
• Star Mountains Rural Local Level Government (Star Mountains Rural 
LLG) – Ward Councillors  
• Mount Fubilan Resource Owners Association (MFRA)  
• Village Planning Committees (VPC)  
• Clan organisations – e.g. Kimka Sepiyan Sub-Tribe  
There are other temporary or short-term representative bodies that hold 
importance in negotiating agreements, specifically the important Mine Life Extension 
community consultations. The elected delegates from the Mine Area Villages were John 
Wanim (Bultem), Joel Dangkim (Kavorabip), Amos Kiki (Migalsim), Thomas Uneng 
(Wagbin), Kelly Bineng (Finalbin) and Jerry Musolok (Atemkit) and the women’s reps 
Anora Wenis (Wangbin), Donna Wanim (Bultem) and Alice Mumuyong (Bultem). 
There is significant overlap between the people who are leaders in the other political 
82 
 
organisations and the MLE delegates – for example: John Wanim is a principal 
landowner of Mt Fubilan, he is also president of MFRA, and VPC Chairman and the 
Ward Councillor for Bultem.  
The Mine Area Villages raised a diverse range of problems and issues through 
the MLE delegates at regional and village meetings from 2009 to 2012. A consistent 
theme emerged of the concerns of the communities in this area: anxieties about 
development projects via OTDF or PNGSDP for the various communities and also 
funds distribution relating to OTDF and also to PNGSDP. Some villagers from 
Wangbin expressed a desire that ‘PNGSDP should put into place large infrastructure 
projects such as bridges and airstrips for [Lower Ok Tedi (Wai Tri), North Ok Tedi 
(Nupmo)] and up to the mine villages’ and ‘Funds allocated in 9th CMCA if not used 
what will happen, Are we liable to be taken to court?’ (MLE Meeting 26 Oct 2010:9).  
The difficulties facing Bultem village in the lead up to mine closure are mostly 
related to the structure of the community, the location of the village, and the 
distribution of benefit streams from the mine. Throughout the MLE process, Atemkit 
village31 representative, Jerry Musolok, said they wanted assistance from OTML and 
PNGSDP to relocate the village despite OTML contesting they told the leaders 
previously not to relocate their village to that location because of the landslide risk. 
Bultem leaders also said they wanted a road built up to the Kam Valley so they could 
access their land easier (MLE Village Meeting 7 March 2012). The issues for Atemkit 
villagers in Bultem is that they asked constantly if the overburden from the mine can be 
used to make a road to Atemkit and Kavorabip, but OTML consistently refused saying 
the rock was not suitable, and that they would not commit to building a road that was 
not part of their core business activity (MLE D Meeting 7 March 2012).  
31 The majority of landowners from Atemkit village have relocated to Bultem village as Atemkit is a 6 hour walk 
behind the mine site away through mountainous terrain. No MLE village meetings were conducted in Atemkit 
village, but rather the Atemkit and Bultem village meetings are conducted concurrently at Bultem. The same thing 
happens for Kavorabip at Finalbin.  
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Migalsimbip villagers were primarily concerned with maintaining facilities 
leading into mine closure. Amos Kiki and Meki Mamemim raised in village meetings 
the desire for maintaining the Ok Menga Tunnel, which people walk through from 
Olsobip and other parts of Migalsim’s hinterland. Leading up to closure, Migalsim 
villagers want to ensure they have access to power and water facilities.  
Wangbin community leaders stated that the villagers wanted the mine to 
continue so that benefits would continue to flow (MLE Meeting 6 March 2012). Borok 
Pitalok in 2010 stated at a village meeting that if MLE was approved, a lot of social 
problems would be encountered and that the squatter settlement issue should be 
addressed by all stakeholders before MLE. For Wangbin, the concerns about the 
maintenance of facilities in Tabubil are of prime importance, as they are the closest 
village to the township.  
 The Mine Area Villages have few complaints about community development 
projects from PNGSDP and OTFRDP as they are not party to CMCA trusts and have 
their own royalty and dividend trusts. Their concerns are primarily about the daily 
immediate conflicts they have with settlers and OTML over a variety of issues. Mine 
closure and the future of Tabubil are important to the Mine Area Villages because they 
have businesses tied up in OTML contracts, investments in joint ventures and housing, 
and the community relies heavily on subsidised food and utilities from OTML. Going 
forward, the communities will need to adapt to the smaller Ok Tedi mine operation 
under MLE, which will see significantly reduced royalty payments to the villages.  
3.4 Nupmo Trust Region / North Ok Tedi  
The Nupmo Trust area in North Ok Tedi region is composed of the Ningerum tribe 
villages historically in Ningerum, North Ok Tedi and South Ok Tedi Census Divisions.  
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Generally, the area of the Ningerum tribe is bounded by the Ok Mani in the north, the 
Ok Tedi in the east, Ok Birim in the south and the Indonesian Border in the west 
(Burton 1991:9). There are 18 villages in this trust region – Ankit, Boliwogam, 
Boungkim (Duombonkim), Bumbin, Derongo, Digam, Haidowogam, Kawentikin, 
Kolebon, Korkit, Kumguit, Ningerum Tamaro, Nioksikwi, Ok Teditau, Walawam32, 
Wogam, Wombon, Wurimkanatgo. The population of the area has grown over the 
period of Ok Tedi mine’s operation, but the population may not necessarily reflect 
actual people from there, as there has been significant immigration and settlement from 
other parts of PNG and Indonesia. The 1980–2000 growth rate was 4.25 percent 
annually, whereas the post 2000 growth rate was 6.28 percent for the whole region. 
(See Table 3.4 in Appendix III). Some of the villages were earlier identified as original 
impacted communities due to their ownership of the land leased for Ok Mani and 
abandoned Ok Ma tailings dam. Welsch (1979: 7) states that the villages that were 
proposed to have their land most impacted by the tailings lease were Okteditau, 
Kumguit, Nioksikwi and Boliwogam. Even though the tailings dam was never 
completed, these villages still have a tailings lease over their lands.  
There is little cultural variation across the Ningerum tribe, but there are 
dialectical differences (Welsch 1979:4) that were confirmed by Lalamana Gaegae from 
Walawam who was unable to understand the Ningerum tribe people of Korkit when 
they spoke their local dialect of Ningerum (MLE VM3 notes 2012). The people of this 
area refer to themselves at times as ‘Ningerumians’. The Ningerum, at the time of the 
early mine operations phase,  
…only have slight involvement in the cash economy, mainly through the sale of food 
crops at one of the urban markets in Ningerum township. Virtually none of the 
Ningerum is involved in the mining operation. Most settlements are well established, 
32 Previously known as Mongolavuram (NSO 1980; 1990; 1983, 2000) and Mongulwalawam (Burton 1991: 4)  
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and there is no social flux like that experienced by the Wopkaimin (Ulijaszek et al 
1989: 62).  
This confirms Welsch’s (1978: 4) assertion that ‘…development within the 
[Ningerum] census division is negligible’ despite the government station opening on 
the east bank of the Ok Tedi at Ningerum Station in 1964, and the subsequent 
extension of the road from Rumginae in 1968. The Ningerum constructed road benches 
along the ridge tops in the foothills parallel to the Ok Tedi and Ok Ma in order to 
access Ningerum Station via a local ferry.  
The settlement pattern is significantly different today than it was before the Ok 
Tedi mine was constructed. The Ningerum traditionally lived in scattered hamlets 
consisting of family units, gardening and exploiting natural forest and river resources 
such as fish and sago swamps (Welsch 1978:3). By the 1950s many of the southern 
Ningerum had coalesced into villages, at the suggestion of missionaries, but many 
people maintained a part-time village existence where they maintained bush houses and 
gardens away from the village (Welsch 1978:6). The Ningerum had no over-arching 
cultural or political organisational structure to bind them together, and traditional pig 
feast gatherings were often attended based on personal clan connection rather the 
broader tribal affiliation, with social cohesion diminishing as groups became larger 
(Welsch 1979.: 24). The complexity of the Ningerum clan affiliation is summarised by 
Welsch (1979: 27) in reference to the Daupka clan:  
There are many sub-sub-clans. Each of the smallest segment forms its own 
independent local clan segment. Sub-clans which are not segmented compete on an 
equal basis with the segments of other sub-clans and there is no more cohesion 
between sub-sub-clans than between segments of different clan names. Once 
segmented sub-clans and sub-sub-clans would fight with and kill members of other 
local groups who have the same clan and sub-clan names as readily they would any 
other group.  
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This sub-sub-clan complexity, although not deployed for warfare in modern 
times, informs the way that politics is performed in Nupmo trust region. Not all of the 
villages within the Ningerum tribe’s lands are defined as being impacted by the Ok 
Tedi mine. Many villages are not within the boundaries of Nupmo trust region, such as 
Hukim and Tarakbits. These villages are significantly worse off than those within the 
Nupmo trust region, due to the lack of resources available to them via the CMCA 
development funds and cash payments. The villages in Nupmo trust region can be 
divided into 3 distinct groups – northern, southern, and east bank (highway). These 
distinctions roughly align to those mentioned by Welsch (1979) as being previously 
used as dialectical divisions (Kasuwa, Alice and Daupka). Burton (1991:11) reported 
that informants state the division is katuwa in the north and kangua in the south. My 
division is not based culturally but rather geographically, as the Nupmo trust villages 
on the Kiunga-Tabubil highway have different concerns to those located in the northern 
and southern Nupmo region.  
The northern villages are part of the Lease for Mining Purposes (LMP1) area.  
The most northerly villages are closest to the border between Ningerum and Star 
Mountains Rural LLGs, with land mountainous in topography. These villages have two 
clans of the Ningerum tribe – the Konwop and Wopka clans (OTDF 2002n:5). An 
example of these villages is Nioksikwi. Most Nioksikwi residents live in the Ok Ma 11 
corner, on the Ok Ma access road built in the early 1980s to serve the subsequently 
abandoned tailings dam. The original village is not accessible by road so they moved to 
the road corridor. The MLE Village meeting round #3 had the meeting as a combined 
Ok Ma 11 with village representatives from Boliwogam, Bongkim, Nioksikwi and Ok 
Teditau. The specific concerns expressed relating to mine closure and sustainability 
were  
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• The need to fix the Lower Ok Tedi (Maria) Bridge as it was the link to 
Tabubil and services. Since the bridge was unusable the aid post and school 
were running low on supplies  
• For stakeholders to come together to manage/evict resident of informal 
settlement at 7 Kona.  
• Community development projects promised by CMCA were not 
delivered which compounded the lack of development for the last 30 years.  
The southern villages are geographically close to Ningerum Station, but on the 
west bank of the Ok Tedi. An example of a southern village is Kolebon. I travelled to 
this village as part of the 2012 MLE village meetings. Kolebon is located northwest of 
Ningerum Station on the west bank of the Ok Tedi. Kolebon has an aid post and a 
school, as well as a road bench that aids villagers to access other villages. Garden sites 
are along the ridges to the north, and Ningerum Station is in the south. Kolebon has 
two clans of the Ningerum tribe – the Nium and Bii clans (OTDF 2002k: 5). Kolebon is 
only accessible by walking or helicopter. The southern Ningerum villages have least 
access to the benefits from the mine and associated infrastructure because of the lack of 
road access to the west bank south of Ok Ma. The issues of the west bank isolation 
were highlighted by the MLE delegates Daniel Atmeyok (Kumguit), Lalamana Gaegae 
(Walawam), Keop Kowa (Wombon) and women’s rep Noni Dukmun (Kumguit) at 
Delegates Meeting #3. The west bank villages, as a whole, face difficulty of access to 
services, especially since the Ok Tedi (Maria) bridge at Tabubil closed. The bridge was 
originally built to provide access to the Ok Ma tailings site; however, the tailings site 
has long since been abandoned. Since the end of 2011 it has been decommissioned 
because the FRPG declined permission to OTML for the use of FRPG’s royalty funds 
to maintain it (Michael Namalok pers. comm. 2012; OTML 2012). OTDF 
commissioned the construction of a footbridge over the Ok Tedi at Ningerum Station to 
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link up with the network of road benches constructed by communities along the bank 
(OTDF 2013). This allows villagers to have safer passage across the river than the use 
of risky ferry crossings that have led to deaths in the past.  
The east bank (highway) Nupmo villages are exemplified by Wurimkanatgo, a 
village I travelled to numerous times. The village is located at Km96 on the 
KiungaTabubil Highway. The village relocated from the west bank of the Ok Tedi 
because of increased opportunity and access to services. Wurimkanatgo has a roadside 
market and villagers engage in artisanal mining along the riverbanks. Wurimkanatgo 
has no primary school only an elementary school, but has a small ECP church (OTDF 
2002w: 6). There are five Ningerum clans in Wurimkanatgo – Kimkwi Opka, Dopka, 
Gengho, Boni Kim and Boni Opka (OTML 2003w). In MLE Village Meeting #3 on 27 
February 2012 Wurimkanatgo village concerns were for need of better 
telecommunication and access to the west bank of the river for connecting with their 
families. Villagers also raised concern about how the P’nyang mudstone33 (proposed to 
be dumped in the Ok Tedi as part of the MLE) would affect gold recovery rates in their 
artisanal mining activities. In addition, concern was voiced about the lack of 
development projects in the villages. The highway Ningerum villages have easy access 
to Tabubil, Ningerum, and Kiunga, as there are many PMVs travelling the highway. 
They can sell their garden produce roadside, or travel to markets that are more central. 
They face road safety issues, such as risk of death from car accidents and convoys, 
dust, and pollution. The highway villages also deal with the risks associated with the 
pyrite concentrate (P-Con) and copper concentrate (Cu-Con) pipelines that run adjacent 
to the road. Multiple P-Con and Cu-Con ruptures and spills over the life of the mine 
have meant the highway communities are impacted by tailings in their waterways. At 
times OTML moves fast to contain and clean up any spills into waterways and 
33 The overburden from the West Wall extension to the mine site.  
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compensates communities for the impacts through special compensation rather than as 
a part of the CMCA or RESA funds (OTML 2009).  
Across all the MLE village meetings attended in the Nupmo trust – Korkit, 
Derongo, Wombon, Digam, Kolebon, Ningerum Tamaro, Wurimkanatgo and Ok Ma – 
every single village raised the same issues relating to CMCA community development 
and infrastructure projects not being implemented in their villages. Facilitating 
economic and social development and capacity in these villages in the lead up to 
closure is the most important function of the CMCA trust funds, but there was a 
disconnect between PNGSDP, OTFRDP and the communities. Many villagers put this 
down to the VPCs being disorganised and unresponsive to their respective 
communities. This on the whole has led to community expectations for development 
not being met, and the promises of the CMCAs left unfulfilled.  
3.5 Tutuwe Trust Region / Highway  
The importance of roads to community and development cannot be overstated. 
Throughout the developing world, roads act as arteries of a nation. With road access, 
communities are open to money, healthcare, education and marketing, but also they 
bring in many social vices. The Kiunga-Tabubil highway stretches the 137kms between 
Kiunga, a government port town on the Fly River, to Tabubil. The establishment of this 
road was and continues to be significant for the local people of the North Fly. The road, 
which started as a crude road cutting from Kiunga to Rumginae in 1968 and then later 
to Ningerum (Jackson 1979), is the sole reason for the migration of all the villagers that 
currently live along the road corridor, from Sisimakam down to Gre. The majority of 
these villages moved to align themselves with the road corridor prior to the Ok Tedi 
mine’s development (Jackson 1979). The road is mostly dirt, and the northern parts 
towards Tabubil after Sisimakam require daily grading. Dust from the road had become 
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a big complaint of the communities that border the road corridor. This complaint 
prompted a program of road sealing initiated for the northern villages Sisimakam, 
Wurimkanatkgo and Kwiloknai by 2012.  
With any infrastructural development in Melanesia there is an accompanying 
‘wave’ of migration, resettlement, and settlement pattern change that accompany this 
type of development (Gibson and Rozelle 2003). As an example, with most of the main 
roads in Papua New Guinea, including the Kiunga-Tabubil Highway34, the Enga 
Highway extension to Porgera mine and the Kutubu access road in Southern Highlands 
Province, local people have moved their settlements (or set up new secondary 
settlements) so they can more readily access the accompanying benefits that roads 
provide: access to schools, aid posts and other people to do bisnis with. People also 
move to the outskirts of large towns so they can access these same benefits. These 
settlements are referred to as ‘corners’ or ‘highway corners’ when referring to roadside 
settlements (Jackson 1993: Chapter 10; Burton 1991).  
In the region around the Ok Ted mine the ‘highway corner’ settlements on the 
sides of roads are tolerated by the provincial government and the mining company 
(Burton 1991). As an example as soon as the Awin and Ningerum people heard 
rumours of a feeder road being built between Ningerum and Rumginae in the late 
1960s, they moved their villages in expectation of where the proposed road would be 
constructed (Burton 1993b). When BechtelMKI built the Kiunga-Tabubil Highway 
more people shifted from existing settlements to take advantage of the highway 
(Jackson 1993: 126; Burton 1991, 1993a, 1993b).  
Living on the east of the Ok Tedi means the Awin people have direct access to 
the Kiunga-Tabubil Highway in contrast to the Yonggom people on the west bank of 
the river. The lack of feeder roads to the Kiunga-Tabubil Highway has meant that many 
34 This highway links the port of Kiunga on the Fly River to the Ok Tedi mine site.  
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northern and western Awin people have moved great distances to settle in ‘highway 
corners’. Awin informants explained to Burton in the early 1990s, the reasons that they 
moved to roadside ‘highway corners’ such as Pampenai were:  
The first [is] that ‘the government’ needs people in one place. This seems to 
accompany an implicit feeling that living in scattered hamlets is somehow backward. 
However, if pressed, secondary reasons are given, such as the need to be near schools 
and the Ningerum Health Centre. These, by contrast, are excellent reasons and are a 
reflection on the poor delivery of services to rural dwellers here. (Burton 1991: 21)  
Many Awin and Ningerum have moved up to fifteen kilometres onto other 
community lands to live adjacent to the Kiunga-Tabubil Highway (Burton 1991: 16). 
Some villages relocated from the west bank of the Ok Tedi (Wurimkanatgo, 
Haidowogam, Bumbin). The Awin informants were adamant that when feeder roads 
were constructed, allowing for easy access to the Kiunga-Tabubil Highway, they would 
move back onto their own lands and resettle in their former villages (Burton 1991: 21). 
It must be stressed that whilst people moved and constructed housing on the side of 
roads many people maintained, or just locked up, their former settlements. They even 
retained gardens and animals in their original villages, and often just used the roadside 
houses as part-time sleeping quarters (Burton 1991).  
The commercial opportunities, access to the cash economy and services that this 
brings to the Awin and Ningerum outweigh the effect of dislocation from their lands. 
As a consequence of increased settlement in ‘corners’ away from traditional hunting 
grounds and gardens means that often people cannot hunt or garden on the lands that 
they now live on, as they are not permitted to by the local land custodian. However, 
often the case is that the people who move to the area seek the permission of the local 
people to use the resources (Jackson 1993: 65). It has only been in the last 30 years that 
this move into ‘corners’ and permanent settlements has occurred (Kirsch 1993: 44; 
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Jackson 2003). Jorgensen (2006) argues with reference to the Telefol living in small 
villages, which prior to the advent of mining in the region were perceived as good 
places to live, are now by these same people seen as marginalised places out of touch 
with modern life. The people of these villages have greater aspirations for bisnis, 
education and for modern lifestyles. These people recognise that if they continue to live 
in small villages their current situation will not allow them to achieve their aspirations; 
consequently, they move to ‘corner’ settlements (Kirsch 1993: 44).  
The villages along the Kiunga to Tabubil Highway identified are impacted by 
the road extension from Ningerum to Tabubil. North of Ningerum, the road runs along 
ridge-tops of steep hills. The villages along the highway had their lands compulsorily 
acquired for the road35, and were compensated for destroyed gardens and economic 
trees.  
The Tutuwe Trust or Highway Region consists of the Awin/Aeykom tribe 
communities. It comprises 29 villages36 and has a population of 13,703 as of 2011 
(OTML CMCA 2011). The villages can be divided into two groups, those north of 
Ningerum Station, and those south of Ningerum Station (Ningerum is generally seen as 
the half-way point of the 137km highway as it is at Km 70 from Kiunga). The northern 
highway villages are, in proximity to Tabubil – Sisimakam, Kwiloknai, Tapko, 
Hoskomugu, Hosonai, Awin Tamaro, these villages are in a hillier area, and are closer 
to the Ok Tedi than their southern counterparts  
 An example of a highway village is Sisimakam. This village is representative 
of villages along the highway and is the product of a movement where people 
coalesced from hamlets in the lands to the east into a series of roadside village 
developments along the road to Rumginae in 1968 or during the construction of the Ok 
35 The leasing arrangements will be discussed further in chapter 5.  
36 See Appendix II for a map of village locations and Appendix III for the population table.  
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Tedi mine (Jackson 1979; 1982). According to Welsch (1979:45) the name Sisimakam 
was originally the name of the boundary mark for the village of Apram, located some 
way inland. Sisimakam is the first major roadside settlement south of Migalsim on the 
Kiunga-Tabubil highway, and the most northerly Tutuwe trust region village. 
Sisimakam has a large roadside market, an aid post, and all weather road access. The 
portion of the Kiunga-Tabubil Highway that runs through the present settlement of 
Sisimakam is sealed. The village refused to sign the CMCA until 2009. This was 
probably due their non-participation in village meetings. The Awin clans in Sisimakam 
are Somoi, Kriakoe, Ipine, Ningelin, Prine, Ipin-Rupkoe, Hore, and Fikalin (OTML 
2008s). According to a letter to OTML in 2001 Sisimakam had been involved in 
landowner issues with neighbouring village Migalsim as well as espousing a claim over 
Mt Fubilan.  
The highway communities face different environmental and social challenges to 
the other impact areas. While the highway brings economic advantage and mobility, 
the main concern for most of the communities is road safety, dust, and pollution 
associated with the truck convoys and CuCon and PCon pipelines. In the initial Plan D 
patrol (the proto–MLE), some of the concerns of the community were voiced. An 
important point raised by Kevin Deko (VPC Wanganai) was that:  
…travel and banking facilities is [sic] very hard for the communities. The banks are 
usually full with long lines, and people cannot bank in one day, they overnight and 
have no place to stay. Can OTML, Mr Masani recommend to [PNG] Micro Finance to 
open an office in Ningerum.  
Awin Tamaro villagers raised questions about the CMCA Women and 
Children’s 10% fund37, especially wanting to know how to access the funds. Also 
mentioned that they want to know what is going on at strategic level for the allocation 
37 Part of the CMCA Review’s compensation package, see chapter 5  
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of Women and Children’s fund. The Tutuwe trust region communities all, as reported 
in the minutes of delegates, regional and village meetings, are concerned with ensuring 
the KiungaTabubil Highway is maintained at the same (or at least close to) standard it 
has been while the Ok Tedi mine remains open.  
Across the whole of Tutuwe Trust, there was a level of hopelessness in the 
communities reported by OTML CR personnel in 2009, relating specifically to the fact 
that mine closure was so close and that ‘now they showed resignation to the fact that 
nothing much may happen by mine closure. They have very high expectation of change 
by way of tangible benefits without really knowing exactly what they want’ (OTML 
2009k:17). The shifting goalposts for mine closure do not help with managing 
expectations of communities in the CMCA more widely. Many of these issues were 
brought up by MLE delegates Michael Gen (Hiorenkia), Penai Napu (Tope), Keri 
(Kerry) Krori (Mimigre) and women’s rep Cathrine Puse (Menumsore) in Delegates 
Meeting #3 in March 2011.  
A common difficulty for the OTMC stakeholder organisations with the highway 
communities was refusal to attend scheduled meetings. This occurred during the 
CMCA Review as well as the MLE meetings (Michael Namalok pers. comm.2012). 
The communities were not happy with the outcome of the meetings. In a letter to 
OTML in 2011 the people of Highway Villages (29) stated that:  
OTML CR Consultation Patrol was not welcomed [sic] by Highway Communities…on 
the basis of fundamental issues yet there are other issues to be named, we hereby 
strongly advice [sic] you that your unfacilitated consultation patrol is not welcomed. 
Even if facilitated, our people will still refuse to welcome any form of consultation 
patrol related to OTML operations, whether it is MLE or whatever (Letter OTML 4 
November 2011).  
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When OTML CR officers, the Tanorama facilitators, MLE regional delegate 
Lalmana GaeGae, attempted to conduct the MLE meeting in Kwiloknai, Haidowogam, 
Tapko and Bumbin these villages refused to turn up or be interested in the consultation 
process. This meeting round was able to be conducted at Sisimakam. The avoidance of 
the MLE village meetings stems from long running disputes between OTML and the 
highway villages about issues such as grass cutting to PCON spills. It is a form of 
protest that they do not engage with the OTMC stakeholder organisations unless they 
see some form of obvious immediate benefit.  
South of Ningerum is twenty highway villages ranging from Ienkenai to Gii, 
located just outside Kiunga. The southern villages are inland of the Ok Tedi and not 
subject to the same level of river based environmental impact that is associated with the 
northern highway villages. This area was not covered in my fieldwork, and I was not 
party to any meetings as the MLE meetings are divided between Kiunga and Tabubil 
based field teams.  
3.6 Wai Tri Trust Region and Alice River Trust Region / Lower Ok Tedi  
Alice River Trust region  
The Lower Ok Tedi Agreement was recognition that the Lower Ok Tedi area 
deserved more compensation for damages, as the impacts on access to resources was 
greater than any other part of the Ok Tedi impact area. The communities involved in 
the LOTA were: Ambaga, Atkamba, Bige, Bongobun, Demasuke, Dome, Ieran, Iogi, 
Kawok, Komopkin, Konkonda, Kwiape, Miamrae, Sarae, Senamrae. These villages 
signed the agreement on 9 May 1997. This special recognition enabled access to a 
K40m package further discussed in chapter 5.  
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Wai Tri Trust region  
The Wai Tri trust region is located along the Ok Tedi on both the east and west 
banks38. The Yonggom inhabit the west bank of the Ok Tedi River and this area is 
where profound changes have taken place during their lifetimes (Jackson 2003; Kirsch 
1993; Kirsch 1997). During the 1960s, the Australian colonial administrators 
encouraged the Yonggom to move as far away from the border as they could, but 
remain on Yonggom land (Jackson 1993; King 1997). This meant settling far nearer to 
the bank of the Ok Tedi River than any of them had previously lived. This situation 
created new pressures and conflicts on resources, such as garden land, housing, and 
services (King 1998:80). The Yonggom were the main ethnic group represented in a 
class action suit for compensation against the Ok Tedi mine’s major shareholder BHP. 
The west bank is not accessible by road, so there are different development challenges 
faced by the villages there. The main features of this region are the river damage and 
the Bige Mine Waste Tailings Project.  
A small number of North Fly villages within the RESA village list are not 
represented in the CMCA. In the North Ok Tedi region, one particular village is 
Karandimok, which highlights the confused nature of community and company 
perceptions in funding issues. This village was recognised through the RESA era 
environmental impact assessments in 1995 to be affected by the development of the 
mine, as it is located on the Ok Birim. It annually receives compensation from OTML 
via the Heduru Trust. In 2000 the village had 44 people, but it was not surveyed 
separately in the 1980 or 1990 censuses (NSO 2000:11). In 2012, Karandimok had a 
population of 74 people and consisted of three clans – Kimki Taramgo, Kimki Kereyap 
and Kiko Tetput (OTML 2012g). However, it is not part of the CMCA as a standalone 
village. In a letter from OTML CR to the Ningerum LLG Senior Area Affairs Officer, 
38 See Map 3.7 in Appendix II and Table 3.7.x in Appendix III  
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Dume Wo’o, in November 2001, it is stated Karandimok was believed by OTML to be 
part of Kungembit village, and as such would receive benefits through that channel. A 
2003 OTML CR interoffice memo states that Karandimok chose not to join the CMCA 
even though it was invited, as it was part of a class action against OTML in the early 
2000s (OTML 2003c:5). By March 2010 Karandimok was asking OTML to be 
included separately in the MLE negotiations, via a letter of endorsement from the 
Ningerum LLG Manager Jim Ufaio. However, Karandimok was not on any schedule of 
MLE meetings at any level as obviously OTML still considers it not a separate 
community.  
This area is not covered in my fieldwork and I attended no MLE village 
meetings as these meetings in this area were covered by another MLE extension 
consultation group. The delegates at Delegates Meeting #3 in Tabubil representing the 
Wai Tri were Ketu Nuri (Kwiape), Nick Bun39 (Atkamba), James Assan (Konkonda), 
Moses Oti (Bongabun) and women’s rep Juliet Hmentori (Senamrae). The main 
concerns expressed by these delegates was they lacked confidence in the FRPG to 
implement development in the area. They also wanted better access to funds through 
OTDF. They also expressed health concerns from environmental pollution damage to 
the river: sores on legs. The concerns relating to health and environment are important 
to people in this region, as this is where the most significant overbank flooding and 
dieback occurs along the lower Ok Tedi. Stuart Kirsch has long advocated for the 
communities in this region, writing extensively about their responses to environmental 
impacts (Kirsch 1991; 1996a; 1997; 2002; 2004; 2007b; 2014).  
Kirsch has talked less about how the desires of the Yonggom communities of 
the Wai Tri trust region are the same as the rest of the 156 villages across the CMCA 
mine impact region. As with the other three previous examined trust groupings, what 
39 Also the President of Ok Tedi Mine Impact Area Association.  
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the Wai Tri trust region communities are most unhappy about is the lack of CMCA 
development projects or PNGSDP projects in each of their villages. At the village 
meeting in Atkamba 13/5/2010 villagers raised two comments relating to future 
livelihood and development in their village:  
• What are we going to survive on when our environment is already 
spoilt?  
• This is like a cover up because since the mine started there has been no 
schools, no aid post, no development in our village. We want to live in good 
houses, have electricity, water supply.  
The basic desires for a better, easier life through community development and 
infrastructure projects is the same across all the villages in the Wai Tri trust. 
Development is a priority, but communication of development plans and processes 
from OTFRDP and PNGSDP and the method to access money are critically important.  
3.7 Conclusion  
This chapter examined the communities of the Ok Tedi mine impact area as a range of 
stakeholder organisations – the CMCA trust regions. The communities within the 
CMCA trust regions all have fears about mine closure despite MLE being discussed 
and negotiated. The communities all complain about the lack of tangible benefits from 
mining. The lack of effective communication from PNGSDP and OTDFRDP through 
the VPC channel to villagers obviously needs to be remedied, because there is a 
complete disconnect between the grassroots villager and the funds held in trust for 
community development. Without effective mechanisms to communicate to 
communities, there might as well not be money for development because the 
communities are not seeing the benefits in front of them.  
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The next chapter will discuss the development of mine closure and 
sustainability planning through the OTMC and the bottlenecks hindering development 
in Western Province.   
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Chapter Four – The institutional politics of sustainability and 
mine closure planning  
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter is about the politics of planning for Western Province, in particular the 
North Fly District. This chapter will examine the way planning is conducted through 
relations between the major stakeholder organisations of the Ok Tedi mine for the 
communities in the mine impact region. The chapter, through this examination, 
illuminates the fundamental issues of sustainable development in Western Province. 
This chapter debates the details of the political stakeholders, the substance of available 
plans, and the influence that the Ok Tedi Mine Complex (OTMC) has on determining 
the outcome of the planning process.  
The existence of the OTMC influences both the design and outcome of the post 
closure sustainability planning process. As cited earlier in the introduction chapter, 
Historical New Institutionalism describes the institution as being able to ‘shap(e) not 
just actor’s strategies … but also their goals as well’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 9). 
This chapter will demonstrate that the expectations of the various political stakeholders 
are heavily influenced by the constraints of the OTMC, as such the failure to generate 
outcomes from plans are foreseen by the plan designers before they are implemented.  
The power relations between the primary stakeholders and the secondary 
stakeholders needs to be examined in detail because there are different levels of 
influence and agenda setting abilities for the primary and secondary stakeholders to 
wield. The three most important stakeholders in the development of the sustainability 
and mine closure planning process were the national government, OTML, and 
PNGSDP. The other stakeholder organisations, Ok Tedi Development Foundation/Ok 
Tedi Fly River Development Program, CMCA trusts, provincial and local level 
government, are involved in the social and economic aspects of mine closure.  
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 The social and economic aspects of mine closure plans are especially 
significant for the pivotal place that the Ok Tedi mine holds in the regional economy 
and the opportunities, benefits and services that it provides to local communities. This 
chapter will explore the complex relationships that have developed between the 
primary stakeholders: the national government, the provincial government, PNGSDP, 
and impacted communities, on the subject of mine closure planning during the life of 
the mine to date. It will also reflect the way that plans for the sustainable development 
of the mine-affected area have been related to the broader national policy process 
dealing with the issue of mine closure and the contribution of the mining industry to 
sustainable development outcomes for people living in such areas. An in-depth 
examination of PNG's mine closure policies and a discussion of the inadequacies of the 
current regime is conducted.  
4.2 Fundamental challenges in sustainability planning in Western Province 
leading up to mine closure  
Planning for a sustainable future for the Ok Tedi mine’s impact area involves a greater 
community focus than most other mines. The scale of the Ok Tedi mine impact area, 
coupled with the lack of government engagement in the province, means that the 
difficulties and complexities of the closure planning are exacerbated. OTML has over 
the years provided many services, both for the Tabubil community and for the province 
as a whole. Through the various development trusts, the company and its development 
partners provide services to over 100,000 people from Atemkit all the way to the Fly 
Delta islands.  
The Ok Tedi mine is the primary economic driver of the province, as without it, 
the province would not have much in the way of significant economic activity. Mining 
in remote areas can often mean that the mining company becomes a de facto 
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administrator, providing services such as healthcare, education and transport 
infrastructure (Jackson 1992). There is a disconnection between public policy making, 
and all that it involves in agenda setting and discourses, and implementation of policy. 
In this context, a mining company enters into an area and creates services for the local 
people, not just the people who work for the company. This induces reliance by the 
local communities on the mining company, referred to as the resource dependency 
syndrome (Filer 1998), which leads to expectations that the services will continue post 
closure. This means that consideration of socioeconomic impacts of mine closure have 
to be at the forefront of mine closure planning.  
 This commitment goes beyond corporate social responsibility to a role similar 
to that of a foster parent to a neglected child. The government services throughout PNG 
are run down, underfunded or absent. In the 40 years since independence there has been 
little actual change in the lives of people in remote areas. Considering that the majority 
of the population lives in rural and remote areas, the dearth of services available to this 
majority of the population is notable.  
National Government  
The relationship between OTML and the national government is complicated because 
of the different departments involved. The national government is a complex 
stakeholder of Ok Tedi. It has an 18.2% equity stake in OTML which it holds on behalf 
of the people of PNG, Western Province and the Mine Area Village landowners (Post 
Courier 16/6/2011). The national government also collects royalties and taxes on the 
copper concentrate and gold that the mine produces. It also, through the Mineral 
Resources Authority, regulates and monitors the mine. Rather than the national 
government being an amorphous singular voice, the various departments and offices of 
the Government have very different views and relationships with the Ok Tedi mine. 
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The Department of Treasury sits on the OTML board, but is not involved with 
regulation of the industry. The MRA and the DEC are most involved in regulation of 
the mine. The national government also approves amendments (supplemental 
agreements) to the Mining (Ok Tedi) Act, as well as the Mine Closure Plans. Although 
there would seem to be a conflict of interest in the Government's relationship with the 
mine and OTML, different departments deal with different aspects of the relationship.  
From the inception of the Ok Tedi project, the national government has had a 
full role in the development and operation of the mine. The structure of the Principal 
Agreement clause requiring any changes to the Act be discussed with and passed 
through the parliament, in addition to the equity participation in the project, ensured 
that the national government has always been appraised of the workings of the mine. 
This insider knowledge has meant that at times OTML has benefitted from the 
government’s cooperation and support when facing difficult situations (for example, 
with the Interim Tailings Scheme), and at other times OTML has been subject to 
particular and intense scrutiny. The government-company relationship heavily depends 
on the motivations behind the particular elected official from Western Province interest 
in the mine. The national government acknowledges the lack of good governance 
throughout PNG as stated in the Vision 2050 document of 2009:  
the lack of good governance, accountability and transparency has contributed to the 
deterioration in the delivery of public goods and services at the 
microlevel…Infrastructure in the broad sense must be improved to enhance 
accessibility and service delivery to bring improvement to remote, rural and urban 
communities. (Vision 2050:29)  
The national government’s appropriation of PNGSDP’s shareholding in OTML 
has placed pressure on the relationship between OTMC stakeholder organisations. This 
action by the national government has severely curtailed the development activities of 
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PNGSDP since 2013, and changed the positive relationship that had developed 
between the OTMC stakeholder organisations. This does not bode well for the 
sustainability of services for Tabubil town or Kiunga, as PNGSDP had planned to 
assume control of these assets as opposed to them defaulting to the provincial 
government.  
Western Province Government and Administration  
The Western Province’s government, more commonly known as the Fly River 
Provincial Government (FRPG), was established in 1977. The stakeholder 
organisations of the OTMC have gone through peaks and troughs with FRPG. The 
lowest ebbs of the relationship are when the provincial government was suspended by 
the National Executive Council for gross mismanagement of funds in August 1985, and 
in the 1990s when the provincial administrator resigned after touring the province 
getting signatures to press for the closure of the mine (Jackson 2003) . Up until the 
2012 elections the relationship between other stakeholders and the provincial 
government was at another low. The elected Governor Dr Bob Danaya, the Governor 
for 2 terms, was antagonistic and difficult. He was continually in the business of 
obfuscating and grandstanding, however he was primarily against environmental 
damages. FRPG is led currently by Governor Ati Wobiro40  
Table 4.1 Premiers and Governors of Western Province  
Premier/Governor  Years  Notes  
Tatie Olewale  1977 – 1983    
Semai Aitowai  1983 – 1985  Suspended 1985–1988  
Norbert Makmop  1988 – 1991    
Isidore Kaseng  1991 – 1992  Suspended 1992–1995  
Dere Waramo  1995 – 1997    
Norbert Makmop  1997 – 2000  Suspended 2000–2002  
40 Ati Wobiro has a Masters in Economics, was a former Provincial Planner of Western Province in the 1990s, 
former Acting Administrator of Department of Western, former country Manager of World Vision, former Church 
Elder of the Evangelical Church of Papua, former employee of PNGSDP. As of February 2015, charged with 
corruption. He was charged with 12 offences: four for abuse of office, four of conspiracy to defraud and four of 
misappropriation of public funds (Papua New Guinea Today 2015).  
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Premier/Governor  Years  Notes  
Bob Tawa Danaya  2002 – 2012    
Ati Wobiro  2012 – Present  Corruption  Allegations  
2014–15  
  
At the provincial level there are two distinct groups that are critical to the 
overall Ok Tedi mine stakeholder relationship for mine closure and sustainability 
planning. The first is the elected government represented in the Western Province 
Assembly; the second is the Western Provincial Administration. The provincial 
administrator, William Goinau (2009–2011) and Modowa Gumoi (2011–2015), is the 
head of the bureaucracy and controls the budget. The relationship between Provincial 
Administrator and FRPG of late has been difficult. Internal politics within the province 
are often blamed for the lack of effective policy planning and implementation. Goinau 
worked cooperatively with OTML and PNGSDP during his tenure, but the sourness of 
the relations between the FRPG and OTML, PNGSDP, OTFRDP, and the WPA is 
often shown by the absence of provincial government representatives at critical 
meetings. There has often not been effective governance in Western Province over the 
past 30 years, with the administration being suspended numerous times.  
Many difficulties exist in the Provincial and LLG planning for development. 
The Western Province Capacity Building Project funded by OTML in 2000 was 
designed by OTML to overcome some of these difficulties. But with a history of weak 
governance, corrupt administration and even an absentee government (provincial 
government suspended several times by the national government for gross 
mismanagement) within two years of this project commencing, funds for the running of 
this organisation were not forthcoming from either the national government or the 
provincial government. OTML even asked the national government not to place its 
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contributions into ‘the black hole otherwise known as the Provincial Operating 
Account’ (Filer and Imbun 2009)  
These complex problems are not aided by specific and directed difficulties in 
stakeholder relations with the provincial government. Overtly hostile is the only way to 
describe the FRPG's stance towards OTML and PNGSDP. The former governor of 
Western Province, Dr Bob Danaya, used threats of annexation of PNGSDP on behalf of 
the people of Western Province as a constant destabilising device. PNGSDP's 
Chairman retorted to this by saying that ‘the (Western) province has no history of a 
fully functioning government or a fully functioning infrastructure to deliver goods and 
services to the people’ (Namorong 2011). The thorn in all other stakeholders' sides is 
the grandstanding and posturing of the provincial government at the expense of the 
very people they claim to represent. The Western Province Administration (WPA) is in 
charge of the bureaucracy, and the provincial administrator is able to act independently 
from the Governor and three Open members. However, the WPA has over the years 
been ineffectual in expanding services to areas within the province which are subject to 
increasing population pressures. The North Fly District has been effectively left to be 
administrated by OTML since the early 1980s. In this climate, effective provincial 
planning is impossible. The plans that the provincial government and administration 
have in the past developed are not in line with the reality of Western Province. In 2008, 
the Deputy Provincial Administrator, Willy Kokoba, wrote:  
In Western Province, well-meaning projects and program plans fade away as a 
result of conflicting and contradicting political views compounded by past 
administrations either by default, design or both. The political desires to 
support a transparent budget to sustain the implementation of development 
proposals were mismatched such as proper project costings which, in most 
cases were non-existent…thus resulting in increased bad administration with 
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below average production of goods and services. To the people of the 
province, it meant that very little or nothing had been achieved through past 
governments and the public service.  
The chronic development dilemma for Western Province was that there was 
little existing public infrastructure, health or education services or transport to facilitate 
policy and project implementation. The decades of neglect from FRPG, on top of the 
vastness of Western Province, meant that even if a project was properly planned, the 
implementation was often ineffective and the outcomes were unsustainable. 
Maintenance and development of new roads to aid transportation have not been funded 
by the government but left to OTML to fill the gap. The division between the 
bureaucracy of the Western Provincial Administration and the elected members of the 
FRPG is the only thing that enables any form of dialogue between the Administration 
and OTML, PNGSDP, and OTFRDP. Even this budding relationship came under fire 
from the Governor, who in 2011 attempted to sack the Provincial Administrator 
William Goinau despite having no such powers. This antagonistic relationship harms 
the province. Goinau subsequently left and Modowa Gumoi was appointed, but there 
have been allegations of corruption levelled against him.  
 The role of Western Province in supporting Tabubil post closure will have to 
be one of mutual cooperation with other stakeholders. The FRPG would ideally like all 
of Tabubil's assets, infrastructure and utilities to be turned over to them when the Ok 
Tedi mine closes (Nigel Parker pers. comm. 2012). However, their track record with 
maintaining towns to a safe standard is wanting. The deterioration of Daru, the 
provincial capital, is testament to the ability of the provincial government to provide 
services to the people. The 200 deaths from the 2010 cholera outbreak on the island 
(PC 7/12/2010), the overflowing morgue (PC 25/10/2010), and the crumbling 
infrastructure all point to a crisis in provincial governance.  
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OTML over the years has slowly had to take over many of the functions that 
should be the responsibility of the provincial government. The handout mentality is 
something that afflicts the Ok Tedi mine's local communities. The local communities 
always look to OTML to give them things, such as healthcare and education, even 
when it is the responsibility of the provincial government (Musje Werror pers. comm. 
2010). The provincial government is ‘difficult’ with OTML and PNGSDP, to the point 
that Western Province Governor Bob Danaya did everything in his power to prevent 
productive relations between OTML, PNGSDP and the provincial administrator. This 
situation is highlighted by a 2006 statement by the Governor where he accused 
PNGSDP of financial wrong doing and OTML of lack of community consultation and 
engagement. He expressed the desire that the people of Western Province should have a 
majority ownership of the Ok Tedi Mine – at least 52% (Danaya 2006). Considering 
the amount of money that the provincial government collects from Ok Tedi, which puts 
it at the highest per capita revenue in the country, the lack of provincial service 
provision is stark.   
Throughout the country there has been varying success with provincial 
governments. Western Province has the worst record of all provinces in terms of 
capacity, governance, and service delivery. Other resource rich provinces have 
managed the windfall from large mines or other resource developments better than 
Western. Comparing New Ireland, Enga and Western Provinces shows that there has 
been much better management in New Ireland Province and Enga than in Western on 
every single development indicator. While Western Province is much larger with a 
sparser population than Enga and New Ireland Province, the problem is not with 
distance, it is with basic management of funds.  
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OTMC Stakeholder Organisations and priorities.  
OTML has over the years taken the role of de-facto administrator in the North Fly, 
providing services which had been non-existent in the colonial and independence era. 
They act where government capacity is lacking. The expectation from the communities 
is that OTML is supposed to provide, but in many cases it is the provincial government 
which is supposed to provide. OTML has been trying to withdraw from this role, with 
OTFRDP and PNGSDP taking over. OTML and PNGSDP have improved relations 
considerably since PNGSDP was formed. They had previously been unsure of what 
role the other was taking, and as such meetings and relations were cool. PNGSDP 
became a more mature development company, and OTML became sure of the 
supportive role that PNGSDP had, disagreements were less often and are more easily 
resolved.  
 OTML and OTFRDP have an interesting relationship, because of the fact that 
most of the staff of OTFRDP are former OTDF or OTML employees. This however 
has led to some CMCA communities expressing the opinion that OTFRDP is no 
different to OTDF, and are sometimes difficult with the OTFRDP officers. However, 
the OTFRDP is not OTML or OTDF, and they have their own ways of approaching 
development. OTFRDP staff have indicated that they see their role as developing 
communities, where OTML’s role is to mine and give compensation. This may sound 
negative, but the division of labour between these organisations is critical. OTML is a 
mining company; OTDF/OTFRDP and PNGSDP are development companies. The less 
they ‘overstep’ each other's boundaries the better.  
As for OTML, OTDF/OTFRDP, PNGSDP and their relations with the FRPG, 
there were a multitude of problems facing the relationship to become less adversarial. 
The more that Danaya and Boka Kondra (Member for North Fly) postured about how 
PNGSDP should be owned by FRPG, or that OTML has ruined the province, the less 
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cooperation can be fostered. FRPG and the Provincial Administration had effectively 
left the North Fly district to OTML to administrate for the last 30 years, and only now 
that the mine is scheduled for closure, the FRPG is complaining that the provincial 
services are lacking; despite service provision in Western Province being the 
responsibility of government. With closure possibly imminent, working out the roles 
for each stakeholder is critical. By working multilaterally rather than unilaterally on a 
variety of community and regional development projects, much more effective 
outcomes can be reached.  
4.3 Planning mine closure for sustainability – a chronology of OTMC 1976–
2000  
The Ok Tedi mine was developed at a time when globally mine closure planning was in 
its infancy. The shift towards more environmentally safe abandonment practices, 
established throughout developed countries such as Australia and Canada, had not yet 
occurred in PNG. The Ok Tedi mine did not have any guidance from the national 
mining framework at the time (Mining Ordinance 1937) or the Mining (Bougainville 
Copper Agreement) Act 1967. Therefore, there is no reference to mine closure in the 
Principal Agreement in 1976. The mine was expected to operate for at least 25 years. 
As Panguna, the other large-scale copper mine in the country, was not near the end of 
the mining cycle in 1976 either, at the time of the Principal Agreement, very little 
thought was generated for policies about mine closure or post-closure. As there were 
no large-scale mine closures occurring any time during the 1980s in PNG, there was a 
lack of attention paid to the sustainability and mine closure planning issue as the mine 
was only just starting. At Ok Tedi the focus was solely on the construction and 
operation phases. It was not until the early 1990s when the Development Forum 
process was conducted retrospectively at Ok Tedi mine, that future planning for 
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community development was acknowledged as a policy necessity. At that point, there 
was a commitment by the national government to examine the long-term development 
of the Ok Tedi area. In the 1991 MOA Clause 6 states:  
…the National Government will make available a consultant for such period as 
is required to assist the Star Mountains Local Government and the Fly River 
Provincial Government in establishing a long term economic development plan 
for the Tabubil District.  
The Office of National Planning and Implementation and Department of 
Mineral Resources were responsible for funding the economic plan, rather than the 
Office of Environment and Conservation. It took until 1999 to produce the Tabubil 
Outline Long Term Economic Development Plan by OTML consultant Richard 
Jackson. After 1995 the Organic Law on Provincial Government and Local Level 
Government (OLPGLLG) meant that the provinces and LLGs would be responsible for 
drawing up their own development plans, but the commitment to the Long Term 
Development Plan (LTDP) pre-dated the new law. The eight year gap between the 
commitment and the outcome meant that OTML was effectively in charge of district 
planning in the North Fly District, as the provincial government was incompetent and 
distracted with other governance problems. This document took almost a decade to be 
produced. It was part of the Ok Tedi MOA in 1991. In 1993 and 1995, the terms of 
reference were provided for it by the Department of Finance and Planning. The 
substance of the finally delivered LTDP on December 1st 1999 can be summarized in 
three general recommendations:  
(Firstly)…There must be prudent financial planning for the future for without 
that nothing can be done. Overwhelmingly, such planning must be restricted to 
the public finance sector – which, at all levels of government in PNG has not 
performed immaculately in recent years – but there remains some scope for 
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advice on investment on investment strategies to be given to private 
individuals.  
(Secondly)…the administrative capabilities of government structures, 
especially local government structures, urgently need to be developed…When 
the project (Ok Tedi Mine) closes they will be expected to be the prime 
suppliers of community facilities and their maintenance. They are not in a 
position to do this at the present time. Thus, a planned process of gradual 
institutional strengthening is required.  
(Thirdly)…the presence of OTML has temporarily masked – thanks to the 
company providing massive transportation subsidies for many of the region’s 
activities – the fundamental problem facing any sort of development work in 
the North Fly in general and in the Tabubil area in particular…So even if 
public funds are accumulated over the next few years as a result of a carefully 
managed financial policy and even in an increasingly form of local 
government can evolve in that period, without significant reductions in the 
region’s isolation much of those funds will be wasted and many of the most 
efficient of the LLG plans will not succeed. (Jackson 1999: 106)  
 The Ok-Fly Social Monitoring Project reports between 1991 and 1995 
highlight the need for better planning and process in designing community projects 
under the auspices of the Fly River Development Trust (FRDT) as many failed in their 
putative aims, and were poorly implemented with no follow up (Burton 1993; 1994). 
The recommendations of the report series were largely ignored as the reports were not 
widely distributed throughout OTML so their impact on the development of 
sustainability policy is difficult to determine. Sustainable development was also 
examined in the OTML consultancy report ‘Towards Sustainable Development in the 
Ok Tedi Area’ (Jackson et al. 1995), which was produced at a time when many people 
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were calling for the immediate closure of the mine due to environmental concerns. This 
report included the following observation:  
It is clear that currently there is a significant level of business activity in the 
region. It is equally clear that little of this activity is sustainable. Most of the 
activity is directly or indirectly dependent on OTML…the heavy subsidies and 
support (aside from direct compensation) currently provided by OTML to 
many activities in the area can be viewed in the same way as any sort of 
subsidy – they encourage inefficiency, impede initiative and are effectively a 
tax on the people of PNG outside Western Province….the existing standard of 
living could not be maintained in the presence of ‘real’ prices for these 
services and most businesses could not survive in the face of “real” 
competition’. (Jackson et al. 1995: i)  
The clear message from all the reports of the time was that there was no 
overarching plan for the North Fly Disrict or Western Province as a whole. This is 
attributable to the FRPG being undermined by the Kiunga Lake Murray District 
Development Agreement (discussed in chapter 2), or distracted by the suspension of 
Isadore Kaseng’s government, or the Victorian court case. The lack of provincial 
engagement with OTML, especially in planning matters, was detrimental to the 
development of the province.  
 Mine closure planning formally started at Ok Tedi in 1998 through the Ok Tedi 
Rehabilitation Planning Committee. This committee consisted of members from 
OTML departments and government representatives. It was set up to help categorize 
key issues associated with the mine closure, develop a suitable closure framework, and 
aid communication of mine closure issues with all stakeholders (Newton et al. 2000: 4). 
The committee was later renamed the Mine Closure Planning Committee, and 
consisted of the primary committee and a number of sub-committees: Infrastructure, 
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Health, Education, Business Development, Provincial Government, and Community 
Consultation (Kennedy 2003).  
The sustainable development agenda was further developed by the 
formalisation of recognition of the need for sustainability in the Ok Tedi mine impact 
areas. In early 1999 a sustainable development workshop was held by OTML and 
attended by other stakeholder organisations to discuss the sustainable future of the area 
(Newton et al.  
2000). Ten sustainability principles emerged from this workshop:  
• providing a sustainable economic base  
• maintaining infrastructure (road network, bridges, radio 
station, hospital, Kiunga - Tabubil highway, airstrips and 
communication systems)  
• providing effective governance for the future  
• mitigating environmental impacts  
• ensuring a skilled labour force  
• continued access to health and education services  
• gender equity  
• providing food security  
• having an integrated development and mine closure plan 
(Newton et al. 2000)  
In July 1999, OTML convened another workshop to discuss how these 
principles of sustainable development could be applied to OTML's environmental and 
community programs. This workshop was attended by stakeholder representatives from 
OTML, BHP, the national government departments of Mineral Resources, 
Environment and Conservation, Treasury, Planning, Attorney General and Western 
Province, as well as independent participants (OTML 2000). At this workshop, the idea 
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for OTDF was first mooted, as distinct from the previous Ok Tedi Fly River 
Development Trust. Importantly, the group defined sustainable development as it 
applies to the North Fly and the rest of the Western Province after the Ok Tedi mine is 
exhausted. This workshop identified sustainability objectives that need to be achieved 
by the time the mine closes in order to have satisfied the elements of sustainable 
development as the group defined them. This focus on sustainability with specific 
reference to mine closure shows that OTML's consideration of sustainability concurs 
with the influence of the global sustainability planning agenda through the Mining 
Minerals and Sustainable Development Project  
OTML’s first mine closure reports were developed out of these collaborative 
workshops on sustainability. The reports consisted of two major documents: OTML 
Rehabilitation and Closure Plan and Social and Sustainable Development Issues in 
Relation to Mine Closure. These reports were presented in November 2000. The OTML 
Rehabilitation and Closure Plan 2000 was prepared with the national government to 
meet both parties’ obligations and sets out to identify functional areas (mine 
operations), issues and options associated with mine closure and addresses 
rehabilitation of the functional areas and other areas of impact (OTML 2000a). The 
Social and Sustainable Development Issues in Relation to Mine Closure report details 
OTML's position on sustainability for the impacted communities. For OTML 
sustainability:  
• includes a relationship between current and future generations;  
• requires an institutional framework for governance so that facilities and 
programs can persist, and  
• assumes both socioeconomic and environmental improvements, on-
going after  
mine life.  
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Sustainability will be measured by such factors as regional economic stability, 
infrastructure and access, skills base and jobs, and social cohesion (OTML 2000b:50).  
4.4. New regime for mine closure planning and sustainability 2001 – 2006  
Between 2001 and 2006, the OTMC expanded with new stakeholder organisations, 
legislation, and regulations. This section examines the key parts of the 9SA applying to 
the mine closure and sustainability planning process.  The 9SA has as its third schedule 
the Mine Closure and Decommissioning Code 2001, known as the ‘The Code’ or 
MCDC, which sets out the obligations of OTML for closure planning. The Mining Act 
1992 had no provisions for closure, and the national government had only just started 
discussing a national mine closure policy as part of the PNG Mining Sector 
Institutional Strengthening Technical Assistance project funded by the World Bank. In 
any event, any national mine closure policy would only act in Ok Tedi's case to ‘fill the 
gaps’ in the MCDC, as Ok Tedi mine is not subject to legislation inconsistent with its 
own Act and Supplemental Agreements (Allens, Arthur, Robinson 2006; Patrick 
Kapuot pers. comm 2011). The MCDC in Clause 2.3 (a) states:  
…this Code (MCDC), and the Mine Closure Plan, apply in respect of the operations of 
the Project (Ok Tedi Mine) after the Commencement Date to the exclusion of anything 
inconsistent with them in the Principal Agreement and any other laws or regulations 
concerning mine closure and decommissioning whether in force before or after the 
Commencement Date.  
The closure planning process involved not just decommissioning, rehabilitation 
and relinquishment plans, but also a central theme of socio-economic and cultural 
impacts, and effects of closure on the impacted communities. From 2002 to 2006, 
OTML provided three Draft Mine Closure plans to the national government as the 
MCDC requires draft plans to be submitted every 2 years.  
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Draft Mine Closure Plan 2002  
This OTML Draft Mine Closure Plan was developed: ‘…in accordance with Company 
desires, shareholder commitment and Government agreement…in conformance with 
the Ok Tedi Closure and Decommissioning Code 2001…and in the spirit of Best 
Practice Environmental Management’ (OTML 2002). The draft Mine Closure Plan was 
to be developed after consultation with all levels of Government and communities 
affected by the mine. It was to be ‘substantially’ consistent with development strategies 
of the national government and complement the provincial government and LLG 
development plans within the areas affected by the mine (MCDC 2001).It would 
appear that the main point of this draft plan was to identify gaps in existing data and in 
planning preparedness. The data and analysis was to be used ‘to establish priorities for 
further consultation’ (OTML 2002).  
CMCA Trusts  
CMCA regional plans were developed by regional trusts in conjunction with OTML’s 
Regional Development department in order to facilitate use of the CMCA development 
funds in a more sustainable way. Plans were conceived from extensive field 
consultations with consultation with provincial government, CMCA villages, and 
LLGs.  
Outcomes from these consultations took the form of five year rolling plans. An 
example of this extensive consultation is the Nupmo Development Plan of 200241. In 
this plan the prioritised areas of development were:  
1. improved housing; improved housing with electricity;  
2. increased small business activities including: timber milling, cash crop 
introduction,  
41 Tutuwe regional trust also had a development drawn up by OTML at the same time.  
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3. livestock production and cottage type industries;  
4. improved farming methods and systems;  
5. community and public facilities such as meeting halls (Nupmo Trust 
2002)  
Development strategies outlined in this document point to the promotion of 
selected and suitable business and cash cropping activities. The OTDF and the 
Regional Development Team and the Trustees are to ensure that every proposal is well 
set out and feasibility studies are carried out to determine viability before funds are 
approved.  
‘The ‘Hand-out’ culture must be discouraged in all sectors of the community and 
equity (in whatever form appropriate) must be an important component to all village 
project implementation’ (Nupmo Trust 2002:36).  
This points to the community taking:  
…full responsibility for all development activities that are approved by the Trust for 
implementation…the trustees should adopt a ‘slow but sure’ attitude…That all 
members of the VPCs and village leaders understand the importance of wellplanned 
and designed project(s) and the slow process of implementation …The villagers will in 
turn contribute land, labour cash and other resources towards agreed project activities 
(Nupmo Trust 2002:36).  
The development plans indicate that a level of comprehension within the 
CMCA community organisations of the complex funding and planning processes, and 
feasibility study outputs was expected by OTDF and OTML Regional Development 
department. Unfortunately, the reality in the CMCA communities was a low level of 
communications and information sharing between the OTDF, Village Planning 
Committees and the villagers. The penetration of information to the grassroots CMCA 
villagers from OTDF over the course of 2002 – 2006 was low. The expectations put on 
the VPCs to understand the processes and responsibilities proved to be onerous and 
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unworkable in many cases. These issues were raised by communities as a reason why 
OTDF needed to become independent and more responsive to the CMCA communities.  
2004 Draft Mine Closure Plan  
The 2004 Draft Mine Closure plan was submitted to the national government on the 
15th February 2005. Part 2 of Social and Economic Impact Report of this Plan 
highlights again the problems for Western Province when the mine closes. Given very 
little provincial government presence in the area during mining there is no assurance 
that the FRPG will have the capacity to maintain infrastructure and services throughout 
the region. This is compounded by the province’s isolation from the rest of the country, 
low social and economic achievements, and ineffective government (OTML 2004).  
It was noted that since the mine started OTML has initiated various 
socioeconomic development initiatives. These programs have been undertaken through 
various business development, agriculture, forestry and fisheries divisions. Most of 
these programs have been under the direct control of OTML personnel. These functions 
should, when the mine closes, be transferred to other entities notably the provincial 
government and either PNGSDP or OTDF (OTML 2004:26).  
2006 Draft Mine Closure Plan  
The process in developing the 2006 Draft Mine Closure Plan built on the work done in 
2004. The SER in the 2006 iteration was more detailed. Once again this draft mine 
closure plan highlights the inadequacies within the FRPG and WPA to cope with the 
closure of the mine. Western Province did not have a master plan to effectively guide 
development or a mechanism to coordinate the activities of development partners. This 
draft plan emphasizes (OTML 2006c:64) factors that have contributed to the lack of 
development progress in the province:  
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• The province covers a vast area and the cost of service 
delivery is exceptionally high;  
• High transport costs and the absence of basic 
infrastructure, such as power and communication systems…  
• Low education standards may inhibit entrepreneurial 
activities and limit suitably qualified staff required for any new 
ventures  
• Many people in North and Middle Fly, in particular land 
users (not owners), will be prevented from planting cash crops or 
establishing new businesses  
• The South Fly, in particular is subject to particularly 
harsh climate conditions and many communities are forced to 
relocate in search of water….  
• The quality of public sector governance in Western 
Province has for many years been poor  
It is expected that government income will also fall dramatically post mine 
closure from around K160 million per annum to approximately K55 million per annum.  
4.5 Working towards a best practice mine closure planning process 2007–
2012  
After the CMCA Review was completed, a new managing director took over and there 
was progress towards the Detailed Mine Closure Plan (DMCP), which was submitted 
in 2009. A key influence on the DMCP was the strategic community and regional 
development planning activities OTML undertook leading up to the finalizing of the 
CMCA Review.  
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Community and Regional Development Strategy  
In early 2007, OTML and OTDF released the Community and Regional Development 
Strategy (CRDS). This strategy was developed in response to the reality that the FRPG 
used their ‘national budget allocation and mining revenue entitlements… principally 
for recurrent activities’ so OTML was the ‘only institution with additional development 
revenues… capable of community and regional development in the province’ (OTML 
2007:1). The Mine Closure and Decommissioning Code’s regulations relating to the 
Social and Economic Report (SER) of the mine closure plans submitted to the 
government meant OTML reviewed its contribution to Western Province, and 
accordingly the impact that closure would have without substantial capacity building in 
economic and social development. The CRDS acknowledges the ‘primary obligation to 
support the mine impacted communities in the lead up to and after mine closure’ with 
the goal of ‘support[ing] sustainable and equitable development in the mine impacted 
communities and the Western Province’ (OTML 2007:2). The CRDS would be 
implemented through two program initiatives: Community and Livelihood 
Development and Regional  Development.  The Community and Livelihood 
Development program was ‘to improve the livelihood and wellbeing of the 
communities living within the mine villages and the CMCA trust areas’ (OTML 
2007:4) and would focus the development activities of OTML and OTDF on:  
• Community Relations Support  
• Trust Management  
• Food Security  
▪  To support food security and improve household nutrition and 
access to income earning opportunities.  
• Community Development and Training  
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▪ To improve community development and planning skills and 
public access to information and resources in support of 
livelihood development  
• Development Vehicle – OTDF  
The Regional Development program was ‘to promote programs which diversify 
the economic base of the Western Province and facilitate public infrastructure and 
service development through partnership arrangements’ (OTML 2007: 6). This 
included:  
• Landowner Business Development  
▪ Local Contractors 
▪ Regional Business Enterprises  
• Rubber Development  
• Rural Development 
▪  To promote food security and primary industry development in 
support of sustainable livelihood development  
• Ecotourism  
• Public and Community Infrastructure  
• Health and Education Services  
• Planning and Coordination  
▪ To assist the provincial government to establish effective 
development planning and coordination mechanisms which will 
assist the development partners in working together to achieve 
the Western Province development priorities.  
From the highlighted portions of the plan, it can be seen that there was a large 
focus on community livelihood and sustainable development planning for the mine 
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impact areas. OTDF took over much of this responsibility (except Community 
Relations Support and Landowner Business Development, which remained within the 
Community and Business Support department of OTML). This is reflected in the 
OTFRDP 20102015 Business plan and 2010–2015 North Fly Regional Action Plan. 
These plans set forth the ways that the CRDS framework is built on and developed into 
practical policies for project implementation. The business plan, which was developed 
over three years, clarifies the respective responsibilities between OTML and OTFRDP. 
Chapter 5 identifies the scale and scope of the funding available for development 
programs overall, but for planning purposes OTFRDP identified thresholds for 
accessing CMCA Trust funds (K300,000), PNGSDP (K300,000 – 2 million) and 
Western Province People’s Dividend Trust Account –CMCA portion (More than K2 
million) (OTFRDP 2010b:74)  
This assumption of responsibilities was in line with the CMCA review outcome 
that OTDF should be separate from OTML. The CRDS acknowledges that the Regional 
Development program ‘is reliant on ongoing and effective collaboration’ between 
OTML, FRPG, PNGSDP, MRA and the Trusts, but that ‘collaboration… is hindered by 
the lack of a master plan to effectively guide development within the province and a 
mechanism to coordinate the activities of development partners’ (OTML 2007:18).  
OTFRDP’s main concerns were driven by the development aspirations of 
communities within the CMCA trusts. It was obligated to deliver existing programs to 
CMCA communities under the CRDS framework for Community and Livelihood 
Development and Regional Development. With new funding partners, OTFRDP would 
also develop larger scale programs: community housing projects, establishment of 
proper water supply systems and the construction of feeder roads to open areas for 
forestry, which were designed to benefit entire communities in the CMCA areas 
(OTFRDP 2010:14). For example, in the North Fly region, on the outskirts of Kiunga, 
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OTFRDP partnered with KK Kingston Ltd and the Provincial Department of Works to 
construct a feeder road using a chemical polymer road base.  
OTML also identified OTDF as the best mechanism to deliver development to 
the mine impact areas as it was already working with the communities there, but just 
needed the guiding strategy to become more effective and targeted in its approach. The 
CRDS represented a recognition of the OTMC’s impact on development. The programs 
identified within the strategy required cooperation from the OTMC stakeholder 
organisations for both planning and effective implementation.  
Benchmark Study Trip  
OTML learnt from the closure of Misima that provincial government capacity 
has to be clear and obvious for the government to be left in charge of infrastructure 
(OTML 2008a). OTML was heavily influenced in their mine closure planning by a 
benchmark study tour (OTML 2008) of three closed mines in the region – Minahasa 
Raya in North Sulawesi, Kelian in East Kalimantan (Indonesia) and Misima in Milne 
Bay Province in PNG. I will focus here only on the lessons drawn from the Misima 
mine. This trip served as a cautionary tale for OTML as to the importance of focusing 
on post-closure asset outcomes, securing sites and fixing land issues. The study came 
up with one key lesson: never leave infrastructure, plant equipment or services in the 
hands of organisations which lack the capacity to maintain them. The trip to Misima 
Island appears to have had the most influence on the perceptions and policy issues on 
the mine closure study group although their focus was more on remediation than on 
socio economic factors (OTML 2008).  
Misima Island is located in the Louisaide Archipelago in Milne Bay Province. 
Misima mine had a fairly short lifespan, as it was opened in 1989 and closed in 2004. 
The mine was operated by Misima Mines Limited (MML), which was 80 percent owned 
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by Placer Dome/Barrick and 20 percent by Orogen Limited, a majority PNG 
government owned company. Misima Island's main town is Bwagaoia, which is the 
Samarai-Murua district headquarters. The current population of the island is somewhere 
around 5000 people.  
The island had a long history of small-scale gold mining going back to 1889 
(Nelson 1976), but before the large-scale mine was developed, most people were 
engaged in subsistence agriculture. Since the closure there has been a move towards 
artisanal and small-scale mining on the island in an attempt to generate cash incomes to 
maintain the lifestyle to which people had grown accustomed. Misima mine’s closure 
went according to plan, especially the technical aspects of the closure to do with 
rehabilitation and revegetation. However, the mine closure plans (MML 2000; MML 
2002) were not approved by the provincial government, and there were no (and still are 
not any) national level guidelines, policies or legislation for MML to follow. Being the 
first planned mine closure in the country meant that Misima's closure outcomes were 
like a rudderless ship. The post-closure experience on Misima has guided OTML in 
how not to close a mine.   
Ok Tedi mine closure planning committee members went to Misima in 
December 2008. This visit influenced the way OTML has approached closure planning 
for their mine. One of the key lessons OTML took from Misima post closure was that 
mines have to be very careful what assets they leave to the provincial government. 
Road plant equipment was handed over to the provincial government to maintain roads 
on the island, but the roads are unmaintained and the equipment is rusting away where 
it was left by MML (OTML 2008: 61). This problem was signalled earlier by the MRA 
when they conducted their post closure inspection report (MRA 2007). Much of the 
problem is that the provincial government does not have the funds to support 
infrastructure and maintenance. Without government will or capacity to look after plant 
126 
 
equipment for road maintenance, or maintenance of other critical infrastructure such as 
a wharf, then there is no point in leaving them, as they become a hazard.  
This problem was highlighted in the plane crash at Misima in August 2010 
which killed 4 people. The poorly maintained runway at the airport was found to be 
covered in moss and grass that may have been a contributing factor to this tragedy. 
Funding issues contributed also to the poor airfield maintenance (AICPNG 2012). 
Infrastructure maintenance should be a responsibility of the provincial government, and 
provincial government capacity is better in Milne Bay Province than in Western 
Province. They have similar logistical issues, having to deal with dispersed populations 
across a large geographic area.  
My own trip to Misima three years after the Ok Tedi Benchmark Study team 
was a more hopeful tour. The provincial government had taken over the management 
of the maintenance of infrastructure, including the hydro station and roads. People were 
now being paid wages to maintain services. Power was more or less constantly in 
supply, with only short scheduled blackouts for priming and maintenance of the hydro 
station. The physical rehabilitation work done by MML was excellent, but the social 
program side was still inadequate. The lack of sustainable programs was evident, as 
most islanders were engaged some way with the informal artisanal mining sector.  
Detailed Mine Closure Plan 2009  
In 2009 OTML submitted the Detailed Mine Closure Plan (DMCP), which was the 
culmination of a decade of ‘back and forth’ consultation with the national government. 
This plan is the most comprehensive to date, and comprises four volumes. The DMCP 
was approved in May 2012. It contains a base case scenario which describes the ‘likely 
scenario for Tabubil if alternative sustainable major industry is not possible’ (OTML 
2009a: 39). This ‘base case’ was defined to assist in the development of closure plans, 
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cost estimates and schedules. It is to give an idea of how Tabubil will appear after mine 
closure (OTML 2009a 39). OTML have estimated that the cost of running Tabubil after 
mine closure, under the base case scenario, will be approximately US$12 million per 
annum (in 2009 terms) (OTML 2009a: 40).  
The most significant items in the list of the base case are that the town will be 
limited and the services will be scaled down. Significantly, OTML seems to recognise 
that Tabubil has little scope beyond a single industry town. This plan also has an 
expectation that the national government and PNGSDP will underwrite the basic 
services required under the base study (OTML 2009a:41). For it to become a viable 
post-closure town, it would have to become a centre of commerce rather than a distant 
outpost. However the problem that hampers this vision is the terrain around Tabubil. 
Road linkages to the north, west, and east are problematic because of the landslide 
prone terrain. OTML is not going to build any more roads in the Ok Tedi area because 
they do not serve a core mining purpose. The roads that exist in the area are there for 
access to key infrastructure, such as the mine, mill and Ok Menga hydro power site. As 
in the OTML Draft Mine Closure reports of 2002, 2004, 2006, this report concludes 
that:  
…without an effective development that extends beyond the mine closure period, it is 
uncertain whether the province has the staff and resources to operate and maintain 
public facilities…far more support should have been provided by government to the 
people Impacted by the mine, particularly during the early years of mining in terms of 
lifestyle education, which could have included awareness and /or training in basic 
financial management, personal savings, the importance of attaining a good education. 
(OTML 2009c: 69)  
Mine closure planning demands rigorous community consultation, and in this 
did occur for the DMCP. The system might not be perfect, but it is a significant push in 
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the direction of community-based mine closure. An example of local villagers’ 
attitudes to the DMCP after consultation is shown in this document sent to OTML from 
Wangbin village:  
We the Principal landowners of Wangbin Village have come up with the 
strategy for mine closure in 2013. We are hereby to give [sic] our opinion 
about what we have missed during the first signing of the MOU in 1991 
agreement. Now, we want the National Government, Ok Tedi stakeholders and 
the Developers take initiative from the strategy plans below. These are the 
following strategy plans for mine closure that we have come up with.  
• Relocating a new Wangbin Village.  
• Costs of building new houses. (K250,000 each houses)  
• Road Link to Old Wangbin (Wangbin Lake).  
• Tourism centre in Wangbin Lake.  
• Request for Warehouse 120.  
• Allocate B and C houses to Wangbin for rental.  
• Sealing of New Wangbin Village.  
• Increasing power and water supply.  
• TV and telephone line connected from Tabubil Township.  
• Relocating the church.  
• Women Centre in Wangbin Village.  
• Sealing of Tabubil Airport.  
• Sealing of Kiunga Tabubil Highway.  
• Power and water supply to Kiunga  
• Grade 11 up to university Ok Tedi must met cost  
• No contract awarding outside the (Min Boundry)  
Signed Thomas Uneng 19/06/09  
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PNGSDP  
PNGSDP and OTML had a common Board Chairman, Prof. Ross Garnaut, until the 
end of 2012. In the Annual Report 2008 PNGSDP stated that it ‘seeks to sustain the 
excellent infrastructure established by OTML for broader social and economic 
development beyond mine closure’ (PNGSDP 2008:7). With large cash reserves for 
development of Western Province post closure, the organisation had the ability to keep 
the northern part of the province from sliding into the FRPG mire.  
The 2007 management change in OTML with Managing Director Alan Breen 
signaled a new working relationship between OTML and PNGSDP on mine closure. 
PNGSDP from 2007 became more heavily involved in closure planning with the 
establishment of the PNGSDP Mine Closure Impacts Office, headed by Patricia 
(Pepena) Kila, former Principal Policy Officer and Mine Closure Coordinator in the 
PNG Department of Mining.  
 PNGSDP was committed to keeping Tabubil as a viable town (Clewett et al. 
2011). PNGSDP had a significant role in the sustainable planning for Tabubil through 
the Tabubil Futures project. Significantly, PNGSDP had already taken the commitment 
to fund the maintenance the Kiunga-Tabubil Highway despite it being a national 
government road that OTML leases. The road, which is essentially a private road, is a 
key to maintaining Tabubil as a town because otherwise the only transport link is the 
airport. A significant influence on PNGSDP's plans was the population of the Tabubil 
area. A PNGSDP manager indicated that they wanted to encourage the settlers to stay 
in the area, rather than drive them away. However, others within PNGSDP thougt that a 
smaller Tabubil would be preferable. Settlement maintenance would be in direct 
contradiction to the view of OTML, local government, and local landowners, that 
settlers are better served going back to their places of origin.  
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 In 2010 PNGSDP commissioned nine ‘element studies’ on the future 
sustainability of Tabubil. These studies covered: population demographics, health, 
education, security and law and justice, governance, economic development, utilities, 
transport, urban planning. These studies were commissioned because PNGSDP wanted 
independent analysis of whether Tabubil was sustainable. The PNGSDP board position 
on these was that they would pursue specific projects out of the element studies but 
these projects have yet not come to light. With regard to PNGSDP's Tabubil Futures 
project, the comment from OTML officers was that the consultants were just taking 
OTML information and repackaging it rather than making their own discoveries. Many 
ideas have been floated as alternative industries or commercial reasons to keep the 
town. These include setting up Tabubil as an army base to guard the border, developing 
a tourism industry, operating the town as a FIFO base for the Frieda mine (in West 
Sepik Province) and various oil and gas developments planned for Western Province, 
and having it as a college town. Some of these ideas have been called 'pie in the sky' 
ideas. Much of the impetus behind big ideas for Tabubil stemmed from the then 
Chairman of PNGSDP, Ross Garnaut (pers. comm. 2012).  
 PNGSDP continued its active participation in community consultations and 
negotiations associated with the proposed Mine Life Extension throughout CMCA 
Trust regions. The process that began in 2009 seeking prior informed consent from the 
mine impacted communities culminated in all the CMCA Trust regions plus six mine 
villages signing their respective compensation packages with OTML, in December 
2012 (PNGSDP 2012:40). This, however, does not denote agreement to the mine 
closure plan, as that is approved by the relevant ministers of MRA and Department of 
Environment and Conservation on behalf of the communities.  
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4.5 Conclusion – The future of sustainability for OTML as a State Owned 
Enterprise – Some thoughts.  
Ok Tedi having its own mine closure and decommissioning code means that the closure 
will be a lot more regulated than the closure of Misima. However, OTML needs to 
learn the lesson from Misima, that regardless of how difficult the provincial political 
situation, the provincial government is at a basic level responsible for the provision of 
services and maintenance of infrastructure in the province. Despite having one of the 
highest per capita revenues of any province in the country, the FRPG has been one of 
the least effective at development. Mine closure and sustainability planning for the 
North Fly region depends on a common conception of what is sustainable and what is 
not. PNGSDP had viewed Tabubil as an asset which it could not let go to waste, but 
unfortunately Tabubil’s future is not under the organisation’s control any longer. Since 
OTML is not going to be responsible for Tabubil after it passes to whichever 
organisation takes over, so their conception of what is sustainable and what is not is 
fairly concrete. OTML managers understand how much the company spends on 
services to the community. From utilities to logistics, OTML heavily subsidizes the 
daily running of the town. No town would have existed in this location without the Ok 
Tedi mine. Managers and other workers of the mining company express 
disappointment that the town will not go on into the future if there is no new mineral 
deposit found nearby. The town is not in a desirable location, nor does it have a 
desirable climate.   
Without the mine, the area was a rural backwater and with closure the economic 
base and access to services are forecast to be severely diminished. Without intervention 
the economic hub will shift from the northern end of the district, Tabubil, to the 
southern end at Kiunga. Diversification in the Tabubil area is difficult due to the very 
high maintenance costs of the town and transport links as well as the unsuitable land 
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for cash cropping. Kiunga and Ningerum have a clearer diversification route, through 
agroforestry, oil and gas exploration, and tourism. The expansion of road networks, 
with the Pampenai Feeder Road and the Aiambak Road upgrades, makes Kiunga a 
central access hub for the North and Middle Fly. Various plans exist to develop 
alternative industries in the Tabubil area in order to support the continuing existence of 
the town.  
The criticism of PNGSDP led to a full stripping of its equity through the revised 
9SA 2013 and 10SA  2013. The expropriation of PNGSDP’s equity holding in OTML 
was framed by many within the national government as a way to get BHP Billiton’s 
influence out of PNG and force PNGSDP to be more transparent with its decision 
making and funding of projects (Post-Courier 4/2/2013) With this national government 
takeover of OTML, the future sustainability of Tabubil and the other villages above 
Ningerum becomes less likely. The people of Western Province are unlikely to benefit 
at all from the national government’s appropriation of PNGSDP’s share in OTML.  
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Chapter Five – Compensation and Benefit Streams: Past, Present, 
and Future.  
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the financial basis for sustainable planning and mine closure 
policy for the Ok Tedi mine impacted communities. The financial aspect to mine 
closure and sustainability planning is important because without necessary ongoing 
funding of programs they usually fail. For a sustainable future for the Ok Tedi 
impacted communities and a positive legacy of the mine post closure, the financial 
health of trusts and payments is crucial. The wide variety of funding sources currently 
available to Ok Tedi impacted communities is a result of the unique history of the mine 
within PNG. The historical changes to the amount and extent of funding available 
mirrors the growing emphasis within OTML and the other stakeholders to facilitate the 
identified impacted communities to receive ongoing benefit from the mine. The 
changes to the structure of compensation and benefit sharing reflect the broader 
national debates and changes in policy stemming from the Namaliu government’s 
reforms to the Mining Act to include development forums and negotiated benefit-
sharing agreements between government, and landowners. This chapter provides 
original analysis of the Ok Tedi mine’s compensation and benefit streams up until the 
end of 2012. It supplements and expands upon the work of Filer, Henton and Jackson 
(2000) and Finlayson (2005).  
This chapter is the result of fieldwork and data collected between 2009 and 
2012. It also approaches key questions about the quality of the management of the 
funds in trust earmarked for future generations. It asks if there something special about 
the Ok Tedi Mining Complex (OMTC) landowning groups that make them more or 
less likely to engage in mismanagement of money. Why if there is funding for 
sustainable development initiatives projects has there not been more cooperation 
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between development organisations? In what ways does the OTMC ensure 
transparency in payments to communities? The analysis contributes to the basic thesis 
of the dissertation: how change can be managed by OTMC to reduce negative 
consequences on communities after mine closure.  
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first is an overall discussion of 
the compensation and benefit streams in PNG for the non-renewable resource sector. 
The second section is an historical look at the compensation and benefit streams over 
time, and the changes made to the structure and substance of these streams ranging 
from Lease Payments and Royalties to Tax Credit Scheme. The third section focusses 
on the complex issues dealing with expending development funds and investing future 
generations’ funds for the ongoing benefit of communities. The fourth section is a 
discussion of the issues relating to the OTMC organisations’ deployment of 
compensation and benefit streams, and community issues with access to trust funds.  
5.2 Debates about Compensation and Benefit Streams in PNG  
The basic premise of all compensation in PNG is that the majority of land in the 
country is under customary custodianship and thus requires permission from the 
landowners to proceed with any development. Customary understandings of land 
ownership and custodianship are complex and have been discussed in detail by 
academics (Crocombe 1987; Larmour 1991). PNG has a complex variety of land 
tenure. The special relationship between land and Papua New Guineans is not uniform 
across all cultures, however the possession and transmission of land through tribe, clan 
or familial custodianship is a common factor. Traditionally land is not privately held by 
individuals, it is communal with overlapping usage. Byron Chan, Minister for Mining 
(2011), expresses the view that the Papua New Guinean landowner does not see a 
distinction between soil and minerals – they see them as all being subject to their 
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traditional land tenure, rather than an arbitrary line underground separating them. In a 
survey of Papua New Guinean market vendors, public servants and university students 
about attitudes towards resource development, a significant proportion of the people 
surveyed said that the landowners (32.9 percent) or both the landowners and the 
government (43.3 percent) should own subsoil natural resources, as opposed to the 
government solely (22 percent) (Toft and Saffu 1997: 27). These community attitudes 
have changed little over time, and is confirmed by grassroots support for the ‘Boka 
Kondra Bill’ that would vest mineral rights in the landowner rather than the State.  The 
construction of ‘the landowner’ as an entity has accompanied the exercise of 
compensation demands for resource development in PNG. Much of the compensation 
demanding behaviour is rent seeking. McGavin states ‘Compensation claims in PNG 
usually start off with some fabulous sum that “comes into the head", and in customary 
circumstances conclude with the maximum that can be extracted.’ (McGavin 1994: 14). 
This understates the strategic nature of compensation demands from customary 
landowners. Compensation covers a wide range of happenings, from a dog being run 
over by trucks to river system wide pollution at PNG mines. Burton (1997b) argues that 
all forms of resource rent are regarded as forms of compensation – royalties, leases, and 
compensation packages.  
Discussions about compensation and benefit streams in the PNG resource sector 
have been occurring since before independence. Some of the discussions have resulted 
in positive outcomes for communities, but other discussions have resulted in armed 
conflict. The agreements for Ok Tedi and Panguna mines occurred when the 
negotiations were conducted between two stakeholders, State (whether Australian 
Administration or Independent PNG) and Company, with little to no involvement of 
recognised landowners beyond securing permissions for land access. The State of PNG 
received royalties and taxes distributing benefits to the Provincial Government and 
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landowners. This posed a problem generally, as the ferment of discontent about 
colonial mining development and perceptions of inequitable distribution of benefits 
over 20 years after the Bougainville Copper Agreement at Panguna shows (Denoon 
2000; Quodling 1991). Bedford and Mamak (1977) conducted a rigorous examination 
of the benefit-sharing regime at Panguna before and after the first Bougainville Copper 
Agreement renegotiation in 1974, examining the history of the agreements and 
legislation that formed the genesis of the benefit-sharing regime that exists throughout 
PNG.  
In 1966 royalties were a point of contention between the colonial administration 
and the representatives of the people of Bougainville. There was a tension between the 
Australian laws, which reflected State ownership of minerals, and Melanesian concepts 
of land and resource ownership. A small royalty – 5 percent of the 1.25 percent total 
copper revenue royalties paid to the government by BCL – were passed in the House of 
Assembly as recognition of the need to assuage grievances local landowners had over 
the resource development (Bedford and Mamak 1977: 14–15). The distribution of 
benefits has become critical to the academic study of resources in PNG. The most 
important discussion about the negative results of perceived inequitable benefit sharing 
and compensation is Colin Filer's (1990) discussion about the economic and social 
aspects of the community’s compensation payment distribution at BCL's Panguna 
Mine. However, as rightly predicted by Oliver (1977: 164), the royalty issue would 
‘continue to disturb the companies’ local public relations for many years to come’.  
The changing landscape of benefit sharing over the past twenty-five years has 
reflected the trend of recognizing the rights of indigenous people in resource 
development. The emergence of the Development Forum and the subsequent benefit 
sharing agreements associated with the negotiations have changed the way wealth 
accumulated from mining and oil/gas projects is distributed (McGavin 1994; Toft 
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1998; Filer, Henton and Jackson 2000). This negotiation process is much more 
inclusive, however it is still not immune from pressures of corruption.  
Communities receiving funds from compensation and benefit sharing 
agreements with mining companies is an important aspect of mining projects in PNG. 
The different ways in which communities are provided for by way of cash, trusts, and 
development stakeholders influences the possibilities of sustainability and orderly mine 
closure. The interests of the company, stakeholders, and government are sometimes 
pitched against the desires of the communities over how the money is to be deployed. A 
recent example of academic interest in disentangling the complex webs of benefit 
stream and compensation is the 2012 National Research Institute report by Peter 
Johnson (2012). This report describes in detail the available information on the Porgera 
mine's benefit streams, including some of the problems associated with benefit sharing 
and compensation money management. Porgera mine is located in Enga Province's 
Lagaip-Porgera District. The mines have very different arrangements with the 
government and other organisations. In particular, the political context of landowner 
organisations and traditional forms of conflict and negotiation that exist around the mine 
sites are different. The report builds on previous research done by Banks (1997) during 
his PhD as well as his working paper for the PNG Mining Sector Institutional 
Strengthening Project (Banks 2002). The clear issues which face any mine, and 
especially Porgera, are that the problem is not always problems with capacity, but rather 
the basic power relations within the community. Trusts and landowner associations are a 
central part of analysing the benefit sharing at any mine in PNG.  
Analysis of benefit sharing and compensation arrangements present at the Ok 
Tedi mine and the way they enable the sustainability policies the mine's stakeholders 
develop is essential to understanding the process of mine closure. At Ok Tedi mine the 
compensation money is at a scale and complexity that requires its own detailed 
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examination. The financial aspect of the OTMC is central to the discussion of 
sustainability and mine closure. The OTMC does not convey immunity to the problems 
of money ‘going missing’ or there being disputes about how it is spent. The 
background legislation and agreements relating to the benefit stream and compensation 
arrangements contribute to the OTMC having a unique position within the PNG 
mineral resources sector. The OMTC covers a large number of organisations, which are 
more heterogeneous in their approach to development than is normally acknowledged 
by academics such as Kirsch (2008) and Jorgensen (2006; 2007b). By analysing the 
benefit streams and compensation, currently and longitudinally, there is more ability to 
examine the development context of the OMTC. The next section deals in more detail 
with Ok Tedi mine compensation and benefit streams.  
5.3 Compensation and Benefit Streams from Ok Tedi mine  
This section deals with the benefits streams and compensation resulting from the 
Principal and Supplemental Agreements and other agreements. The changing of the 
structure and substance of compensation packages is a result of the various unique 
historical events related to the Ok Tedi mine. The significance of the mine having its 
own Act subject to supplemental agreements has given OTML advantages and special 
considerations not applicable or available to other mines. The Ok Tedi mine is not 
guided by the Mining Act 1992 for compensation and benefit streams like other mines 
in PNG. The Development Forum process was retrospectively conducted for Ok Tedi 
mine (Filer and Imbun 2009). This section details the particular financial flows over 
time.  
Lease Payments  
Lease payments represent a large source of income for individuals within landowning 
communities. Lease payments are compensation for occupation, use of land and 
restriction of access by the mining company. OTML holds a number of leases, both for 
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mining purposes and general purposes. The lease payments for the various leases at Ok 
Tedi are mandated under two pieces of legislation. The main Special Mining Lease 
(SML) No. 1 and Lease for Mine Purposes (LMP) 1 were granted under the Mining 
Act 1937 (Papua). Portion 1 and 2 were acquired under the Lands Act but are bundled 
with the Mining Leases for compensation consistency (OTML 2005). SML No. 1, the 
lease coving the Mount Fubilan mine, milling facilities, covers a total area of 2083.45 
ha, of which cleared land was 1460 ha, and physically used land was 1190 ha (OTML 
2005).  
The physically used land is the land that has improvements – infrastructure 
assets (roads, tailings, waste dumps, buildings, etc.) whereas the cleared land has 
ground improvements (e.g. taking out trees) but no physical asset on it. The LMP 1 
lease, the Harvey Creek (southern) dump, Taranaki (northern) dump, North and South 
Ok Mani, covers an area of 8593.00 ha, of this in 2005, cleared land was 1440 ha, and 
physically used was 1231 ha (OTML Lease Schedule 2005). 
For the town site of Tabubil, the State acquired 363 ha of Wangbin village 
owned land for a 99-year lease on the 31/09/1981 under provisions of the Land Act 
Section 73 and shortly after sub-let it to OTML on the 09/10/1981. The initial period 
was for five years under the tenure of a Town Sub-division Lease (TSL). The lease was 
expanded to accommodate airport extension, road realignment and a creek in early 
1982 taking the total to 389.57 ha (Ransley to Public Affairs Manager 2/9/1985). 
Special provisions were granted to OTML over the TSL. Firstly OTML could use as 
much of the land as deemed reasonable to conduct its business, without the normal 
requirement to survey and return all unused land to the State. The second provision was 
the lease payments given to customary landowners (Ransley 2003). Normally when the 
State acquires land a one off payment is given and is final, as it was with the Kiunga-
Tabubil Highway, but with Tabubil Portion 1, ongoing lease payments are made under 
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the Mining Act leases, LMP 1 and SML1, to maintain consistency (Ransley 2003). In 
1998, after the second renewal of the TSL lapsed, the State granted OTML a Special 
Purpose Lease for a period of twenty years to be effective from 8/10/1998 under the 
same provisions for the previous TSL (Ind. State of PNG 1999). This meant that the 
complications of the TSL, including prohibition on modifications to land use and 
permanent subletting, in post mine town planning would not have the same impacts. 
The three extensions to the Tabubil Town lease – LMP 28 Tabubil Plateau Extension – 
Eastern Ridge Line (219.1 ha), LMP 36 Tabubil East Extension (6.599 ha) and LMP 75 
Tabubil Escarpment Extension (153.96 ha) – were made after landowners requested 
help from OTML to control land degradation from illegal gardens and overpopulation 
by informal settlers (Ransley 2003). The payments the landowners receive for the 
leases acquired are significant. Table 5.1 shows two payment schedules 21 years apart.  
Table 5.1 Lease Payment at Ok Tedi mine fees in 1990 and 2011  
Fees  1990 in K/Ha 2011 in K/Ha 
Occupation 7.00 10.00 
Restricted Access 15.00 62.92 
Cleared Land 10.00 48.28 
Physically Used Land 20.00 82.09 
Lamin Trust Non Renewable 
Resources Fund 
8.00 36.21 
Sources: Compensation Package Agreement State of PNG, OTML and Certain Customary Land Owners 
1990: 6; Land Lease Agreement OTML and Customary Land Owners 2011:3  
The cash components  (all payments excluding Non-Renewable 
Resources/Lamin Trust Fund) are paid to landowners’ clan accounts42. OTML was 
sensitive to the differences of impacts on landowning clans within the leases, 
acknowledging that especially for the LMP 1 there was a significant burden on the Ok 
Mani landowners compared to the bulk of landowners. By paying all the landowners in 
42 The majority of landowners had bank accounts with Bank of South Pacific in 2011(OTML 2011b).  
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the lease for the cleared and physically used lands, OTML realised they were ‘short 
changing’ the Ok Mani clans, so they took those two components out of the bulk 
payments and paid them instead to the impacted clans (Ransley n.d). Lease payments 
are distributed annually in the fourth quarter, reviewed every five years, and indexed at 
up to 5 per cent (OTML 2011:8). In 2011, the SML villages received cash payments 
per head (Table 5.3):  
Table 5.2 Special Mining Lease village cash payments  
Village  Payment per person (K)  
Wangbin  344.70  
Migalsim  217.27  
Bultem, Atemkit, Kavorabip, Finalbin  328.88  
Source: OTML 2011.  
In addition to the payment made to communities, OTML pays K12.00 rental per 
leased hectare per annum to the Registrar of Tenements in the Mineral Resources 
Authority and to 2011 this was estimated to be K2.6m (OTML 2011: 13).  
Kiunga Tabubil Highway – ROADCO  
 In 1982 the road corridor between Kiunga and Tabubil was compulsorily 
acquired by the State of PNG and payment of compensation to landowners was 
K110,023.00 (at K75 per ha), as deemed in 1983 to be its value by the Valuer General 
(Giheno 1996; PNG NIO 2004: 3). The national government borrowed K50m to build 
the road and OTML through the ‘user pays’ system repaid the loan (Ransley 2006a; 
Giheno 1996). It is not subject to any ongoing lease payments as it was acquired under 
the Land Act Chapter 185. Over the course of the last 30 years, the highway 
landowners from Km45 to Km59, known as the Kiunga-Tabubil Highway 
(Landowners) Association, have disputed that the land was acquired and registered 
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correctly, demanding proof of proper process and extra compensation (Giheno 1996; 
KTHA 2003; PNG NIO 2004; Kokoba 2007).  
Royalties – 1983 – 1991  
Royalties are a large component of the cash benefit stream at the Ok Tedi mine. Ok 
Tedi mine's royalty regime has changed over time. Initially, as per clause 24.2 in the 
Principal Agreement:  
The Company shall pay royalty at the rate of one and one quarter per cent (1 1/4 
percent) of the sum of -  
(a) the F.O.B. Revenue applicable to deliveries by the Company pursuant to sales 
or other dispositions made by the Company of Mine Products where such deliveries 
are directly or indirectly for export; and  
(b) the Net Smelter Returns applicable to such Mine Products where they are 
smelted or smelted and refined in Papua New Guinea.  
The royalty shall be paid monthly in accordance with the procedures to be agreed 
between the State and the Company or in default of agreement as determined by the 
State.  
The State of PNG collected K21.9m in royalties from OTML between 1985 and 
1990 (OTML 2007d: 9). The State paid the majority of the royalties to the provincial 
government, minus transactional costs, and under section 67 of the Organic Law and 
Chapter 107 of the Mining Act 1977, 5 percent was paid to owners of ‘private land’ 
(Little and Regan 1987). The breakdown of royalties paid out was of the 1.25 percent 
royalty, 95 percent to the Fly River Provincial Government, and 5 percent to mine area 
landowners. In 1986, it was decided that half of the Provincial Government’s share 
would go into a trust to fund infrastructural development and maintenance in the North 
Fly District, as the provincial government did not have the capacity to spend the money 
(Little and Regan 1987: 3). This money is still being used to fund maintenance of 
provincial buildings, various bridges, and other provincial infrastructure development.  
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Garden and other Specific Compensation 
The basis for the compensation for downstream effects comes from the Principal 
Agreement and related to the Lower Fly. In clause 29.12 (See Chapter 2) the 
requirement for compensation for damages was established and garden compensation 
was paid at agreed rates (see Table 5.3).  
 
 
Table 5.3: Garden compensation payments, 1991–96  
Region  Month/Year  Amount (K)  
North Ok Tedi  June 1991  24,787  
North Ok Tedi  August 1992  38,854  
Ningerum  April/May 1994  395,342  
Lower Ok Tedi  September 1994  1,380,000  
All Regions  1995/1996  2,702,625  
Total    4,541,608  
Sources: Ransley 2006b: 2; Burton 1991.  
Requests for small claims compensation from the community are constant and 
are reviewed and dealt with by OTML based on the Valuer General's schedules for the 
payment of specific compensation for individual items – such as a dog being hit by an 
OTML vehicle, or a road-widening taking out a Pandanus tree.  
However, at times there are compensations which require discussions and 
agreements with the community and this is where the principal and supplemental 
agreements give flexibility in compensation payments for damages. The Tailing 
Pipeline Spill in 2011 was one such example. In 2011 there were ruptures of the pyrite 
concentrate (PCon) pipeline which was installed in 2007 as part of the Mine Waste 
Tailings Project along the Kiunga - Tabubil Highway between the mine site and Bige. 
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The ruptures occurred at five sites along the highway - Km45, Km80, Km84, Km87 
and Km90. There were three creek systems impacted: Wai Sontri, Wai Smare and Wai 
Swreme/Wai Meari (Ok Mart), which are customarily owned and used by both CMCA 
and Non-CMCA villages. In a letter dated 16th June 2011 the Km 80–90 affected 
communities outlined their case for receiving compensation to the tune of 
K638,500,000, stating ‘Our demands are non-negotiable. Any negotiation attempts by 
the company will only increase the amount of money we are charging’. As a response 
to OTML negotiation, the communities revised the demand to K168m on 6 September 
2011. The finalised compensation package from OTML was stated in an interoffice 
memo as K2.05m.  
Other times, OTML compensates for things that are not necessarily the 
company’s fault. On the 10th December 2011 Korkit (Ward 11) councillor Tokona 
Kevam was allegedly hit on the mine access road between the Helsinki checkpoint and 
Finalbin village by an OTML hired vehicle by a former OTML employee43 who did not 
subsequently stop and render assistance. In a letter dated 7th February 2012 Tokona 
Kevam demanded K290,000 for pain and suffering (including a dislocated knee), and 
alleged that OTML Security at Helsinki checkpoint did not notify the Tabubil Police or 
Asset Protection Department, and it took him three days before he got taken to hospital. 
He states in his letter, ‘I’m just a village councillor/landowner. When I had an accident, 
OTML, security firm treated (me) like animal [sic]’ and threatened that if the matter 
was not responded to within the fortnight that he would take ‘this matter to customary 
magicians to make a landslid [sic]’. In an interoffice memo dated 12th February 2012 
OTML CR manager Yaru Pohei states that initially OTML tried to get Tokona Kevam 
to register a third party compensation complaint with Motor Vehicle Insurance Limited. 
Tokona Kevam refused as he thought it would take too long, be complicated, and likely 
43 Although there seemed to be inconsistency in the reports as whether the driver, Abel John, was employed by 
OTML. 
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not to result favourably for him due to the time between the incident and when he was 
taken to hospital. The memo states that the incident was a ‘bad image for OTML when 
the driver is getting away free of charge while the victim is suffering…incident could 
have caused him his life’, resulting in the decision by OTML to pay compensation to 
Tokona Kevam of K10,000 to conclude the matter to both parties’ satisfaction.  
1991 Ok Tedi MOA  
In January 1991, in response to the changes in negotiations and benefit sharing 
arrangements stemming from the new mineral regime in the late 1980s, the State of 
PNG and the Ok Tedi Landowners conducted Development Forum negotiations and 
entered into a MOA between the national government and the Ok Tedi Landowners (in 
addition to FRPG MOAs with the national government and the Ok Tedi Landowners). 
This MOA changed the structure of royalties paid. The Provincial government was now 
obligated to share the royalties at a rate of 70/30 with the Ok Tedi landowners, splitting 
the 30 percent between the six mining villages: 25 percent for the four mine villages 
and 5 percent for Migalsim and Wangbin. On 1st July 1996, the overall royalty level 
was raised from 1.25 percent to 2 percent (Jackson 2002: 8), applying the RESA 
changes to Section 24.2 of the PA agreed to the previous August. The monthly 
royalties were paid out in cheques to village clan leaders with little or no savings 
mechanism.  
1995 Restated Eighth Supplemental Agreement  
The RESA granted compensation to be paid out to 120 villages along the river. The 
RESA funds come as general compensation for the downstream communities. The 
RESA general compensation payments are distributed into clan accounts along the Ok 
Tedi and Fly Rivers. The money is deposited into the Heduru Trust account. The 
Heduru Trust pays out to the 120 communities that receive money over two weeks 
every March with the next year's payments being decided in the February. In 2012, 
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K12,457,952.16 was given to a total population of 50,760 people, which is K245.43 per 
head (OTML 2012b). The money is paid to clan accounts, and the majority of this was 
paid into BSP accounts, but 598 people did not have clan accounts so were given 
cheques instead (OTML 2012b). The amount people receive per year is indexed at a 
rate of 5 percent, with reviews every 5 years, as per clause 29G. This compensation 
runs parallel to the CMCA compensation payments. The Mine Area Villages are not 
part of the Heduru Trust, but receive set general compensation from OTML. The Mine 
Area Village general compensation benefit was incorporated into the CMCA unlike the 
RESA.  
1997 Lower Ok Tedi Agreement  
The LOTA, signed in 1997, was the out of court agreement reached for extra 
compensation for the people in the lawsuit, 15 LOT villages: Atkamba, Ieran, Dome, 
Ambaga, Kawok, Iogi, Kompokin, Bongobun, Senemrae, Kwiape, Bige, Miamrae, 
Sarae, and Demasuke. The total out of court settlement for the LOTA was a K40m 
package that was divided into three parts (Table 5.4):  
Table 5.4 LOTA Compensation package  
Fund  K amount  
Development Funds  23,110,920  
Future Generation Fund (FGF)  2,533,361  
Landowners and Land Users Fund (Cash)  14,355,719  
Source: LOTA 1997.  
Initially the representatives from 15 villages who had signed the Heads of 
Agreement, accepting the out of court settlement and RESA compensation were 
adamant that the K40m be paid out in cash (Ransley 2006b). Eventually two schedules 
to the LOTA were settled, with a recognition that the Land User and FGF should be 
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structured so they incrementally went up by 5 percent per annum to appear as if they 
were indexed. The first part of the structure decided was the FGF as it was recognised 
that 15 percent of the money should be quarantined for the future, as it was a 
requirement from the Government (Ransley 2005).  
The Landowner and Land user funds were a source of difficulty because of the 
contentious issue that in one of the early meetings ‘only about 5 percent of the resident 
population of the LOTA area are actually landowners’ (Ransley 2005). This reflects 
Jackson's assertion that many people from the border area moved closer to the river in 
the 1960s to gain easier access to the emerging cash economy around Kiunga (Jackson 
1977). OTML CR had conducted social mapping as part of a possible extension to the 
LMP1 tailings lease area to cover the riverbanks to a varying width that were impacted 
by riverbed aggradation and die-back (Ransley 2005). This lease idea was derailed by 
the FRDT, general compensation, garden compensation and the court case all emerging 
in the early to mid-90s. OTML already had the data about landowning communities 
and the extent of their land boundaries for comparison to the claims of landowners and 
land users in the discussions. However, there had to be a recognition in the LOTA that 
the land users were an important part of the impacted community (Kirsch 2007). As 
such, funds were divided between the landowning and land using communities which 
served the interests of both parties well. The Development funds were envisaged by the 
15 member committee to be for private, small scale, clan or individual projects, not 
public, physical and social infrastructure because that was seen as the responsibility of 
the Government (Ransley 2006b). The projects were undertaken under the auspices of 
the Lower Ok Tedi Investment Corporation (LOTIC). The LOTA was intended to 
supplement the compensation in RESA, as the impacts, especially the dieback because 
of overbank flooding along the river, is most significant in the Lower Ok Tedi area, and 
people there deserved more compensation (Ransley 2006). In addition, in the 
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agreement there are responsibilities and rights on both sides of the agreement. There 
was no renewal of the LOTA after the agreement lapsed in 2009 (Bull to Kaledi 2011).  
LMP 37/79  
As a result of the agreements relating to the LOTA and RESA, the Bige Dredge Mine  
Waste Management Project (MWMP) was started in 1998, and subsequently the Mine 
Waste Tailings Project (MWTP) was commenced in 2007, the communities of Dome 
and Bige have required lease payments and compensation for the sites, LMP 37 
(dredge trial/mine waste camp) and LMP 79 (dredge storage) of the pyrite and silt 
storage.  
Table 5.5: Lease and compensation payments (in kina) for LMP 37 and 79  
Fund  LMP 37  LMP 79  
Lease Payments  2,380,109  2,142,197  
Access Road  1,400,000  -  
Development Fund  1,400,000  1,570,000  
Grant  1,000,000  3,000,000  
Pyrite Storage  -  3,500,000  
Discretional  280,000  -  
Kobom Investment  -  1,000,000  
Total  6, 180,109.  11,492,197  
Source: OTML 2013.  
2001 9SA Community Mine Continuation Agreement  
Compensation was again widened in its scope in 2001 when 155 villages were 
identified as requiring compensation under the CMCA process. Before the mine could 
proceed beyond the withdrawal of BHP from the consortium/shareholding, a review of 
the business case and social licence to mine were conducted. The original 
compensation agreements were not sufficient for the mine to proceed beyond BHP’s 
exit. As part of the transition from the BHP era to the 9SA era of Ok Tedi, the CMCA 
negotiations were conducted. The result of these agreements was a compensation 
package for impacted communities downstream from the mine site and along the 
Kiunga Tabubil Highway. The communities were divided along regional lines and the 
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compensation reflected the distance and impact from the mine. Community Members 
Fund was given to the Nupmo, Tutuwe, Wai Tri and Middle Fly initially, as they were 
recognised as the most heavily affected (due to sedimentation and dieback). The 
original package for the communities was K176m.  
The villages in the Mine Area have special arrangements that came under the 
RESA originally, and were subsequently converted into CMCA. As part of the CMCA, 
the Mine Villages continued to receive these fixed amounts as recognition of the 
impacts, but it is not as much as the other affected villages because they already receive 
lease payments, which compensate them for the restriction of access and clearing that 
occurred on their lands. The four SML and Migalsimbip villages received village 
development funds totaling between K4,375,000 each between 2001 and 2013. Finalbin 
received K2,886,244 for a special community housing project. The two LMP Villages 
received a separate component called special compensation which totals K1,019,231 
for Migalsimbip and K2,183,230 for Wangbin over the 2001–2013 period.. Wangbin 
also received K5,750,000 for Village Housing general compensation payment to 
Wangbin community of K987,347 between 2001 and 2013, K1,200,000 for Housing 
Maintenance in 2002, and K700,000 for Business Development in 2002/3 (OTML 
2009d).  
The 2004 MOA changed the royalty split between FRPG and Landowner to 
50/50. The extra 20 percent for landowners was put into a trust for the landowning 
villages called the Ok Tedi Landowner Royalty Investment Trust. The six mine villages 
receive, as per the 2004 revised MOA, 50 percent of the 2 percent royalty. The other 50 
percent is paid to the FRPG, of which some is sequestered by OTML for maintenance 
of provincial buildings and infrastructure (Nigel Parker pers. comm. 2012). Of the 
landowners 50 percent, the breakdown is as Table 5.6 shows:  
Table 5.6 Landowner Royalty Split  
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Village/Trust  Breakdown  
Atemkit, Bultem, Finalbin and Kavorabip  25 percent  
Migalsim and Wangbin  5 percent  
Ok Tedi Landowner Royalty Investment 
Trust  
19.5 percent  
Administration (Mt Fubilan Resource 
Owners Association)  
0.5 percent  
Source: OTML 2011.  
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 Table 5.7: Summary of the Ok Tedi royalty payments, 1985–2013 (in kina millions)  
Year State of 
PNG 
Fly River 
Provincial 
Government 
Mine Area 
Villages  
Western 
Province 
Development 
Project Trust 
Total 
(*Incl. 
WHT tax) 
1985  2.0        2.0  
1986  2.6        2.6  
1987  3.4        3.4  
1988  3.6        3.6  
1989  4.7        4.7  
1990  5.5        5.5  
1991    3.6  1.5    5.0  
1992    3.4  1.4    4.8  
1993    3.2  1.3    4.6  
1994    4.7  1.9    6.6  
1995    5.9  2.5    8.4  
1996    8.1  3.3    11.4  
1997    4.2  1.7    5.8  
1998    9.8  4.0    13.8  
1999    11.3  4.6    15.9  
2000    12.3  7.8    20.1  
2001    15.0  6.5  1.1  22.9  
2002    13.0  7.1  4.3  24.8  
2003    23.5  10.6  2.6  37.3  
2004    22.6  10.9  -  34.0  
2005    28.0  28.0  -  57.5  
2006    43.2  43.2  -  88.5  
2007    44.9  42.7  -  89.8  
2008    36.8  35.1    73.5  
2009    33.6  31.9    67.1  
2010    46.8  44.5    93.6  
2011    42.9  40.7    85.8  
2012    32.7  31.1    65.4  
2013    25.1  23.9    50.2  
TOTAL  21.9  474.3  386.0  8.0  909.1  
Source: OTML 2013: 10.  
2006/7 CMCA REVIEW  
 In 2007, the total compensation package was revised up from K176m to K1.1bn for 
the period to 2013, which included TCS projects, PNGSDP’s and the State’s 5 percent 
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contributions from their dividends to fund community projects (CMCA MOA 2007: 
clause 3). PNGSDP’s contribution to the CMCA review package is K21.5m or 2 
percent of dividends, whichever is higher (PNGSDP 2009: 9). The eight CMCA 
regions and the mine villages directly receive funds from OTML, through the 
Community Members Fund, but the Development and Investment funds are paid into 
the eight regional trust accounts. The eight CMCA regions receive payments annually 
in the 4th quarter.  
Table 5.8: OTML contribution to CMCA funds from 2007  
Fund  Kina millions  
Development Funds  218  
Community Members Fund (Cash)  163  
Investment Fund (Excl. Mine Villages)  80  
Special Compensation (Wangbin & Migalsim Villages)  4  
Legal Fees (Middle Fly Development Foundation)  1.5  
Total  466  
Source: OTML 2011.  
In the eight CMCA trust regions a Women's and Children 10 percent Fund was 
set aside in the 2006/7 review of the CMCA. This fund is for projects directly targeting 
women, youth, and children in the eight impact areas. It was originally established in 
2001 in the Middle Fly as the Middle Fly Children's Fund (Middle Fly CMCA 2001), 
but was expanded to the rest of the CMCAs except the Mine Area in 2006/7. The 
projects under this 10 percent fund are guided by the individual trust regions Women 
and Children Action Plans designed by women’s groups and implemented by OTDF. 
To 2009, PNGSDP and the State of PNG paid K64.5m and K249.6m for the CMCA 
communities (OTML 2010c). According to Clause 4.2.2 of the CMCA MOA, the mine 
villages did not receive any increase in direct funds from the CMCA review, but were 
able to access development funds, via OTDF, the State and PNGSDP’s contribution. 
The CMCA only extended to the end of 2013, when the agreements lapsed, and were 
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replaced with the Community Mine Continuation Extension Agreement. Over the 
course of the Ok Tedi mine’s operation, communities have been paid out a total of 
K1.277 billion in compensation payments for environmental damage.  
Table 5.9: Historical compensation (exclusive of lease and royalty payments) expressed 
as a kina per tonne of waste measurement  
 Waste 
Mt 
Tailings 
Mt 
Total 
Waste 
Mt 
K/t Total compo 
Kina M 
Pre CMCA  501  353  854  0.08  71  
CMCA  2001–2007  311  165  746  0.35  170  
CMCA  211  145  356  2.90  1036  
CMCA Subtotal  552  310  832  1.45  1206  
Total  1023  663  1686  0.76  1277  
Source: OTML 2010c.  
2009–12 Mine Life Extension – Community Mine Continuation Extension 
Agreement (CMCEA)  
OTML’s MLE proposed to the communities that they would receive 60 percent of the 
compensation rate they had from the CMCAs. In March 2012 Yaru Pohei, Community 
Relations manager, indicated that CR would prefer to give all the MLE compensation 
funds to the communities as cash because they had asked repeatedly and it was their 
money. The CMCEA were signed at the end of 2012 at the MLE Regional Meeting in 
Tabubil (Post Courier 31/12/2012). The value of the total package in 2013 was 
K544,076,000.  
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Table 5.10: CMCEA compensation K millions  
Region Cash WCF Investment Development Total 
Mine Area  16.297  9.402  -  36.983  62.684  
Nupmo  25.396  4.232  6.349  6.349  42.328  
Tutuwe  27.609  10.573  3.524  17.035  58.743  
Wai Tri  55.872  16.328  11.974  20.683  108.859  
Middle Fly  100.318  14.331  2.388  2.388  119.427  
Suki Fly Gogo  30.672  3.834  1.917  1.917  38.341  
Manawete  32.220  5.245  -  -  37.466  
Dudi  29.869  7.070  0.910  0.910  38.762  
Kiwaba  31.846  4.683  0.936  -  37.466  
Total  350.099  75.698  27.998  86.265  544.076  
Source: Popotai and Ofasu-Amaah 2013: 19  
 The regional representatives from each trust region were able to negotiate and 
decide on the split between cash, investment, development and Women and Children’s 
fund. The range was from 26 percent cash in the Mine Villages to 86 percent cash in 
Manawete (Popotai and Ofasu-Amaah 2013: 19). The Middle and South Fly 
communities had cited that they preferred 100 percent cash compensation to investment 
and development funds in the delegates meeting in March 2011. The North Fly trust 
regions all have compensation funds allocated for investment and development, but the 
Mine Villages decided not to allocate for investment as they already have access to a 
royalty investment trust. All regions allocated at least 10 percent (Nupmo, Suki Fly 
Gogo) to a maximum of 18.24 percent (Dudi) of compensation funds to the Women 
and Children’s Fund, a continuation from the 2006/7 CMCA review (Popotai and 
Ofasu-Amaah 2013; Menzies and Harley 2012).  
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Although it appears to be a larger compensation package from OTML to the 
communities than the previous CMCA package, it is important to recognise that the 
cost of goods and services has increased significantly for people in Western Province. 
Although headline inflation has remained on average around 6–7 percent between 2006 
and 2012 (Bank of PNG 2013), the reality is that in remote areas purchasing power 
erodes faster due to higher inflation. Even if the package is indexed to a cap of 5 
percent, this still represents a reduction in real value for the package.  
Dividends  
OTML was a joint-venture company, it is not listed on any exchanges, nor are its 
shares available for trading, always owned by just a few organisations, which has been 
detailed in previous chapters of this dissertation. The dividend situation of Ok Tedi 
mine has changed over the lifespan of the mine as a reflection of the changing 
ownership structure. In 2011 Inmet Mining of Canada sold back its shares in OTML 
(after initially trading them for a 5 percent net smelter return), which were subsequently 
cancelled, making it the last foreign mining company to own a stake in OTML. The 
equity partners of OTML reflect the shift towards greater landowner participation in 
resource ownership. As such in 2013, the shareholding was 36.6 percent national 
government (owned by MRDC on behalf of landowners and the provincial 
government) and 63.4 percent by PNGSDP.  
 The dividends for Ok Tedi have changed over the years depending on the 
shareholding of OTML. The first ordinary dividends were not paid out until 1997, this 
was a big problem leading into the 1990s, the mine was not very profitable after its tax-
free grace period was over, then that was not in the interests of the shareholders. The 
dividend breakdown until 2013 was paid out to two organisations - PNGSDP and the 
national government. The Government portion is divided into sections – 18.3 percent 
goes to the treasury as consolidated revenue, 12.2 percent goes to CMCA and Non-
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CMCA Western Province People’s Dividend Trust Account, 3.05 percent goes to Mine 
Area (MRDC Company MSRM) and 3.05 percent goes to FRPG (MROT#2(FRPG)).  
 
Figure 5.1 – OTML equity participants in 2011 (OTML 2013)  
Table 5.11: Dividends distributed by OTML from 1997–2013  
Shareholder  Kina millions  
State of PNG44  1712.2  
MROT#2 (WPPDTA)  1063.3  
  MROT#2 (FRPG)    269.7  
MRSM  269.7  
PNGSDP  5534.2  
Inmet Mining  1537.2  
BHP (to 2001)  202.8  
Total  10589.1  
Source: OTML 2013.  
The wholly owned MRDC subsidiary company Mineral Resources Star 
Mountains(MRSM) holds the Mine Area ownership; the Mineral Resources Ok Tedi 
No.2 (MROT#2) holds the Western Provincial Administration share. The Western 
44 Including preference shares disposed of in 1995.  
157 
 
                                                 
Province Peoples' Dividend Trust Account (WPPDTA) is the 12.2 percent of money 
held on behalf of the CMCA and Non-CMCA people in Western Province. 
Other Benefit Streams  
The other avenues for funding development and sustainability projects that are 
available to individuals and communities, which are not a result of direct agreements 
between the mining company and community, can be broken into two separate 
categories. The first category relates to large scale funds available for infrastructure 
projects (Special Support Grants, Tax Credit Schemes) and the second to broad 
community initiatives (Preferred Area District programs, Local Local employment and 
education assistance programs) as well as emergency funding (donations committee).  
Preferred Area District  
The population of the general hinterland of the Ok Tedi mine was provided for under 
the localisation and training and local business development provisions in the Principal 
Agreement which state in Clauses 30.6 and 32.3 ‘...in so far as is practicable give first 
preference (for employment and assistance) to landowners in and other people 
originating from the Kinga and Telefomin sub-provinces of the Western Province’. 
This was what gave rise to the Preferred Area Districts (PAD) and the special provision 
of projects for those areas. The non-impacted communities of Western Province were 
not given any specific provisions for preferential treatment under the PA beyond the 
PAD. The Preferred Area Districts receive assistance from OTML in the form of 
scholarships, preference for employment at the mine, as well as development programs. 
The significance of the PAD is that OTML was required to support the development of 
both Telefomin and North Fly Districts, despite the fact that Telefomin is outside 
Western Province. Other infrastructure programs, such as TCS, follow on from this as 
they provide funds for the PAD as well as the rest of Western Province more generally.  
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The Mine Villages receive special treatment in the form of ‘Local Local’, which 
provides training and education for landowners, as well as preferential contracts 
awarded to landowner companies. This is a feature of the 1991 and 2004 MOA. A 
significant criticism of Local Local is that despite 30 years of training, not one person 
from Western Province, and especially not from the immediate landowners, is at the 
level of Team Leader or above (by 2013). In comparison, Telefomin District sourced 
workers at OTML have worked their way up to Manager External Affairs (Atimeng 
Buhupe – who subsequently in 2002 was elected Telefomin Open MP). Why there is 
this disparity between the Western Province people and Telefomin District is not 
readily apparent. Possibly, it is because there was more habituation with leaving 
Telefomin because of colonial labour migration, or that West Sepik has overall a less 
dysfunctional primary education system. As discussed earlier the local landowners 
have less incentive to work as they receive large amounts of money.  
The employment breakdown at Ok Tedi mine out of the directly employed 
workforce of 2310 in 2013 was 763 (33 percent) employees from the Preferred Area, 
83 (4 percent) from non-Preferred Area Western Province, and 1,349 (58 percent) from 
the rest of PNG and 115 (5 percent) expatriates. (OTML 2013). This is in stark contrast 
with the case of Misima where the majority of people working at the mine were local 
Misimans, and they mostly lived in the villages rather than in work camps. This is 
because Misima Mines Ltd provided transport from their villages to the mine site for 
every work shift (Israel Israel pers. comm. 2012).   
For contracts, the majority of contracts tendered are given to local companies or 
local/PNG joint ventures (75 percent of total contracts), but the value of these contracts 
is only worth 33 percent of the total value of contracts (K371.5m with payments of 
K293.1m) with most high value contracts going to overseas companies or 
PNG/overseas joint ventures in 2013 (OTML 2013). The local and joint venture 
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companies contracted include Fubilan Catering Services, Faiwol Investors, Azobelle, 
Camp Administration, Wokman Teleoks, and Tabubil Engineering.  
Special Support Grant  
Special Support Grants (SSG) are paid by the national government to the 
provincial government and trusts. For those provinces hosting a major mining or 
petroleum project, based on the export value of minerals and petroleum production in 
the province (May 2007: 209). Usually it is 1 percent of export value of the 
mineral/petroleum goods from the province. In the 2012 budget the SSG received by 
Western Province was  
K15.5 million, while SSG for FRDT was K3.9 million (Department of Treasury 
2012: 641); Over the period 1990 to 2008 K103,484,000 was for projects in Western 
Province. The Special Support Grant is listed in the RESA under clause 29J as  
29J.1 The government of Western Province from time to time will identify projects to 
be funded out of the Special Support Grant. Projects will be  
identified on the basis that:  
(a) approximately 20 percent of the Special Support Grant is to be supplied in the 
vicinity of Tabubil;  
(b) approximately 40 percent of the Special Support Grant is to be applied in the 
area of the North Fly (outside the vicinity of Tabubil; and  
(c) approximately 40 percent of the Special Support Grant is to be applied in the 
area of the South Fly.  
This limited the geographical extent to which the grant could be applied. The 
projects are identified in the Western Province Development Plans, which are since 
2005 generally modelled on the Millennium Development Goals and the Medium Term 
Development Plan authored by the national government. A criticism of plans by 
provincial governments is that they are fantasy plans, based on desire rather than 
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budgetary reality (OTDF officer pers. comm. 2010). According to clause 29J.1 there is 
an onus on the Western Provincial Administration to implement SSG projects, but it 
was up to OTML to decide whether the Provincial Works Department had the capacity 
to undertake the projects. Instead OTML got local contractors, such as Tabubil 
Engineering and Starwest, to perform most of the work. Perhaps the interesting part 
about SSG is that it is in legislation that OTML is in control of a portion of SSG. 
Normally the provincial government would have capacity to spend SSG by itself, like 
other provinces.  
29J.2 Subject to Clause 29J.3, the company will have the right and responsibility, 
during the life of the Project, to implement the projects referred to in 29J.1. Unless the 
Lower Ok Tedi/Fly River Development Trust has ceased to exist, those projects will be 
implemented as part of the Trust's programme.  
The Lower Ok Tedi/Fly River Development Trust did cease to exist. It was 
replaced with the Ok Tedi Development Foundation in the 9SA in 2001 and it assumed 
the responsibilities of the FRDT. As was described earlier, OTML spun out OTDF into 
a zero tax entity, starting in 2008.  
29J.3 The Company will involve the Provincial Works Department of Western 
Province in the implementation of the projects referred to in Clause 29J.1. The 
Company will assist that Department to put in place an agency or other instrumentality 
which will assume responsibility for implementing and maintaining projects.  
The use of the term ‘involve’ indicates that the Provincial Works Department 
does not have an active part, but merely was required to be consulted. The relationship 
between OTML and the provincial government was at its most trying in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s and the SSG issue might have something to do with it.  
SSG has become a source of tension between the stakeholders. The inequalities 
between the implementation of SSG projects and FRDT projects lead to a significant 
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problem of growing envy of the non-FRDT areas. Many of the SSG projects 
implemented fall into the same category as the Tax Credit Scheme projects. Both are 
identified in the Western Province rolling 5 year plans. The problem with the SSG was 
that it was not effectively implemented for the benefit of the people of Western 
Province by the FRPG. From the very start, the SSG has been subject to corruption and 
mismanagement (TPNG 11/04/1991; TPNG 17/10/1991). It was routinely raided by the 
government for other purposes, rather than used as a targeted development apparatus. 
In 1996, removing administrative responsibility from FRPG, in reality, meant that the 
national government had little faith in the capacity of the provincial government to 
stand alone. However, this created even more reliance by the people of Western 
Province on OTML as administrator, lessening the legitimacy of the provincial 
government and administration. It is acknowledged by OTFRDP in their Business Plan 
(OTFRDP 2010) that the capacity in implementing projects is weak in the Western 
Province Administration. Effectively the WPA goes to OTML for implementation of 
Projects, and leading up to closure, OTFRDP is to take over that role from OTML.  
The FRPG's general problems with money was most evident in the 1990s with 
the lack of infrastructure being invested in Western Province (Burton 1993a; 1993b). 
Western Province was particularly affected by the breakdown of authority as it was 
constantly in the throes of political intrigue and corruption allegations. In the early 
1990s there were even riots on the streets of Daru. Also during the 1990s the Provincial 
Premier was suspended a number of times for corruption and mismanagement with the 
NEC appointing an administrator (Jackson 2003).  
Tax Credit Scheme  
In 1992 the national government amended the Income Tax Act allowing the mineral 
resource developer companies to exchange ‘0.75 per cent of their gross revenues on the 
construction of social and economic infrastructure, and have this counted as corporate 
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income tax already paid to the government’ (Filer and Imbun 2009: 89). OTML started 
utilizing this tax credit in 1997, and is entitled to a tax credit against the income tax 
payable in respect of any tax year, for an amount equal to the aggregate amount of 
royalty paid or payable during that tax year less the aggregate amount of royalty that 
would have been paid or payable had the royalty been payable at the rate of 1.25 
percent instead of 2 percent. If the tax credit exceeds the income tax payable by 
OTML, the excess is to be carried forward to the next tax year. In 1997 the limit was 
raised to 2 percent, then in 2001 it was reduced back to 0.75 percent (Department of 
National Planning and Monitoring 2001: 3). This means that the equivalent to a 0.75 
percent royalty is set aside for the Regional Engineering Department to use for 
provincial infrastructures. For example, the rural airstrip upgrades, specifically the 
Olsobip terminal and strip upgrade, as well as the North Fly Administrative building in 
Kiunga were built with TCS funds (The National 24/05/2012). The TCS essentially 
makes up for the lack of capacity in the Provincial Government to do large 
infrastructure projects. Over the course of 1997 – 2008, OTML allocated K 97,150, 000 
for TCS projects inside Western Province and K28,423,000 for TCS projects outside 
Western Province in Telefomin District (OTML 2008f). To 2014, OTML has delivered 
116 major infrastructure projects worth K272.04 million (OTML 2014). OTML 
transferred management of TCS to OTDF at the start of 2012 (The National 
24/05/2012). This reflects OTML’s organisational transformation from primary 
community development manager to being solely a mine operator, and a shift of 
responsibility to PNGSDP and OTDF to manage sustainable community development 
and infrastructure projects. This brings the TCS into line with the SSG project 
implementation.  
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Donations Committee  
The OTML Donations Committee apportions money not tied to any compensation or 
other benefit sharing agreement. These are generally seen as goodwill payments to 
engender good relations between the Company and the local communities. The 
Donations Committee of OTML contributes to the community for special projects –- 
for example, if there is a death of a community leader, the donations committee can 
contribute to the haus krai and organise transport for the body to go back to the village. 
OTML contributed K5,078,000 through the Donations Committee between 1982 and 
2008 (OTML 2008f), with an additional K3.6m from 2009 to 2013 (OTML 2013). 
Donations are often the subject of articles in The North Flyer and Tok Tedi, two 
OTML community news outlets. The Donations Committee is funded out of the 
Community Relations budget.  
5.4 Ongoing funds for sustainability – Trusts  
The discussion of sustainability at Ok Tedi mine ultimately rests upon the ongoing 
funds available to enable implementation of sustainable projects. This is where the 
trusts come into play. While the majority of the compensation flows listed above 
(excluding SSG and TCS) have been cash compensation, the trusts are sequestered 
funds for development and future generations. Development or Infrastructure funds are 
for current expenditure on identified projects, some of which will be elaborated on in 
Chapter 6 and 7. Future Generation or Non Renewable Resource Funds are for the 
ongoing funding of projects in the future, after mine closure.  
The Royalty Trust  
The Ok Tedi Landowners Royalty Investment Trust (LORIT) was set up by the 
Minister for Treasury to administer the 19.5 percent of the monthly royalty payments 
from FRPG’s share given to the landowners because of the 2004 MOA. OTML acts as 
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the trust administrator. The LORIT pays out for authorized investment, at a rate that 
does not exceed 20 percent of the annual investment income annually to the 
beneficiaries to ensure the sustainability of the trust into the future (OTML 2012:14). 
The trustees in 2011 were: Henry Asekim (Wangbin), Joel Dangkim (Kavorabip), 
Leonard Lagisa (OTML), Yaru Pohei (OTML), James Topo (MRA), and Timothy 
Mais (Treasury).  
The views of the villagers, as seen in correspondence between their lawyers and 
the state solicitor indicate that it was from the village side that concerns about wasted 
funds were being voiced, not from OTML. The now current arrangements between the 
State and the Landowners reflect the importance of sustainable funding arrangements 
continuing into the future. The payout of the royalties to the MAV demonstrates a 
sustainability focus on the funds. Whether the funds are actually invested sustainably is 
another matter. There has been criticism from people inside OTML and OTDF that the 
investment of funds into property in Australia and PNG does not represent a good 
investment return for local people. For example, The Weigh Inn Hotel in Konedobu is 
owned by the people of the mine area villages. In the end, the investments are chosen 
by the landowners, and if they want to invest in foreign hotels then that is their 
prerogative. Investing only locally in businesses that will have to relocate at mine 
closure represents a risk some landowners are not willing to take.  
 In a letter dated 30th January 2009, landowners from Bultem Village 
questioned a withdrawal from the 'Ok Tedi Landowners Investment Trust' of K3 
million which highlights first hand villagers concerns of possible malfeasance. This 
letter was not sent via the Mount Fubilan Resource Association which is the peak body 
for the 12 Star Mountains and LO villages.  
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Lamin (Non Renewable Resources Fund) Trust  
In 1985, the Lamin Trust Fund was established to be a non-renewable resources fund 
that acts as a future fund or the main leases of Ok Tedi mine and associated town 
infrastructure. The Lamin payments are part of the lease payment schedule previously 
outlined. The leases are as according to the OTML compensation payment Instruction 
form (OTML 2008f):  
• SML 1 (Mine and Mill)  
• Portion 1 (Tabubil Township)  
• Portion 2 (Ok Menga Hydro)  
• LMP1 ( North and South Ok Mani),  
• LMP 16 (Sawmill Flats)  
• LMP 19 (Sawmill itself)  
• LMP 21 (Tabubil explosive magazine)  
• LMP 22 (Yuk Creek Mini Hydro)  
• LMP 27 (Kumsumbip Gravel Pit)  
• LMP 28 (Tabubil Portion 1 Extension)  
• LMP 29 (Dablan Water Supply)  
• LMP 36 (Tabubil East Extension)  
• LMP 75 (Tabubil Escarpment Extension)  
The Lamin Trust Fund covers the villages of Atemkit, Bultem, Finalbin, 
Kavorabip, Ok Teditau, Kumguit, Nioksikwi, Wangbin, and Migalsimbip. The Lamin 
Trust is managed by an Investment Advisory Committee, and the funds are managed 
by KPMG and invested to earn interest, on behalf of the SML, LMP 1, and Portion 1 
and 2 lease landowners. Since 1985, K6,758,740.67 has been deposited into this trust 
(OTML 2012).  
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Dividend Trust Accounts  
Dividends trusts accounted for large benefit steams deployed for sustainable 
development in the both the CMCA and Non-CMCA communities of Western 
Province. There were three main dividend trust accounts to 2013 – PNGSDP, MRSM 
and MROT#2.  
PNGSDP was established for the benefit of Western Province, to act as a type 
of future generation fund for the province. Of the dividends from PNGSDP’s 63.4 
percent equity, one third went to current projects (Development Fund), of which one 
third again is allocated for projects within Western Province. The other two thirds of 
the development fund went to administration and projects throughout PNG. The two 
thirds of the dividends go into a Long-Term Fund, which is invested for the benefit of 
Western Province to last at least 40 years after mine closure. The LTF is entirely held 
offshore, which is legal because PNGSDP is a Singaporean registered entity. Between 
2002 and 2012, PNGSDP received K5.534bn in dividends from OTML, which has 
appreciated vastly to make it a significant financial instrument. The way that PNGSDP 
distributed the funds from the development fund in PNG was to fund already existing 
organisations or programs. For example PNGSDP funded health aid posts and health 
clinics run by the Monfort Catholic Mission and the Evangelical Church of Papua.  
A significant part of PNGSDP was its subsidiaries. Western Power, PNG Micro 
Finance, Cloudy Bay Forestry were a few of the companies set up to deliver services to 
the community. Western Power conducted the rural electrification program along the 
Kiunga- Tabubil Highway. PNG Micro Finance provided micro banking and 
microloans to communities. Cloudy Bay Forestry (located in Central Province) 
managed logging concessions and plantations, which supply housing and infrastructure 
projects. Outside Western Province, PNGSDP funded extensive feasibility studies on 
large infrastructure projects, such as the long-proposed Purari Hydro Scheme.  
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Mineral Resources Star Mountains (MRSM) is the holding company for the 
share of the SML, LMP, and Portion 1 and 2 landowners’ 3.05 percent equity stake in 
OTML. Over the period 1997 to 2013, the MRSM received K296.7m in dividends from 
the Ok Tedi mine (OTML 2013). In 2010, the Board had John Atmeyok (Kumguit), 
Nellie James (DMPGM), Augustine Mano (Managing Director MRDC), Bill Menim 
(Finalbin), Toby Nongkim (Kavorabip), Borok Pitalok (President Star Mountains Rural 
LLG).  
The MROT#2 WPPDTA is sectioned into 2 parts. The Non-CMCA and CMCA 
funds are held in the same account but are subject to different conditions. The CMCA 
part requires OTDF, whereas the Non-CMCA is managed through a different 
mechanism (see Figure 5.1 Appendix VI) The CMCA part was created as part of the 
2006–7 CMCA review process, the WPPDTA accrues the dividends that are derived by 
the 12.2 percent equity holding that MROT#2 holds on behalf of the CMCA and 
nonCMCA communities of Western Province. In 2007, this account held K132m. 
There has been dispute between OTDF, Ok Tedi Mine Impact Area Association, and 
FRPG over who should have control of the funds, and for which sort of development 
they should be used. OTDF accessed the CMCA portion of the funds in order to pay for 
three Fly River ships – the Fly Warrior, the Fly Hope, and the Fly Explorer.  
Heduru Trust  
Heduru Trust was set up as the trust mechanism to facilitate the payment RESA 
compensation. It is managed by Deloitte. The board had in 2011 the representatives:  
• Chaired by the Secretary of the DMPGM (Shadrach Himata)  
• OTML (two positions – Musje Werror and Leonard Lagisa)  
• President of Kiunga Urban LLG (Patoro Ako)  
• President of Lake Murray LLG (Peter Ambrose)  
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• President of Kiwai LLG (Kamea Segewo)  
The trust is administered by the OTML nominated trust administrator (Eminoni 
Kaleidi), with payments managed by OTML and Deloitte. All RESA funds are paid 
into the trust in March, and then the trust pays them out to the communities the 
following February. In the time between when the trust is paid by OTML and the 
communities are paid (eleven months), the Heduru trust garners interest from the 
capital of the following year’s payments. This accrued interest is saved for emergency 
disasters, with the remaining to be paid out to the RESA beneficiaries after mine 
closure. As of 2011, the Heduru trust was holding K19m of accrued interest (OTML 
2011:5)  
Alice River Trust  
The Alice River Trust (ART) administered the Development and Future Generation 
Funds allocated in the LOTA with OTDF being responsible for implementing approved 
projects, but originally the Lower Ok Tedi Investment Company (LOTIC) was the 
vehicle of implementation. The trust had nine trustees, with two each from OTML 
board and Kiunga Rural LLG, and one each from the Mining Department, FRPG, one 
PNG council of churches, one Yonggom represenative, one Awin representative, and 
one member from the Individual and Community Rights Advocacy Forum. The OTML 
Community Relations Department, Deloitte, and trust administrator Eminoni Kailedi 
were responsible for payments (OTML 2011:6). The funds were not subject to 
escalation or review, and were paid out in the fourth quarter of each year from 1997 
until the schedule for payment ceased in 2009. The ART also received Non-renewable 
Resources funds from Leases (LMP 37 and 79), before it ceased to exist (AAR to 
Kailedi 2011)  
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CMCA Regional Trusts  
These different trusts are managed by trustees and OTDF and held by professional 
service companies: Deloittes and KPMG. The funds are deployed by OTFRDP for 
village-based projects. Significant political and bureaucratic systems have been set up 
in order to facilitate the approval of such projects. OTFRDP has a process for 
communities to access the funds from CMCA trust accounts. The process is meant to 
increase the transparency of the transfer of money from Trust to project. Initially, 
OTDF was created as an independent entity but in reality acted as part of OTML's 
Regional Development Department. It was responsible for running programs in the 
CMCA villages from the Mine Area to Kiwai in the Fly Delta. It was intended to be an 
independent organisation that acted on the behest of the CMCA communities not 
OTML. However, in the 2006/7 CMCA review, many landowners complained that 
OTDF and OTML were the same and that they saw no point in calling OTDF separate 
when it was not. This is mirrored by other stakeholders saying that historically OTDF 
was more like an arm of the OTML Public Relations Department than a foundation for 
genuine development. Subsequently in the CMCA MOA 2007, commitments were 
undertaken to clearly delineate between OTML and OTDF (CMCA MOA Clause 3.1).  
Many of the projects OTDF engaged in were unsuccessful, especially those  
involved with agriculture/livestock (See chapter 6). The difficulty in 
implementing rural development schemes at Ok Tedi reflects the wider difficulty 
throughout the country of successful sustainable development.  
In mid-2010 OTFRDP was completely spun out of OTML, becoming a ‘new 
entity’ and a new, separate stakeholder in sustainability planning. The vision statement 
states: ‘To ensure self-sustainability and improve the quality of life to all Western 
Province communities’ (OTFRDP Business Plan 2010–2015). It is the trading name of 
OTDF, but has different responsibilities to its parent. OTFRDP is responsible for new 
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small-scale community development projects. OTFRDP is at the coal face of sustainable 
livelihood policy implementation in the area. Whatever plans are made by other 
stakeholders are directly actionable by this entity. Community members come to 
OTFRDP and float ideas which have to be approved through village planning 
committees (VPCs), and can be then be funded through a range of options from 10% 
Women and Children’s' fund to PNGSDP project funding (OTFRDP 2010).  
 To access development funding from a CMCA trust, an individual or group first 
must put together a proposal to submit to their VPC. The VPC decides whether the 
project is passable, then they send it to OTFRDP. OTFRDP decides whether the project 
is sustainable (according to its own metric) and consults with the VPC about 
improvements to the proposal. The VPC transmits this information back to the 
individual or group the review and recommendations OTFRDP has made, and ask for a 
resubmission of the proposal if it does not meet sustainability guidelines. OTFRDP 
assists with resubmission if necessary. When the project is deemed to be sustainable 
and workable, it is submitted to the Trust for approval (Watson Siarit pers. comm. 
2011). There are opportunities to apply for counterpart funding from other 
organisations depending on the scale and type of project. PNGSDP only counter funded 
community (village) benefitting projects (facilities like churches, school upgrades) 
rather than projects benefitting individuals.  
The significant issue with this system is the reality that close to 70 percent of 
VPC members are illiterate, and often do not transmit the results of applications for 
funding back to the community. There have been accusations within the community of 
nepotism, whereby VPCs approve projects that are not close to sustainable, and fail to 
pass on other projects depending on whether there is a conflict within the community 
with the submitter (Tike Kulingim pers. comm. 2011). The struggle for OTFRDP is 
identifying what is sustainable and what is not. The largest challenge to sustainable 
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development in the Ok Tedi impact corridor is ensuring proper ongoing engagement of 
communities in the projects. There is no lack of funding for well thought out and 
planned projects, but mismanagement of funds, loss of interest, lack of upkeep of 
machinery or equipment all hamper sustainability projects. The types of projects 
funded through this mechanism are almost exclusively small scale and end up being 
short term. This will be explored further in chapter 7 with reference to food security.  
The funds accumulated by the communities in various trusts over the life of the 
current mine are substantial and are increasing as the rate of spending on community 
development projects is slow and far exceeded by the new funds being paid directly 
from OTML and via the two shareholder dividend streams (PNGSDP and the State) 
(OTML 2010c: 3). Between 2001 and 2009 (OTML 2010c: 4) the eight CMCA trusts 
received:  
• K88.7m in cash payments (this was direct from OTML to family 
accounts);  
• K15.2m to women and children, with the total amount still in trust;  
• K51.7m in investment funds, with K12.6m additional in investments, 
resulting in K64.3m left;  
• K108.3m in development funds, of which K48.7m was spent, leaving 
K56.6m.  
This means that in 2009 there was K139.1m in accounts for communities to use, 
and of that K74.8m of Development and Women and Children’s funds were not getting 
deployed by OTFRDP and the CMCA Trusts for the benefit of the beneficiaries.  
5.5 Discussion  
The importance overall of the benefit sharing payments to the development of the 
Western Province is significant. Although the initial benefits were to flow to a small 
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section of the North Fly District, the subsequent compensation for downstream 
environmental impacts have seen a tenfold increase in the amount of people receiving 
benefits from the mining operations. The amount of money available for development 
is sizable, and the mechanisms by which it is distributed are also important to 
determine how it can be effectively deployed for sustainable development.  
OTML effectively distributes the cash compensation to the communities 
through financial institutions, but they have no control over how the money is spent. 
The amounts of assistance and financial flows to communities in the impact and 
affected regions indicates that there have been many missed opportunities in the 
communities. While every village in between Ningerum and the mine has some 
measure of basic infrastructure and services, there is little in the way to indicate that the 
money, which is being allocated to them through compensation, royalties or dividend 
payments, is actually working to make their lives sustainably better. Issues relating to 
school attendance and health outcomes are less important to people in the Mine Area 
Villages than demands for moving Bultem or a road to Atemkit and Kavorabip, as 
though returning people to their lands is a panacea to the problems of gambling, 
prostitution, drunkenness and addiction in their community. The Mine Area Villages 
are especially depressing when it comes to what they look like. People seem to be more 
interested in individual permanent housing than they are in developing their community 
as a whole. Tallying up all the money the Mine Area villages receive in compensation, 
royalties, lease payments and other funds, there is a discrepancy between the actual 
money and the noticeable outcomes of that money.  There are problems associated with 
distributing such large sums of money to people who did not have existing mechanisms 
for dealing with cash45. The cash money is rarely saved, and a number of people are in 
45 OTML pays out all the compensation on a regular basis. Most compensation payments come in the 4th quarter, but 
some are earlier, for example the RESA funds. Some are paid by cheque and others are direct deposited into clan or 
individual accounts, depending on the type of payment.  
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debt to loan sharks or gamblers in anticipation of recieving their compensation money. 
PNGSDP set up PNG Microfinance Ltd in order to facilitate easier access for bank 
accounts and other financial transactions, but even this did not work the way it should. 
By 2012, the PNG Microfinance office in Tabubil reported that 90 percent of 
microloans taken out by people in the Mine Area and North Ok Tedi were never paid 
back (Lydia Gah-Bell pers. comm. 2012). PNG Microfinance acted as another benefit 
sharing mechanism, as there was little effort to ensure the sustainability of the 
microloan business ventures. Education of villagers has been necessary to prepare them 
for Ok Tedi mine closure. The compensation and benefit sharing flows will 
significantly reduce or cease altogether, so individual savings are very important to 
ensure that villagers have enough money to afford basic needs into the future.  
The transactional nature of PNG society means that people assume that when 
you give something you will get something for it in return. However, a problem of 
royalties is that a generation will pass and the younger generation do not associate the 
sacrifice of their ancestral land with the payments. The payments become divorced 
from their meaning, and the cash becomes just cash, not compensation for resource 
development. Conflicts become clashes over money, rather than over the land. This is 
what happened on Bougainville. Since the payments were divorced from the land they 
compensated for, the new PLA made demands of the money, rather than saying they 
demanded to be the true owners of the land the money was paid. The abstractness of 
money is problematic because money is divorced from its meaning. The southern 
Ningerum people from villages outside the LMP 1 area said in MLE meetings they 
were upset because the northern Ningerum LMP 1 villages of Nioksikwi, Boliwogam, 
Kumguit and Okteditau were seen to get an unfair share of the CMCA because they 
‘already get paid’, but this is a misunderstanding of why they get paid. The southern 
villagers believe the LMP 1 villagers get paid for no reason because there is no tailings 
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dam. However, the LMP 1 villages receive payments because of the extensive damage 
to the Ok Mani, which has been smothered to a depth of 100+ metres in rock and silt.  
 There is much confusion in the villages about what is what when it comes to 
royalties, dividends, lease payments, and trusts. I witnessed at Korkit village the people 
not understanding the dividend arrangements, mistaking them for royalty payments46. 
Korkit has a share in the royalty trust by way of being located in Star Mountains Rural 
LLG but does not receive a cash component. There is no reasonable explanation in the 
villagers' mind that they would not receive money from the royalties, as they claim Mt 
Fubilan is their land. However, Jeff Ransley noted that when he surveyed the region in 
1973 the Korkits and Kawentikins said their present villages were at the eastern 
extremity of their customary lands, as most of their land is in Papua Province (pers. 
comm. 2012). Despite this, the younger generation of people is at the age where they 
feel that their proximity to the mine site, but distance from benefits, is reason enough to 
say they want more of the Ok Tedi pie.  
Considering the geographical extent and cultural heterogeneity of the 
communities receiving benefits from the mine, no singular mechanism could logically 
be applied for development. Some of the criticism that comes about the CMCA is that 
it was essentially bribing the downstream communities into approving the continuation 
of mining. This is despite the best efforts of the mining company saying that it was 
prepared to close the mine had they not gained approval from the communities. To 
close the mine in 2000 or 2001 would have meant the environmental impacts of the 
mine would have been the only thing left, rather than the continuation of the mine 
facilitating further development in the area. The development of the OTDF and 
PNGSDP with the 9SA meant that there was higher potential for enduring development 
than there was with the FRDT.  
46 Although in fairness, it is extremely complicated and not very transparent – especially when it comes to the FRPG 
portions of dividends and royalties.  
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The key issue faced in mobilising all of the funds available to the landowners 
and impacted communities is the lack of a cooperative framework for design and 
implementation of projects. PNGSDP and OTDF both have very different ways they 
are using funds to develop Western Province. Because of their different structures and 
management, they tend to concentrate on different but overlapping projects rather than 
working together for the benefit of efficient fund use. There needed to be clearer 
delineation of the roles of the respective organisations rather than both trying to do 
everything – e.g. OTFRDP aquaculture fisheries projects and PNGSDP Barramundi 
Hatchery covering the same fish-based ground rather than collaborating and sharing 
expertise. Counter funding arrangements need to be clearer, because every single 
person in Western Province has a right to PNGSDP funds, and additionally every 
person within the CMCA has rights to CMCA trust funds. Communicating this to 
communities is fundamental.  
There has been in recent years a growing dissatisfaction with the way the 
benefits have been dispersed. As I witnessed in MLE village meetings in early 2012, 
many villagers cited that they were not happy with the lack of projects from OTDF, 
PNGSDP and OTML. The absence of an OTFRDP representatives in the North Fly 
MLE meetings in 2012 which I attended is testament to the inadequacy of their 
organisational structures and lack of capacity facilitate officers to go on the MLE trips, 
especially in the Nupmo trust region, as the communities wanted to ask questions of the 
OTFRDP people but unfortunately were denied the opportunity. The communities had 
hoped that OTFRDP was going to be markedly better than OTDF and OTML’s 
engagement in the past (especially considering this was a key issue they brought up in 
the CMCA review). OTML historically had poor follow up and monitoring of their 
community projects and they recognise this (Yaru Pohei pers. comm. 2010). They have 
effectively outsourced their community development programs to other organisations 
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because they were not core business activities. However, like with most things in 
Western Province, there is no point having large sums of money available if it is 
always used poorly. OTFRDP does not yet have the capacity to undertake or monitor 
all the projects that it wants to develop, and relies too heavily on outside consultants to 
design projects.  
 Over the years there has been constant erosion in self-determination for the 
communities. Rather than enabling communities, OTDF and PNGSDP, although they 
do good work and have technocratic and development staff who are trained in the 
implementation of programs and policies, are seen by the communities as being another 
gate keeper to money. Many communities state that the funds should just be given to 
the community so they can determine what they want to do with them. While the 
arguments of the communities might have weight and be reasonable, the reality is there 
is no capacity in individual villages to undertake the sorts of projects which are 
implemented on their behalf – for example rural electrification, water and sanitation, 
road building. The community complaints about the processes by which the monies are 
accessed is an issue which needs to be addressed more by both OTFRDP and 
PNGSDP, because there is general confusion about how to go about it. The VPC 
project funding lodging process is not necessarily the best process, considering the 
problems with VPC members moving out of the villages they are supposed to be 
representatives of, or not transmitting the results of applications back to the 
community. There need to be more effective feedback loops to the community, which 
give individual community members the ability to respond directly to the concerns or 
comments from OTFRDP about the sustainability of proposed projects. The best 
outcomes for communities come from transparent processes, rather than perceptions 
that the VPCs are doing things for their personal benefit rather than the benefit of the 
community  
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Much of the discussion in communities around PNGDSP focuses on the 
disconnection between the aims of the board and the desires of the grassroots people. 
The significant proportion of PNGSDP's headline grabbing infrastructure projects do 
not or will not significantly improve the lives of people in Western Province. The Star 
Mountains Institute of Technology is a prime example. The problem lies in basic 
primary education in Western Province, not vocational or university level education. 
The design of the buildings is inappropriate for Tabubil as well. It is all for show, as 
very few Western Province citizens are able to gain access to university as the primary 
school system is rife with problems. PNGSDP was using its funds to build this 
university which would benefit people coming in from all other provinces, but unless 
they provisioned to set aside a scholarships or free tuition for Western Province people, 
local people would be unable to attend. Otherwise it would have just been another 
example of PNGSDP funding projects which do not benefit the local people.  
There was some argument between OTFRDP and the previous Western Province 
Governor Hon. Dr Bob Danaya over who has the right to use the WPPDTA CMCA 
money. Handed out during the Delegates Meeting in March 2011 was a memo from 
Danaya to Western Province MPs saying that the WPDDTA was ‘our 10% equity’, 
rather than recognizing that the equity belonged separately to CMCA and Non-CMCA 
communities in Western Province, and that OTDF is the sole fund manager and 
implementer of CMCA trust funds for development. Ian Middleton, CEO of OTDF, 
framed this as an attack on the right of OTDF to use money designated for the CMCA 
communities. The hostile relationship between OTDF and FRPG over the expenditure 
of funds for development eased with the election of former PNGSDP employee Ati 
Wobiro to the governorship of Western Province in 2012.  
 In late 2012, there was a renewed criticism of PNGSDP and BHP's relationship 
with the organisation, with PM Peter O'Neill even stepping in to say that former 
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Chairman Professor Ross Garnaut was not welcome in PNG any more, despite him still 
being Chairman of OTML's board. The difficulty with PNGSDP is that it is essentially 
a private not-for-profit company and operates as such, so the more money it accrues 
because of Ok Tedi's recent economic successes, the more political officials and elected 
members claim that they should have control over it. While this is not a new 
phenomenon in developing countries, it is nevertheless a worrying one from the point 
of maintaining the trust's integrity. The significant amounts of money involved in 
dividends means that there is a large amount of money for development in Western 
Province. Of any province in the country Western Province has the money available for 
big infrastructure projects, community development and sustainable livelihoods 
projects, and better health services. The province is far from having everything it 
should after 30 years of a rich mine pouring money into Provincial Government 
coffers, trusts, development companies and pockets of landowners. The accountability 
and monitoring of money and projects is absent in Western Province.  
5.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated that there are vast amounts of money available for the 
communities to develop. The trust system set up for the benefit of future generations’ 
means there will be money available for post-closure project funding. However, as 
discussed, the actual outcome of the money has been for the majority of communities 
unsustainable. The lack of actual benefits from the Ok Tedi mine for grassroots 
villagers is because of failed and abandoned projects, a lack of focus on livelihood 
enabling infrastructure, and an absence of adequate review. While the communities in 
the North Fly District might be better off under the OTMC that is only because their 
lives were dire before the mine existed. They are still isolated, subject to poor health, 
and still desperate for development.  
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In the next chapter, I will examine how the money from these trusts and other 
benefit streams is used to further sustainable post closure livelihoods.  
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Chapter Six – Agriculture and Livestock Project Case Studies – 
Towards food security and sustainable livelihoods in the North 
Fly.  
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter is a study of the ways stakeholder organisations of the OTMC have 
approached agricultural development and food security for the communities in the 
Mine Area Villages and the northern parts of the Tutuwe and Nupmo trust regions. It 
will address through a series of case studies the different types of food based projects 
implemented, and will address the fundamental problems of sustaining interest in 
agriculture, livestock, and fisheries projects despite the stated fears for the post-closure 
future.  
Agricultural development for food security presents a livelihood development 
opportunity within the context of the Ok Tedi Mining Complex (OTMC). Agricultural 
practices exist already within the North Fly District, however the social and economic 
changes brought by the introduction of the cash economy have increased the 
population’s reliance on store bought foods and a shift away from subsistence. There 
has been a shift away from isolated individual stakeholder organization driven 
agricultural programs to multi-stakeholder collaborative decision making and project 
development of agricultural and food security programs promoting sustainable 
livelihoods, particularly after the 1997 drought and highland frost crisis. This chapter 
describes the substance of the agricultural practices existing in the North Fly, the 
OTMC response to the practices, and the complications for OTMC developing policies 
to mitigate food security risks into the post-mine closure future. This contributes to the 
overall argument of the thesis as an example of the OTMC institutional influence on 
communities in the impact area. It is a case study of how the mine closure and 
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sustainability planning processes have influenced the development and limited the 
effectiveness of post-closure livelihood promotion policies under the OTMC.  
Food security forms a large part of the community livelihoods planning in mine 
closure and sustainability planning. The policy agenda of food security in the Ok Tedi 
context was significantly influenced by the 1997 drought (Wissink 2000; Wissink, 
Askin and Bomai 2000; OTML 2005d). Previous to this extended El Nino weather 
event, little thought was put into the issue of food security, because almost everyone in 
PNG has access to customary land which they rely on to provide sources of nutrition. 
When this crisis happened, Tabubil and Kiunga were cut off from the river barges 
bearing food to these towns for seven months. This brought into sharp focus the need to 
support subsistence agriculture as well as cash crops in the region. The specific context 
of Ok Tedi mine’s hinterland communities has been explained in earlier chapters, but 
the significance to food security policies and programs necessitates that this context be 
built upon. The OTMC organisational stakeholders’ discussions of food security fit into 
a broader discussion of the importance of community development (FRPG nd; OTDF 
2005; OTFRDP 2010; OTML 2005d).  
Since Kennecott started exploration in the Star Mountains, there has been a 
gradual move toward cassava and sweet potato production, as opposed to the taro 
monoculture that existed before. Watson (1965; 1977) argues that because taro has to 
be cooked before it is given to pigs due to oxalate crystals in taro. This may seem 
strange to say, because one would think that variety in human diet would be of more 
concern to people. The significance of the need to cook food for pigs comes from the 
fact that the Min have increased the intensity of pig husbandry (Jorgensen 2006: 243). 
Where before they would have raised two female pigs per family with wild boars siring 
piglets, they now have three or four female pigs and a male pig per family). The 
introduction of the shotgun has almost led to the over-utilisation of wild pigs. In 
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addition to this, village groups now throw large pig feasts in order to extract money 
from working relatives or kin. This was almost unheard in the area of before the Ok 
Tedi mine brought the cash economy into the sphere of the Min (Jorgensen 2006: 243–
245). 
In addition to the move away from taro monocultures, there has been a growing 
reliance on rice, tinned fish and bully beef imports. They are cheap alternatives to 
toiling in gardens, and give relief to women gardeners. Diabetes was almost unheard of 
in the North Fly District 30 years ago due high level of exercise and the lack of 
processed food in their diets. However, as with the trend that is common throughout the 
developing world, incomes increase and so do ‘lifestyle’ diseases. Whether the 
increased diversity of diet from taro and small amounts of protein from birds, lizards, 
and marsupials to tinned fish and beef, grains, sweet potato and other recent additions 
to the Mountain Ok diet increases nutrition and overall health remains to be seen47.  
In PNG, fruit and vegetables are generally grown for three purposes – 
subsistence, for sale in the domestic market, or for export. Plantations are still 
important for non-food or processing crops such as coconut (copra), rubber and palm 
oil. Cash cropping is an important source of income for rural Papua New Guineans. 
Common crops are sweet potatoes, coconuts, cocoa, taro, bananas, melons, broccoli, 
capsicums, carrots, and potatoes. Some crops are susceptible to blights and infestations, 
such as taro leaf blight and cacao pod borer that can cause significant crop losses 
(Okpul et al 2002; Yalu, Singh and Singh Yadav 2009; Curry, Lummani and Omuru 
2010). The vast majority of the population lives on locally grown food and food bought 
from local markets. The incidence of bought food is low outside towns of Tabubil, 
Ningerum and Kiunga in North Fly District (PNGSDP 2009), as there is little cash 
47 The Ok Tedi Health and Nutrition Project (Lourie et al 1986; Ulijaszek 1989) provided a baseline to 
compare the current health status of the North Fly population, which is being undertaken by the North Fly 
Health Services Development Program, a joint initiative between OTML, JTA International and local 
church health services. 
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money spare to buy food, after transport and school fee costs. The most common local 
staple foods in the Star Mountains Rural LLG are taro, sweet potato, cooking bananas, 
and sago. In Ningerum LLG and Kiunga Rural LLG, the most common staple foods are 
cooking bananas, sago, and sago. These are supplemented with store bought rice, 
Maggi noodles, and white potatoes where they are accessible.  
6.2 Mine closure: the need for Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries 
Projects in North Fly  
Agricultural programs have gone through various different forms in PNG over the past 
50 years. In the 1970s, there was a large focus on integrated rural development because 
of the increasing impoverishment of rural communities (Carswell 1997). Since 
agriculture is the essential element in rural subsistence, many policies were developed 
to encourage a holistic approach to development hinged on agricultural development. 
The agricultural development sustainability policies require local knowledge and local 
applicability. Taking projects and implementing them without due consideration of 
local context usually means the projects are doomed to failure. Mine closure planning 
has to take into account what the absence or diminished ability to access the diversity 
of foods and the cheap prices of foods in stores will have on communities, and the 
livelihoods of people selling produce to each other or to the mine and government 
workers along the highway should not be underestimated.  
The big issue in the Ok Tedi area is one that is common throughout mining 
impact areas in PNG. Dependency on store bought food is highest in the compensation 
receiving communities close to the mine. With ready access to all manner of imported 
(to the area, not necessarily imported to the country) foods, such as tinned meats, rice, 
and Coca Cola, people have shunned the old ways of growing and gathering food for 
subsistence (OTML 2003a: 8). Imported food is a status symbol of wealth and access to 
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the capitalist cash economy. Food security in the mine impact area varies from almost 
total dependency on store bought food to majority subsistence conditions. The local 
landowners, the residents of the six mine villages of Atemkit, Bultem, Finalbin, 
Kavorabip, Migalsimbip and Wangbin, have shown through household surveys done 
by OTML and PNGSDP that they are very dependent on store bought food (OTML, 
2009j; PNGSDP 2010). This is the ‘Ok Tedi generation’. Reliance on store bought food 
has led to a decline in knowledge and practices of traditional gardening and animal 
husbandry in the villages that receive compensation from either the SML or LMP. 
These villages vary in their access to the markets, with Atemkit, Kavorabip, 
Kawentigin and Korkit being isolated, lacking road access. The further down the river 
or highway people are, the less dependent they are on store bought food. OTDF 
indicated that many local landowners from the mine villages are not enthusiastic about 
or interested in engaging in any model farming or food security programs (Watson 
Siarit pers. comm. 2010). The ready availability of cash from compensation to buy 
food from the supermarket and markets makes subsistence gardening not attractive or 
worthwhile.  
OTML have indicated that PNGSDP need to make some sort of commitment to 
maintaining a portion of food transport subsidies that OTML provides for transport of 
food to Tabubil and Kiunga. PNGSDP cannot afford to subsidise food for Tabubil as 
their prime aim is for sustainable development. OTML will not be providing subsidies 
for food transport to the region after closure (OTML 2009a). The consensus opinion 
from OTML, OTDF, and PNGSDP is that the local people will need to reduce their 
dependence on store bought food and start subsistence gardening again. This is a 
problem for the generations born after the mine started operation. The local people will 
have to (re)learn how to operate in a subsistence model, which included hunting for 
wild proteins, which was customary in the area before mining.  
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 The influx of settlers has also had an impact on food security in the Tabubil 
area. The local people have allowed or been strong armed into letting settlers use their 
land for both subsistence and market gardening. The local people are also paying the 
settlers to garden and maintain fish farms on their behalf (Tike Kulingim pers. comm. 
2010). This is an unsustainable practice and needs to be dealt with before closure, as if 
the settlers are crowding out local entrepreneurialism and business activity, there is less 
incentive for local people to seek out OTDF assistance to set up agricultural projects, 
and when the settlers leave, there is no knowledge base to run projects on their own. In 
1998, a survey in the Tabubil area villages was conducted by David Wissink of 
OTML’s Regional Development Department which showed that even then people had 
fears for food security in the future (especially post-closure). This concern centred on 
the inability and knowledge of how to grow their own food. Many people from the 
villages surveyed believed that the OTML agricultural officers (didiman) should show 
them how. Some people even said that they would starve without help (Wissink 2001). 
Wissink stated ‘Only 37 percent of those surveyed (in 1998) report any form of 
investment or savings. When directly asked the question about life after mine closure, 
93 percent believed they would have problems feeding themselves when the mine 
closed’ (Wissink 2001: 129). Despite the anxiety about long term food security, 
planning for the post-closure future appeared to be a low priority in many communities 
when compared to immediate needs. Wissink (2001:134) concluded that:  
The present economy is overly reliant on revenues generated from Ok Tedi 
mine…building relationships with additional stakeholders is an essential part of the 
transition from communities that have become dependent on the support and resources 
of OTML, to communities that have the knowledge, skills and resources needed 
following mine closure  
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With this in mind, the next section deals with challenges of developing policies 
for agricultural development in the North Fly.  
6.3 Failed Agriculture and Livestock Initiatives of the Past  
OTML implemented, through its Public Affairs (Community Relations) Department, 
the Community Agriculture Program (CAP). This program, initiated in the 1990s, 
deployed OTML development funds, through the Fly River Development Trust, to 
enable local communities to increase agricultural and livestock production in the 
region. However, OTML's self-evaluation of the program was that it was a limited 
success. Although there was commitment by communities at the start, many of the 
CAP era agricultural projects failed due to a variety of factors. A 2002 assessments by 
OTML at the conclusion of the CAP before it was rolled into OTDF showed that 
improper use of funds and community disinterest in projects were the two main 
problems (OTML 2002). These factors, coupled with OTML poorly planning and 
coordinating project, not having enough emphasis on education programs and follow 
up visits as there should have been, and the over-encouragement of inappropriate 
projects such as fixed location agricultural projects for Middle Fly people who are 
semi-nomadic hunter-gatherers (Yaru Pohei, pers. comm. 2010). OTML has in the past 
undertaken agricultural programs with local people in the more immediate impact area, 
but they have not been a success overall. There was an issue with encouragement of 
appropriate crops for the climatic, cultural and land quality.  
Case Study 1: Inappropriate Pineapple Project  
One of the illuminating failed market gardening agriculture projects from the period 
1996–2002 is the North Fly Pineapple Project. Pineapple plants thrive in the Ok Tedi 
mine area. The area has the right type of free draining soil, although the soil acidity and 
mineral content varies greatly throughout the region (Betitis et al. 2000). The 
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topography of the region is suited to cultivation with the varying slopes, fans, and 
ridges, with mountain streams cutting across the slopes. The high rainfall of around 
7500mm a year for the Tabubil Township, and 11,000mm a year for the mine site is 
helpful but erosion and landslides are a constant issue.  
In 1998 OTML commissioned Eddie Pfeiffer from Sogeri Spices, an organic 
pineapple producer near Port Moresby, to carry out a pre-feasibility study into pineapple 
production in the mine affected areas. In the initial report on pineapples in the North 
Fly, Pfeiffer notes that existing local growers of pineapples were selling pineapples too 
cheap and that the market for juice in Tabubil was non-existent (Pfeiffer 1998:10). This 
early identification of the market problems did not deter OTML from commissioning a 
full feasibility report from Sogeri Spices in 1999. The proposed project was known as 
the North Fly Pineapple Project. It would feature a nucleus estate, with farmers selling 
produce to the single desk in order to get a good price. The only real problem signalled 
by this report was concerning a market for the produce (Pfeiffer 1999). Pfeiffer wrote 
that ‘the land is there, the soil is suitable (after some improvement), the technology is 
available, the market are [sic] there and waiting: all these are facts. The only unknown 
and incalculable factor in this equation are [sic] the people themselves.’ (Pfeiffer 
1999:27). Both reports by Pfeiffer are not up to the standard of a professional business 
feasibility report – at times the language is extremely colloquial, using phrases such as 
‘every Tom, Dick and Harry’ and statements about his own business:  
I have no personal experience in the dried fruit business as yet since I haven’t 
produced any. I have, however. Researched [sic] this aspect of the fruit processing 
rather thoroughly and came to the conclusion that while I was producing the base 
material for it anyway it would be a shame not to go the last step and process it as well. 
(Pfeiffer 1999: 9).  
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Despite the red flags contained in the reports, OTML proceeded with securing 
organic pineapple suckers, and distributed them in preparation for the North Fly 
Pineapple Project nucleus estate to be established.  
 The communities were interested and many farmers took advantage of the 
business opportunity, and started to produce pineapples. In 2000 the Migalsim 
‘Integrated Farm (chickens, vegetables and pineapples) and 22 small farms along the 
Kiunga – Tabubil Highway were all given over 20,000 pineapple suckers by the CAP 
(Pani 2003:3). By 2003 despite being given pineapple suckers and being supported by 
OTML and OTDF, no real infrastructure had been set up by any organisation due to a 
miscommunication about equity participation and management between OTML and 
Sogeri Spices. OTML was under the impression that Pfeiffer would take a stake in the 
North Fly Pineapple Project, and the participating communities would fund it through 
the CMCA trusts. In 2003, Rob Crane, OTML’s Team Coordinator, Business 
Development, in a Memorandum to David Wissink, Manager Regional Development, 
contended  
The Pineapple Project is viable and should be pursued. However, progress was stalled, 
and continues to be stalled due to lack of proper planning … Due to this situation, the 
community (in general) are confused and becoming increasingly frustrated with OTML 
(Crane 2003: 2).  
The village farmers had no market to sell their produce, and nowhere to process 
the pineapples to add value, despite the proposals that Pfeiffer had set out in his 
feasibility reports and in meetings with farmers. The farmers, in anger and frustration, 
dumped their pineapples on the doorstep of the Kiunga OTDF office (OTDF Officer 
Pers Comm 2010). In March 2003 a group of 25 existing pineapple farmers formed the 
North Fly Pineapple Limited to represent their business interest. The organisation is not 
listed as existing on the Investment Promotion Authority website, and Pani (2003) 
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clarifies that ‘the company is yet to be incorporated because the payment for 
registration fee was not given’ (5). The North Fly Pineapple Limited business plan 
(NFPL 2003) asserts Pfeiffer as manager, but he did not author48 the plan, so the 
authenticity of this claim cannot be established. Crane questioned the commercial 
acumen of Pfeiffer, arguing,  
His past record as an agricultural producer seems sound but his commercial credibility 
in the marketplace seems to be lacking. Additionally, the reports submitted by Mr. 
Pfeiffer read more like a Kiap patrol report rather than a business man investigating a 
serious commercial venture. (Crane 2003:3).  
In OTML’s Food Security Program Review (2005), they state, ‘Each year there 
is an untold number of pineapples that go to waste because of a lack of markets, or 
alternatively lack of access to markets’ (OTML 2005d:23). Pineapple production in the 
Tabubil area has remained very small scale due to the lack of market and high cost of 
logistics. There are still pineapple plantations along the Ok Ma road; however, with the 
closure of the Maria Bridge their access to Tabubil produce market is significantly 
reduced. Along the Kiunga-Tabubil Highway, roadside markets often have one or two 
small pineapples for sale, as many gardeners keep a small plot of pineapples. The 
North Fly Pineapple Project was a failure because a good idea was acted upon rather 
than a good policy was implemented. Although Pfeiffer was experienced in the 
growing and marketing of pineapples near the capital, it is obvious from his reports that 
he never fully considered how isolated and inaccessible the North Fly was to markets, 
and the significant subsidies required for getting produce to markets. From this case 
study it can be seen that the strategies for promotion of cash cropping in the lead up to 
closure face problems of adequate infrastructure, market access and business 
management.  
48 The business plan was written by educated village members, or by an OTML employee, with limited editing skills 
as by page 14, the business name changes to Komopkin Business Group and the business type changes to rental 
cars.  
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Case Study 2: Failure of Finalbin Model Farm 
Finalbin farm was established under the CAP program. It was a large project, with tens 
of thousands of kina invested into it, and for many years it was a reasonably successful 
operation. It was under the stewardship of a local landowner from Finalbin, who 
managed all aspects of the farm. The farm was located just off the Mine Access Road 
close to the village of Finalbin. It was a large site, with a range of agricultural, 
livestock, and fisheries facilities built.  
I went to the site with Tike Kulingim of OTFRDP as he wanted to show me 
how motivated some of the community members in the Mine Area Villages could be 
when it came to farming. The farm appeared to be overgrown, with no noticeable 
agricultural activity. There were empty sheds, unkempt gardens, a dirty unmaintained 
fish pond, and wreckage of a 4WD. The caretakers – two men from Telefomin – 
showed us some of the remaining animals (two malnourished small pigs and a few 
chickens) and related to us they had been hired by farm owner’s family mind the farm. 
The former owner had died in a car accident sometime prior, and the family was in 
dispute over ownership of the farm. Meanwhile, all the farm assets invested in over the 
time the farm was operating were stripped away, and the farm was no longer 
functioning. Tike Kulingim was very disappointed and upset that the farm had gone to 
ruin. He had a good working relationship with the late owner. 
 Few Mine Area Village landowners showed interest in business development 
and agricultural production. The unfortunate aspect for the community is that the farm 
was a source of fresh locally produced chicken, pork, and fish. OTFRDP agriculture 
and fisheries officers described the Mine Area Village community’s attitude to food 
security programs as ‘failure, disinterest, and general unhappiness with the 
community to follow through on projects’. A comment by an Executive Manager  
sums up this frustration: ‘You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make 
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it drink’ (Pers. comm. 2010). OTFRDP staff indicated that many of the local 
landowners from the Mine Area Villages are not enthusiastic about or interested in 
engaging in any model farming or food security programs. The ready availability of 
cash from compensation, lease payments, and royalties (as discussed in Chapter 5) to 
buy food from the supermarket and markets makes subsistence gardening not an 
attractive or worthwhile activity for Mine Area Villagers.  
6.4 Recent Successes in Agriculture and Livestock Projects.  
Case Study 3: Improving Viability in Poultry Projects  
As per the 2006–2012 FRPG Food Security Strategic Plan, poultry projects have the 
objective ‘to increase small holder incomes and employment opportunity and to 
provide source of protein for these communities’ (FRPG 2005: 11). Improving access 
to protein sources in the Mine Area Villages and the Nupmo and Tutuwe trust regions 
means taking measures to fully utilise birds for breeding, egg laying, and consumption. 
OTML implemented poultry projects as part of the CAP food security program 
between 1996 and 2002. Poultry projects included Australorps, broiler chickens, and 
Muscovy ducks. The intention for the OTML projects was to train village farmers to 
grow the chickens and ducks, sell or eat a portion, and breed a new lot of birds with the 
remaining stock. Australorps were chosen to improve the breeding stock of village 
chickens, as they are hardy birds with high egg yields that do not require specialist 
feed. Broiler chickens grow fast but also require specialist feed. Muscovy ducks are a 
hearty breed and perform well in open range at the village level (OTML 2005d: 38–
39).  
By 2002, only two of the poultry projects established by OTML in the Mine 
Area Villages and Tutuwe trust region were still operating (OTML 2005d: 77–80). The 
failure of the projects was ‘probably due to a lack of market, high feed and logistics 
192 
 
cost and a lack of business acumen among the local people and probably also the 
extension officers responsible’ (OTML 2005d: 38). A common occurrence was that 
birds would be given to farmers with the intention of sustainable breeding, but 
Christmas or Easter would come and all the birds would be slaughtered for sale, then 
the farmer would come back to OTML and ask for more birds (Tike Kulingim pers. 
comm. 2010). A consistent lack of record keeping meant that there was no way for the 
poultry programs to be monitored and evaluated in order to prevent stock loss or 
mismanagement (OTML 2005d). The effect on the poultry program was that many 
farmers were not held accountable, and treated the program as handouts rather than an 
opportunity for sustainable food security. The challenge of maintaining the balance 
between community assistance and dependency was not managed well by OTML CAP, 
as the poultry project example shows.  
OTFRDP has attempted to change the attitude of communities with their 
poultry projects. There has been moderate success, although it has not yet been 
successful in encouraging the local farmers to sustain their flocks by keeping a select 
few birds for breeding. To eliminate this practice targeted education of farmers on 
sustainability has been suggested (National Agriculture Research Institute liaison 
officer pers. comm. 2012) The problems of the old CAP poultry projects still exist. The 
high price of chicken pellets inhibits the success of the village broiler projects, but 
OTFRDP has more success with Australorp chicken projects due to their varied dietary 
needs, which are similar to village chickens. Communities are still interested in broiler 
chickens, as they are easy income generating projects. Encouraging sustainability and 
ongoing viability of the poultry projects has become more important for OTFRDP 
rather than just as one off projects for approval to access CMCA trust funds.  
OTFRDP has also engaged outside help to improve the most important aspect 
of broiler production – the feed inputs. A collaborative Broiler Feed Trial Project by 
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ACIAR was established in order to reduce the costs of broiler chicken production. This 
project was intended to trial reducing reliance on imported (from Lae) broiler feed 
concentrate by supplementing it with locally sourced feed, such as cassava and sweet 
potato (Glatz 2013). The project was also aimed at training officers from the National 
Agriculture Research Institute, OTFRDP, and relevant NGOs (Christian Leader 
Training College and Lutheran Development Service) in supporting farmers in 
increasing profitability for broiler projects. The Mine Area Villages, northern Tutuwe 
and Nupmo trust regions were chosen as one of three geographic areas within PNG 
where the trial was conducted. It involved three objectives:  
1. To develop on-station a range of best-bet feeding options for broiler 
production and profitability.  
2. To evaluate broiler production and profitability on-farm of various 
feeding options that incorporate local feeds.  
3. To promote the wide-spread adoption of alternative feeding options for 
broilers (and layers) that will improve profitability (Glatz 2013).  
Observing the preparation of grow out trials for the broiler project meant going 
to the field sites along the Kiunga Tabubil highway and in Mine Villages. I visited 11 
different trial sites from Kwiloknai up to Bultem, and many of the farmers were new to 
broilers. There were some established famers involved, such as Willie Wokasok from 
Km118, others were newer peri-urban farmers. The farmers had prepared new facilities 
for the chicks to live in. One farmer from Old Wangbin was not taking care of his 
existing chickens (they were dehydrated and overcrowded in the pen). This farmer was 
given a stern reprimand from the NARI liaison officer and the OTFRDP officer Tike 
Kulingim. Most of the farmers were excited about the prospect of being in the grow-out 
trial.  
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The result of this Broiler Feed Trial was proof of scope for farmers to improve 
profitability of their broiler projects through the use of locally available feed 
supplementation – sweet potato and cassava – at a much more achievable price for rural 
villagers (K800/t compared to K2000/t for commercial feed) (Glatz 2013). This means 
for the post-closure viability of the livelihood that small scale poultry farmers will be 
able to, with the use of a mini mill, produce their own broiler chicken feed and grow 
healthy chickens for sale even if they do not have access to commercial concentrated 
broiler chicken feeds.  
Case Study 4: Popular and Effective Highland Aquaculture Projects  
Aquaculture projects have been popular in the North Fly since 2000 when the first 
project was initiated in Golgobip. Aquaculture has high numbers of participating 
farmers. In 2005 there were 417 farmers with 385 fishponds across the North Fly 
District and into Telefomin District, with the majority of fish farmers in Olsobip LLG 
(103) and Telefomin (210) (OTML 2005C: 41-42). Aquaculture in the Ok Tedi area is 
an important project encouraged and supported by OTFRDP. Villagers are given access 
to fingerlings (Common Carp Cyprinus carpio and Tilapia sp.) from OTDF and 
Western Province DAL and encouraged to start fishponds. The fish are sold for money 
or eaten by the family or local villagers. The program has been successful in Migalsim 
with many fish ponds. There are close to 70 fishponds in and around the village. In 
2010 OTFRDP took five farmers from various villages to Goroka to see fish farming 
and learn about the techniques.  My fieldwork took me to Migalsim to look at several 
of the fishponds there. Near the corner of the road to Migalsim and the Kiunga-Tabubil 
Highway, a large and well planned carp and tilapia fish farm operated and owned by a 
man called Abraham (see Plate 6.2 in Appendix I), who was a settler from Olsobip. 
Abraham has been particularly entrepreneurial in his fish farming with seven large 
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ponds which he started by buying a plot of land from the Migalsim village landowners. 
He started a business selling fingerlings to Migalsim and Olsobip villagers, as well as 
selling the large fish for food. With the money generated, Abraham started a canteen, a 
small chicken farm and bought part of a bus. He teaches the other local people how to 
farm fish, an central element the program was designed to encourage, so that capacity 
is built from within the small scale industry (Watson Siarit pers. comm. 2010). 
Migalsim has benefited greatly from the increased local business activity.  
Criticisms of the impact of these aquaculture projects on fish species in the Fly 
River were made by Water Management & Resources and Hydrobiology Ltd, who 
prepared a report for OTML on freshwater fish diversity in 2007. The report said that:  
It can be expected that the currently present exotic fish species will exert adverse 
pressure on the recovery of native fish populations … It would be advisable to 
minimise the risk of further adverse pressure by actively discouraging the introduction 
of other exotic fish species to the catchment, or the further transfer of the existing 
exotic species within the catchment. In particular, the pond culture of carp and tilapia 
in the catchment should be strongly discouraged. (WRM and Hydrobiology 2007:33)  
OTFRDP has not stopped or discouraged carp or tilapia fish farming in the 
catchment area of the Ok Tedi. I am not sure whether escaping fish is taken into their 
risk assessment consideration when selecting or approving aquaculture projects.  
A significant problem with aquaculture development projects is low enrolment 
into projects in the Mine Area Villages, with the exception of Migalsim. There are 
hundreds of people outside the CMCA areas who are very interested in gaining access 
to the fish farming. The fish farm project is one that could be expanded around any 
mine in the developing world (depending on water supply and soil type) because it can 
be a subsistence activity or on a larger scale for business.  
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6.5 Conclusion  
The case studies within this chapter have illuminated some of the problems with 
agriculture, livestock, and fisheries livelihood development in the North Fly. Engaging 
with communities and communicating that the approaching mine closure means that 
they have to be prepared to become subsistence farmers is difficult when the 
communities are receiving large benefit streams from the mine. OTFRDP is attempting 
to make sure that their projects connect with the communities, and the success of the 
aquaculture program shows that a livelihood that considers the lifestyles and skills of 
people before implementation has a high degree of success.  
The next chapter is another livelihood development case study, but with a focus 
on artisanal and small scale mining.   
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Chapter Seven – Artisanal and Small Scale Mining Case Study  
  
‘The river is our ATM!’ - (Ningerum artisanal miner).  
7.1 Introduction  
Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) presents a livelihood development opportunity 
within the context of the Ok Tedi Mining Complex (OTMC). The communities 
involved developed the practice without assistance or encouragement from any of the 
OTMC organisations. This chapter describes the substance of the communities’ ASM 
practices, the OTMC response to the practices, and the complications for OTMC 
developing policies to mitigate risks into the post-mine closure future. This case study 
contributes to the overall argument of the thesis as an example of the OTMC 
institutional influence on communities in the impact area. It is a case study of how the 
mine closure and sustainability planning process has influenced the development of 
post-closure livelihood promotion policies under the OTMC.  
ASM is an activity that occurs throughout the developing world. Over the last 
two decades, ASM has become a focus of academic and non-governmental interest for 
sustainable livelihood development in resource-rich countries with large rural 
populations. From the countries of sub-Saharan and West Africa to PNG, rural people 
are engaging in ASM to support their families. ASM is most common with reference to 
gold, but there are many people engaged in precious stone and metal mining, such as 
sapphires in Madagascar (Duffy 2005, 2007; Cartier 2009), diamonds in Sierra Leone 
(Silberfein 2004; Wilson 2011; Monachie 2012; D’Angelo 2014), and coltan in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (Nest 2011; Sutherland 2011). Formalising ASM 
activities and promoting their safe and regulated engagement through sustainable 
development policy is an important part of both general development and gendered 
development. The World Bank and the European Union have supported projects on 
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ASM throughout the world (Hilson 2003). Much of the academic writing on ASM is in 
the African context. The problems in Africa, which cause people to turn to artisanal 
mining as a livelihood, include war, poverty, educational disadvantage and land 
pressure (Hilson 2002). The development of the artisanal mining sector in developing 
countries has led to many conflicts with larger mining companies. The artisanal miners 
often breach mining lease boundaries, causing security and safety issues for the mining 
companies.  
In PNG, there are multiple regions of ASM activity. From the long existing 
alluvial goldfields of Wau-Bulolo in Morobe Province (Nelson 1978), the gold rush of 
Mt Kare in Enga Province (Ryan 1991; Biersack 1999), to the dangerous ASM at the 
Porgera mine in Enga Province (Human Rights Watch 2011). ASM is widespread 
across regions where an intersection between subsistence rural life and formalised, 
larger scale mining exists. In 2010, there were estimated to be between 70,000 and 
100,000 artisanal miners working across PNG (Javia and Siop 2010: 2). 
Misima Island, in Milne Bay Province, is an example of post-mine closure 
artisanal mining management to prevent environmental damage and social problems. In 
2012, just as Barrick was preparing to relinquish the Special Mining Lease (SML) for 
their Misima mine that closed in 2004, as part of a broader study into employment in 
the resource sector, Bill Sagir and I inspected the ASM activity on the island. ASM on 
Misima Island was in a boom. From the end of large-scale mining in 2004, miners have 
been exploiting creeks beds and digging hillsides to access the gold that has made 
Misima Island a centre of Louisiade economic life since the 1880s (Nelson 1978). In 
previous times, the mode of production and division of labour was mainly controlled 
by Australian colonial interests (Nelson 1978: 41). Today, the ASM is directed and 
performed by Misimans rather than outsiders. The miners set up an artisanal mining 
cooperative Misima Alluvial Gold Mining Association (MAGMA) which was 
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incorporated in 2009. MAGMA has also set up a microfinance office to give loans out 
for small development on Misima without the assistance of any outside organisations 
(Susan James pers. comm. 2012). The guiding principle was to develop Misima into a 
locally driven development island, as large-scale mining did not leave many services 
for the people, and there was little in the way of benefit sharing trickle down from the 
landowners of the site49. A survey of alluvial miners on the island produced a picture of 
the Misiman ASM economy. Firstly, the majority of gold goes is sold through 
MAGMA to obtain a better price. Secondly, health and safety issues are different on 
Misima Island to river based ASM, e.g. along the Ok Tedi. Misima miners excavate 
hillsides, sometimes tunnelling in unsupported horizontal shafts metres into hillsides 
(see Plates 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 in Appendix I). Reports of deaths from cave-ins meant that a 
MAGMA issued directive that banned children from engaging in this ‘hard rock’ 
mining (Solomon Sete pers. comm. 2012). The self -regulated ASM activity on Misima 
provides a comparison for the following description of the Ok Tedi ASM activity.  
7.2 Ok Tedi artisanal mining as a case study  
Approaching the ASM activity along the Ok Tedi as a case study of a process of 
planning and engagement with communities for post-closure sustainable livelihoods is 
the purpose of this section. This section will establish the specific situation of the Ok 
Tedi artisanal miners, present the arguments for regularizing, formalisation, and 
assistance from OTMC, and discuss the community perceptions of the planned 
regulatory regime and intervention from OTMC. The downstream effects of the tailings 
from Ok Tedi mine are well established, but the downstream benefits are less 
discussed. There are real economic and social benefits that the downstream 
49 The final SML and LMP land lease cheques were being distributed in April 2012 (Israel Israel pers. comm. 2012).  
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communities to Ningerum are generating from artisanal gold mining. This economic 
activity has been completely self-generated, independently of OTML. 
The source of the Ok Tedi’s gold was Mt Fubilan. The extensive leeched gold 
capping on the top of the mountain eroded over time. The resulting gold in the river 
originally drew the attention of both Lawrence Hargrave in 1880 (D’Albertis 1880) and 
Kennecott exploration geologists (Jackson 1982a) to be interested in the potential of 
the upper tributaries of the Ok Tedi. Once the Ok Tedi mine shifted to exploiting the 
copper ore underneath the gold cap, the fine tailings, which the Folomian mill produces 
as waste from the copper flotation process, have contained large quantities of gold. 
Estimates are that flotation only recovered 73–75 percent of the gold, the balance is left 
in the tailings deposited into the river system (Joe Seegers pers. comm. 2010). Over 
that time, approximately 100 tonnes of gold have been discharged into the river. OTML 
stated that they have no interest in alluvial mining and that the communities were well 
within their rights as owners of the river to exploit this resource.  There has been very 
little published research conducted on the artisanal mining along the Ok Tedi. OTML 
CR conducted surveys in July 2008 and November 2010. They surveyed 120 people in 
2008 and 241 people in 2010 (OTML 2008g; OTML 2010c). The surveys covered the 
area from Bultem Bridge in the north to Ningerum Station in the south. This chapter 
uses both of these data sets in addition to personally collected data. The data collection 
for this chapter took place between 2009 and 2012. It constituted surveying participants 
in the ASM activity in groups. The individual villages or settlements where people 
were surveyed were Yuk Creek, Haidauwogam, Kwiloknai, Wurimkanatgo, Bumbin, 
and Ningerum Station. OTML Community Relations officers accompanied and 
facilitated me on the survey trips. The survey participants were all artisanal miners. We 
surveyed separately groups ranging from two people to 25 people. The surveys 
addressed various aspects of their livelihood including gold yields, methods used, what 
201 
 
they used the money for, worries about pollution and views on regulation and 
assistance from stakeholders.  
The questionnaire I used (see Appendix V) was basic because of the need to 
gather information that was more general than specific. Age information was general 
rather than specific, because of the difficulty in obtaining accurate age data from 
respondents. In choosing the informal survey method rather than a more rigid formal 
survey, there was more readiness to talk about ideas or opinions on the topic of 
artisanal mining than there would be if people were accounted for individually. The 
initial surveying was performed with individuals, but I modified this method due to the 
difficulties of obtaining participants and the poor quality of responses50. The shift to 
focus group surveying was due to more participants being willing to engage in a group 
discussion, rather than having individual opinions recorded. Group communications are 
a common way community members engage with OTML and other stakeholder 
organisations51, so the interviewed people seemed to feel more confident to speak up 
about concerns or with comments in this context.  
The following is an example of my surveying technique can be found in my 
field notes when visiting Bultem Bridge in June 2010:  
Yon Buhyana dropped Michael Namalok and myself off outside the entrance to 
Bultem Village. We walked across the road and jumped over the water pipeline and 
walked down a bush track through some sweet potato gardens down the tiered hillside. 
The drop was about 300m from top to bottom. At the bottom we noticed there was a 
man behind us. It turned out it was a ‘cousin brother’ of Michael's from Olsobip. We 
started walking with him to where he was going. We passed a man who has set up a 
table at the base of a small waterfall/stream coming out of the rocks. I took some 
50 This could be because of the presence of OTML Community Relations Officers, who did translating 
from Awin.  
51 For example: MLE village meetings, community patrol meetings, and agricultural extensions. OTML, 
OTDF, and PNGSDP collectively conducted hundreds of these meetings a year, with the Mine Area, 
North Ok Tedi and Highway areas the most often visited due to their proximity to Tabubil. 
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photographs (see plate 7.4 in Appendix I) of him because I thought it was an ingenious 
method, because it had a constant supply of water to wash the gold. There were about 
20 people in the area, but about 15 were gathered around a pool of water watching a 
man washing gold. Michael explained who I was. Then we sat on some rocks and did 
the group interview. This group have been panning for a long time. The Olsobip man 
had been panning here for 10 years, and the others around 5–6 years. They were very 
open about the sellers they sold their gold to, the process and their yields. They even 
said that two people lived illegally in the bush around the river. Many were workers 
with OTML and contact companies, but said the money was better panning.  
Then after we finished there they told us that there were people further up the river. So 
we walked up towards the Bultem Bridge and found another group of people. These 
were mainly young men doing the panning during school holidays. The reception was 
less warm here than the previous place. There was an old man at this location who said 
he had been panning for 3 months, but Michael said that the young men signalled at 
each other when the old man said that, indicating that he was lying.  
After we finished there, one of the young men ran after us and asked Michael if the 
Special Mobile Force (SMF) was going to kick them out. The SMF was in Tabubil at 
the time (came to Tabubil on the 7/6/2010) to enforce evictions from the settlements 
around Wangbin and to burn down illegal buildings. The presence of the SMF is 
probably the reason why the second group was more reluctant to talk than the first 
group. The first group were long-time residents of Bultem Village, whereas the second 
group was made up primarily of short term migrants – high school students from 
Tabubil, Telefomin, Ningerum High Schools and Finalbin Primary. However, most 
times people were happy to answer questions but also at times there was a general 
feeling that people were hesitant to talk because of the presence of OTML CR 
Department officers. Particularly at Yuk Creek and Bultem Bridge, people expressed 
by their body language, and through their outright lies, that they were not comfortable 
answering some questions. 
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The artisanal mining is confined along the Ok Tedi between Bultem Bridge 
(Pratt's Crossing) and Ningerum Station. The area covers a distance of about 80km. 
Below Ningerum Station, the Ok Birim and Ok Mart dilute the tailings such that the 
concentrations of gold are not enough to support a significant population of miners, and 
then the Bige dredge removes much of the remaining sediment. OTML reported that 
there were no artisanal miners in the SML (Yon Buhuyana pers. comm. 2010), but this 
could be because there are significant deposits easily accessible gold deposits along the 
Ok Tedi. Thus there is no reason to encroach on the mine site.  
Artisanal miners come from many different communities. The main source 
villages of artisanal miners are Wurimkanatgo (with Walawam corner), Haidowogam, 
Bumbin, Kwiloknai, the Ok Ma villages of Boliwogam, Okteditau, Nioksikwi, 
Derongo and Bongkim (in settlements at Km115–118 from Kiunga), Awin Tamaro, 
Ningerum Tamaro 52,Yuk Creek miner settlement, which consists of people from the 
border villages of Korkit, Kawentikin, Ankit, as well as Olsobip and Oksapmin LLG 
areas), and Tabubil township (below the actual town along the river). There is a general 
division between landowners and settlers depending on the location. Along the 
northern stretch from Bultem Bridge to Ok Menga (Wild Dog), the majority of the 
artisanal miners are not from the Mine Area Villages. The majority are either settlers 
from other parts of Western Province or Telefomin District, with some Southern 
Highlands and Hela province people. From Ok Menga down to Ningerum Station, the 
majority are landowners from the villages adjacent to the river. Some people travel 
from the west bank Nupmo trust area base villages to set up camps on Ningerum land 
on the east bank – for example, two men of Boliwogam village residing at Km118 from 
Kiunga.  
52 Ningerum Tamaro also contains a significant proportion of villagers from the west bank Nupmo trust villages of 
Wombon, Wogam, Digam, Kolebon, as well as people from Hukim, Tekim and Ok Tarim which are outside Nupmo 
trust region but still in Ningerum RLLG  
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Artisanal miners in other settings typically employ unsophisticated technology 
to extract gold from sands and soils. (Susapu and Crispin 2001; Crispin 2003). The 
basic tools range from a pan up to sluice box. At Ok Tedi, the artisanal miners similarly 
use crude methods to extract gold from the sands. They employ the table and cushion 
method and panning in a basic manner. Since the gold is fine and processed through the 
mill, the use of mercury to extract gold is rare. This section details the types of 
technology and methods employed and sets the baseline for upskilling intended in 
OTMC assistance program to artisanal miners.  
There are five main stages in the Ok Tedi artisanal mining process.  
1. Gathering the silt, sand, or gravels:  
2. Using an incline table and cushion method to wash the sand, letting the 
heavy gold particles get trapped in the carpet or mat (cushion).  
3. Washing the carpet into the wok or pan in order to pan for gold.  
4. Using the pan to filter sand from fine gold dust on rubber mat  
5. Collecting in tubes for sale to the gold buyer.  
Environmental concerns are peripheral or non-existent because the artisanal 
miners cannot damage the river ecosystem any more than the waste from the nearby 
mine already has. However, the increasing settlements along the river could lead to 
problems of landslips due to destabilizing the hillsides when clearing land for gardens 
(OTML 2010c). In the northern Ok Tedi, the banks of the river are almost 
perpendicular in places, and landslides here regularly block the paths artisanal miners 
use to move along the banks. In the northern part of the Ok Tedi above the confluence 
of the Ok Mani, around Bultem Bridge, Yuk Creek, and Tabubil Township, the miners 
dig ditches in the riparian zone to get sediments. The artisanal miners do not undercut 
the riverbanks because the gold is contained within the river sands and tailings in the 
river itself. Below the confluence people rely more on the top layer of sediments so 
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utilize a greater area of the riverbed, but only skim the top layer off (see Plate 7.6 in 
Appendix I). Therefore, in both cases, flooding, which is a very common occurrence in 
the Ok Tedi, takes care of the river impacts of the panning. As for suspended 
sediments, the mine site and natural erosion contribute millions of tonnes of sediment 
to the river annually so any increase in turbidity contributed by the miners is negligible 
(Joe Seegers pers. comm. 2010). 
Many artisanal miners I spoke to complained that using this process was labour 
intensive and hard on their bodies and that they had sores from standing in the river 
water. The water pollution is significant in the minds of the artisanal miners, despite 
OTML's assurances that the pollution from dissolved copper and other metals is within 
acceptable environmental limits. The local people have always been suspicious of the 
science about the river (Kirsch 1993:42–45; Burton 1993a: 2–4). Blood testing along 
the river has been conducted by OTML health patrols to establish whether there is any 
lead or heavy metal poisoning occurring from the river water to assure local people the 
river is safe (letters sent out confirmed people were within the safe range). The locals 
look at the river every day, and it has a grey appearance and a greasy feeling (Javia 
2011: 3). A significant common theme among all the population of the artisanal miners 
surveyed is a concern about the effects of river pollution on health. Almost all groups 
surveyed reported that they were concerned with the effects of chemicals in the water 
while they were panning. Open sores and boils on the legs were a common issue. These 
sort of sores are common when skin is constantly immersed in water, and without the 
proper medical attention, they become tropical ulcers or become septic. As most of the 
miners are located within 40kms of Tabubil or Ningerum, a solution to this problem 
might be that health patrols could go out and treat sores and give information on how to 
prevent them.  
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All surveyed miners said that the benefit of money from selling gold outranked 
health concerns. This was a critical question relating to whether there comes a time 
when the health impacts reported outweigh the need to pan for gold. This question has 
not yet been sufficiently answered by my survey or the OTML surveys. 
Other health issues associated with artisanal mining generally around PNG 
involves the use of mercury amalgam (Susapu and Crispin 2001: 15). This has not 
become an issue for Ok Tedi artisanal miners due to the nature of the fine alluvium in 
the river and the non-use of mercury at the Ok Tedi mine. The OTML CR surveys 
reported only one person who used small amounts of mercury in the process of mining 
(OTML 2010c).  
The amount of time artisanal miners spent engaged in this activity ranged from a 
few hours to 16 hours per day, depending on whether a ‘flash flood’ event occurred on 
the Ok Tedi. What is meant by ‘flash flood’ is that when there are periods of very heavy 
rain (100mm or more in an hour) in the catchment of the Ok Tedi, a gush of water flows 
across the areas where the artisanal miners conduct the activity. If there has been a 
‘flash flood’ there is more gold containing sediment from higher up the river, so people 
are more willing to spend all day doing the mining than they would otherwise as the 
benefits are evident.  
In terms of yields and money to be made out of the activity, there was a varied 
response, depending on where the people were located. Many of the artisanal miners 
stated that they can yield up to 3 grams a day of gold on a regular day, with anything 
between 1g/day to 10g/day reported. In the northern end of the mining area, around 
Bultem Bridge and Yuk Creek, the yields were lower and the money paid by gold 
buyers was also lower, by about a third when compared to the highway villages and 
Ningerum Station. The difference in Kina terms was Bultem Bridge/Yuk Creek 
received between K40 and K50 per gram (in 2011), and the highway villages received 
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between K60 and K73 per gram. I did not talk to gold buyers about the reason for this 
disparity, but some local people said that the gold in the north was 'nuggets' whereas 
the gold in the south was 'dust'. In 2011, I saw a 'nugget’ which just looked like regular 
alluvial gold, not like the fine tailings gold found further south. In my 2012 surveys, 
the miners reported receiving less for their gold than the previous year because of 
international gold price depreciation.  
Many of the artisanal miners reported that they were using the money that they 
were getting from selling the gold for school fees for their children or themselves. This 
response is consistent with many of the artisanal miners being from outside the CMCA 
area. Within the CMCA area, also, many people are unaware that they can access 
CMCA funds to send their children to school, so they also save for that. In some cases, 
though, people said that they used their profits to buy betel nut and alcohol. When 
asked if they would like improved productivity, most miners said that they were happy 
with the current yields but would like some technical assistance to not work so hard. 
There are a high proportion of women and children involved, especially in 
holiday periods and on weekends. In OTML’s 2008 survey, a large proportion of the 
surveyed miners did not have any formal primary education (41/241). Women were 
more engaged in artisanal mining. The data collection I conducted confirmed the 
significant presence of women involved in the activity. Many small children were 
present with their mothers in the activity but may not necessarily be involved directly. 
The effects on children seems to depend on where the people are from. For the 
highway communities, they reported that the children only engaged in artisanal mining 
after school, on weekends and in holidays. There may be many children involved 
during holidays, at other times of the year it is unclear how many children are involved. 
My surveying always seemed to coincide with school holidays so my assessment on 
this may be flawed. OTML survey showed that 24/241 (10 percent) artisanal miners 
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were school aged children (OTML 2010a). The women stated that they saved money 
and also still worked in their gardens. This means that they have some measure of 
independence from their husbands to buy the necessities.  
The majority of miners in the northern end around Yuk Creek/Bultem Bridge, 
as indicated by my surveying and OTML's are not landowners but migrants from the 
border region villages (Korkit, Kawentikin), Telefomin District, and Olsobip LLG area. 
The mine area landowners are not involved in the artisanal mining. The 2008 small 
scale mining survey showed this, as well as my own surveying. All of the artisanal 
miners in the Bultem Bridge and Tabubil Town area I talked to were from either 
Oksapmin, Telefomin, Olsobip or Bolivip.  
Through the surveys of people and asking views and opinions of a sample of 
people from Bultem Bridge down to Ningerum, two clear dichotomies emerged. At 
Yuk Creek Mining Camp, people did not want any assistance from PNGSDP or OTML 
or the government in their artisanal mining. The reason for this would derive from the 
nature of their settlement. As all of the people talked to in the Yuk Creek/Bultem 
Bridge area were not local landowners, this has bearing on whether they want people 
formalising their activity. Many of them have settled without the express permission of 
the local landowners, and as such have no rights over the gold they are getting out of 
the river as the local landowners have custodial rights over the resources in the river. 
There are law and order problems, with the occasional heist or robbery in Tabubil – 
some with significant amounts of money taken and injuries to local people. Illegal 
drugs and alcohol, prostitution, gambling and a money market are all problems which 
have developed in the villages and settlements around Tabubil. However, these 
problems face any large town in Melanesia generally. Whether or not these issues are 
because of artisanal mining is unknown, because they could be issues due to settlement 
209 
 
generally. However, it is noted that the changes in the social structure around the 
mining area are blamed on influxes of 'Southern Highlanders' rather than local people.  
There was no regulation of the artisanal mining activity on the Ok Tedi when I 
was conducting the data collection. It has been occurring on the peripheries of Tabubil 
and downstream for up to 10 years without any intervention from OTMC. There are 
provisions to regulate mechanised small scale mining in the Mining Act 1992, however 
as the activities along the Ok Tedi are artisanal, there is no way the government can 
regulate it under the existing Mining Act. The way artisanal gold mining is taxed is 
through issuing export licenses to export gold. This mechanism is inadequate due to the 
smuggling of gold, and the fact that much gold is traded domestically.   
7.3 Issue for OTMC relating to mine closure – Settlers and Immigrants.  
To understand the motivation for the OTMC response to ASM activities, a 
contextualising examination of one of the primary factors for formalising must be 
conducted. Throughout PNG, land issues are central to social concerns about mining. 
Ok Tedi ASM is no different. Many artisanal miners, especially in the Yuk Creek and 
Bultem Bridge localities, are migrants from other parts of the province and Telefomin 
District and less from other parts of the country. Land ownership in the Tabubil area is 
well established between the six mine villages. However, because of the nature of Min 
culture, kin relations from all over the Mountain Ok area have set up camp around the 
fringes of these villages and Tabubil township. From Yuk Creek, 7 Kona to 6 mile, 
there are thousands of migrants setting up informal settlements on Wopkaimin, 
Ningerum, and Kamfaiwolmin lands, with varying degrees of consent.  
The change in the nature of immigration is stark. Before 2000, there was a 
circular movement of people between informal corner settlements and their home 
villages (Polier 1996; Hyndman 1994a: 107–30). These corner settlements were largely 
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dormitory rather than permanent settlements. Post–2000 and especially in the years 
between 2007 and 2012 there was a sharp increase in permanent informal settlements. 
Some of the community members during the MLE village meetings in 2012 attribute 
this to the decline in MAF flights to remote villages, such as Olsobip, Telefomin, and 
Gogolbip, and the no longer readily available helicopter rides to mine villages 
Kavorabip and Atemkit (OTML 2003a: 14). This has meant that the people who used to 
or usually would have had a propensity for circular movement have stayed put in 
Tabubil's hinterland.  
In 2008 OTML Community Relations raised the issue in a report titled 
Population Increase in Tabubil Township is Everybody’s Concern. This report outlined 
the significant challenges the increase in population in informal settlements was having 
on OTML’s ability to regulate the mine town and ensure that Mine Area Village 
community was not overwhelmed with settlers. The report lists (OTML 2008f: 1) a 
number of contributing reasons for the increase in population summarised below:  
1. Lack of basic services in Preferred Area Districts (PAD)  
2. Current major projects and opportunity for employment for unemployed 
from PAD and non-PAD areas.  
3. Informal employment opportunities such as gold panning along Ok Tedi 
River.  
4. Ineffective travel services by Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF) to 
PAD areas.  
The report also outlines the different opinions from provincial leaders, six Mine 
Area Village leaders, and settlement leaders. There is a general consensus that OTML 
needed to become more involved with regulating the communities outside Tabubil 
Township despite it being the governments’ job. It also is significant that all reported 
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that some of the landowners from the Mine Area Villages are partially to blame for 
permitting people to settle and associated activities to occur on their land.  
In 2009, OTML conducted the Tabubil Plateau Survey, a census of the existing 
population including OTML and contractor employees, mine villagers, and immigrants. 
The results of this survey showed that the settlements of 7 Kona, Yuk Creek, corners in 
Finalbin and Bultem, Old Wangbin and along the highway adjacent to the Laydown 
area all the way to Migalsim Junction, there were 10,732 settlers. Old Wangbin had the 
highest population at 4846 people in 796 households, with the vast majority coming 
from Western Province (2528 people) and West Sepik Province (1836) (OTML 
2009b:11). Throughout the settlement areas, there were a total of 4705 people from 
Western Province, 4013 from West Sepik Province, and 966 from Southern Highlands 
(OTML 2009b: 16). According to the survey, many households in settlements housed 
people employed by OTML or OTML contract companies (e.g. Old Wangbin had 102 
households with OTML employees and 436 households with OTML contractors’ 
employees) (OTML 2009B:33). This implies that the housing situation for OTML 
contract companies is insufficient. 
I make a distinction between immigrants and settlers. The former describes 
people from areas outside the Preferred Area Districts and have no tribal or kin 
connection to the people of the Tabubil hinterland, whereas the latter have strong tribal, 
kin, and customary linkages to the people of the area. Atemkit and Kavorabip have 
wholesale moved to Finalbin and Bultem respectively. The landowners from the two 
villages have allowed the ‘exiles’ to build permanent housing in corners with trust 
money. The demands of many of the local people in negotiations for the MLE reflect 
the desire to be back on their land, as they say that if there were roads they would move 
home.  
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Immigration of people from Southern Highlands Province, Hela Province, West 
Sepik Province and other parts of Western Province has complicated the social and 
economic structures in Tabubil and its hinterland. Land pressure has increased in the 
area, with outsiders marrying in and claiming land, and then settling their extended 
families on it. This ‘chain migration’ is popular in PNG53. This means that the little 
arable land available for local landowners' gardens is further reduced. Stories from 
around the town talk of people trying to claim land that they have no right to, even after 
being told they could not settle. Some even alleged that a woman from Southern 
Highlands was receiving royalties from OTML by unlawfully claiming that she was 
from a mine village. Since these people have pervaded local structures so thoroughly, 
the question arises whether they will return to their home villages or provinces once the 
mine closes. Other developments in the region, such as the Frieda mine in West Sepik, 
and the LNG project in Hela Province, could potentially draw the people away when 
Ok Tedi closes.  
Letters from people living in the Mine Area Villages about settlers and 
immigrants causing mayhem illustrate the problem. For example, on 09/09/09 a letter 
was sent to Terry Walsh, then manager of Asset Protection, from six concerned leaders, 
including Borok Pitalok the President of Star Mountains Rural LLG. In this letter there 
was an account about an OTML employee Charles Kimbuka and his activity in 
Wangbin Village:  
When he was drank [sic] under the influence of alcohol he suddenly entered Pastor 
David of Baptist Church premises, entered into the house, and broke the living room 
door. He then yelled and starts threatening people in the house. Everybody in the house 
was very afraid and ran out for help… The employee is not related to local community 
53 See also Porgera (Golub 2014 chapter 3) and Lihir (Bainton 2010: 128-129). 
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and we believe he is from the highlands which he have [sic] no right to come around to 
our village and disturb the community.  
Another two from the elected leaders of Ok Ma (Nioksikwi, Okteditau, Ankit, 
Kumkit, Derongo, Boungkim) dated 10/03/2011 and 24/08/2011 outline the impacts of 
out of control settlement activity at 7 Kona, between the Lower Ok Tedi (Maria) Bridge 
and Tawap Kamen (TKI) Camp on Ok Ma access road. According to the letters, 
settlement of people was originally permitted by Levy Bineng and Walap Bonben, the 
founders of TKI, who have since passed away. The leaders report:  
Over the last few years major criminal offences such as rapes, robbery and assaults 
have been inflicted upon members of Okma communities and reported to Tabubil 
Police Station. Other minor offences such as harassing traveling public and stoning 
vehicles owned by Okma people have been attended to but resolved apologetically on 
site of incidents by perpetrators… Recently we have experienced upsurge or increase in 
major illegal activities such as smuggling and sale of alcohol, drug trafficking, building 
up off [sic] arms in the area. … Guns smuggling and build up is a major concern and 
should be taken seriously (Letter to Ignatius Wanjiman 10 March 2011).  
7 Kona is the site of the majority of Southern Highlands Province immigrants to 
the area, with 613 people from that province living there in 2009. There is a common 
theme voiced by many local landowners that the problems in settlements are all 
because of Highlanders. Even in other smaller settlements, such as Bak Kona opposite 
the Laydown area, Wangbin landowners in an eviction letter to Bak Kona settlers state 
that ‘Law and order problems– this is causing fear to our women who are going to and 
from garden and our women have been subject to intimidation, oppression and holdup’, 
and in a subsequent letter to OTML, the leaders state ‘We had tried [to resolve the 
matter] but were threatened because we feel that we were outnumbered by the settlers’. 
The settler problem will not be eased for the landowners of the Mine Area Villagers 
until eviction and repatriation of immigrants without community, but that costs money 
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and there is anecdotal evidence that people quickly return to resettle because of the 
opportunities, particularly the easy alluvial gold and well-run services in Tabubil.  
7.4 OTMC Response – Small Scale Mining Pilot Project  
In 2009, the issue of the influx of settlers and immigrants to informal settlements 
around Tabubil had become an issue requiring significant input from the OTMC. Since 
the key maintainer of the settler population was ASM activities, there was a push from 
communities to regulate and formalise the practice as a mechanism to discourage 
informal settlement. The specific organisations that would be involved in this 
regulation and formalisation were the Mineral Resources Authority (MRA) and 
PNGSDP primarily, with input from OTML Community Relations, Star Mountains 
Rural LLG, and Ningerum Rural LLG. The communities along the highway involved 
in ASM activities formed and registered an association – Alice River Alluvial Mining 
Association54. The leadership of this association mainly comes from Wurimkanatgo 
and Bumbin villages from the Nupmo trust region, and Kwiloknai and Tapko from the 
Tutuwe trust region, but there are 17 villages involved from Migalsim to Ningerum 
Station. In 2009, the initial meetings and planning commenced for a three-way 
sustainable livelihood project focused on artisanal mining along the Ok Tedi. A 
working group made up of representatives from MRA, PNGSDP, OTML, community, 
and LLGs started investigating the potential for the ASM activity to be ‘upgraded’ to 
mechanised small-scale mining and examined the existing legislation for its ability to 
regulate the landowners’ exclusive exploitation of alluvial gold along the Ok Tedi.  
In the initial working group stage, many ideas were passed around about the 
potential for productivity increases for artisanal miners through mechanisation with 
floating dredges. I attended a working group meeting in June 2010 – and this position 
54 The entity is not an incorporated association but rather a company named Alice River Alluvial Mining Ltd 
registered on 29 August 2008. 
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situated me as an active member of the OTMC, rather than an outside observer, in this 
case. It was suggested that the pilot project be split into three areas: Zone X from Yuk 
Creek to Ok Menga (Wild Dog); Zone Y Ok Menga (Wild Dog) to Km100–105 
(Haidauwogam), and Zone Z Upstream Ningerum to Ok Birim Junction. Notably, this 
did not include the main village areas from Km97 (Wurimkanatgo) to Km89 (Tapko). 
An idea to encourage semi-mechanisation of the activity with a large floating dredge 
was raised also. I suggested that it was not appropriate technology considering that it 
required specialist mechanical maintenance and for a post-closure livelihood that it 
might be too expensive and difficult to access qualified mechanics. I was not present at 
any further working group meetings, but the idea of a floating dredge ended up not 
being pursued because of ARAMA securing a floating dredge that did not work well in 
the Ok Tedi (due to finer gold than naturally occurring alluvial gold) and subsequently 
the group became reluctant to spend any more funds in the future on that technology 
(Jeff Ransley pers. comm. 2011)  
The other part of this project was assessing what regulatory mechanisms would 
be appropriate for formalising the currently unregulated gold market in the area. These 
regulatory mechanisms would function to “lock out” settlers from engaging in alluvial 
gold mining with mechanical equipment without permission or licences from 
landowners along the river. This regulation would hopefully make the area less 
attractive to settlers (Yaru Pohei pers. comm., 2010)  
After over two years of working group meetings, the pilot project was 
commenced. The World Bank funded the MRA’s appointment of Joe Seegers as 
project manager of the Ok Tedi Small-Scale Mining Pilot Project in November 2011 
under the contract number 2011-MRA-C2-CS-017 for one year at USD104,000. This 
was part of the wider second Mining Sector Institutional Strengthening Technical 
Assistance Project (MSISTAP II) which was funding various regulatory reforms 
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throughout the mining sector in PNG. The official start of the pilot project was 
11/10/2011. A Project Funding Agreement that had been signed in February 2011 
clearly delineated the stakeholders of the project. Clause 3.1 states ‘The Project 
Committee (PC) shall be responsible for the Project Activity and shall comprise of 
representatives appointed under Clause 3.6 of this Agreement’. Clause 3.6 elaborates 
that ‘Membership of the PC shall comprise of two (2) representatives from: PNGSDP, 
The Company; MRA, The Project Partner; and OTML, The Interested Party’. The role 
of the PC was explained in Clauses 3.3 and 3.5 as ‘overseeing the implementation’ of 
the contribution of PNGSDP and MRA, as well as monitoring, review and compliance 
activities relating to the pilot project activities. The restriction of the membership of the 
PC to the direct supporters of the project, as opposed to other parties (LLGs, FRPG, or 
ARAMA), was made ‘for reason of keeping full control over project activities and 
budget expenditure for the duration of the pilot project. Without the key parties 
exercising their control, the project might easily derail or being [sic] hijacked by other 
parties to serve their own interests’ (Seegers 2012: 4). The reality is that without 
significant oversight, many projects fail from misappropriation of funding in Western 
Province.  
PNGSDP’s main role was the fund the project. They were the primary driver of 
the project as they were providing K2m in funding to the budget of the project.  
The MRA was the centre of the pilot project. The MRA’s role was also initially 
counter funding of the project. In 2009 meetings, the MRA was slated to contribute 
K3m to the project, but in 2011 that had been reduced to K100 thousand. This 
reduction in cash contribution was because the MRA could absorb the cost of 
regulatory affairs as that is the function of the MRA in the PNG mining sector. The 
MRA’s Regulatory Operations Division is responsible for the technical supervision of 
the regulation communication during the pilot project. MRA ROD already was 
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regulating by way of the Alluvial Mining Leases (AMLs) under Division 4 of the 
Mining Act 1992 that apply to mechanised alluvial mining. Such leases are only 
available, according to the Act, Section 48(1) to  
… a natural person who is a citizen or a land group in respect of land owned by that 
natural person or land group and after considering a recommendation from the Board, 
grant an alluvial mining lease over that land to that natural person or land group.  
This effectively means that only landowners will successfully be granted an 
AML. AMLs according to Section 50(1) and (2)(a) of the Act ‘may only be granted 
over land that is a river bed, and land that extends no further than 20m from any river 
bed’ and is ‘no more than 5ha’. Since the natural riverbed along the Ok Tedi is 
significantly wider than it was prior to mining, the amount of space available to 
landowning communities for AMLs is considerable. The clan land ownership done as 
part of the compensation process by OTML should have ensured that little dispute 
about who owns what part of the river would occur, but of course there were still 
issues. The role of the MRA RDO was also to communicate the relevant information to 
the relevant communities about the AMLs and how to go about securing them. This 
was a core component of the pilot project, as many villagers do not have access to the 
legislation or know the processes that are required.  
The MRA Wau Small Scale Mining Training Centre’s (WSSMTC) role was to 
develop and implement training packages for the pilot project. The trainers are all from  
WSSMTC which is a joint venture between the EU and the MRA set up in the 
early 2000s. As part of the pilot project, Immaculate Javia of the WSSMTC conducted 
a site visit to the area. The WSSMTC trainers’ time was paid for out of the K2.1m 
budget for the project. In May 2012, the trainers did Level 1 training near Ningerum.  
National Gold (PNG) Ltd was contracted by the MRA to provide technical, 
testing and marketing for the pilot project. Managing director Lubo Todorov came and 
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did a site inspection along the Ok Tedi and indicated there was scope for the 
communities to have a long, sustainable small scale mining future along there. National 
Gold supplies lightweight dredges of various sizes in PNG.  
OTML was involved in the project by providing ‘in kind’ logistics, 
accommodation, and food for the trainers and PC members when in Tabubil. OTML 
CR had been pressured initially to provide monetary support for the project, but 
privately indicated that it did not seem fair for MRA or PNGSDP to ask for money 
considering that OTML directly contributed millions in dividends and fees to both 
organisations annually. CR collected data on ASM activity in 2008 and 2010, and 
conducted SSM awareness campaigns along the area between Ningerum Station and 
Yuk Creek.  
Since the fieldwork for this thesis ended in March 2012 I have been unable to 
secure any follow-up on the success of the pilot project from the PC members. The 
project was intended to run for one year, with a final report provided by the end of 
2012. However, from the initial working group discussions to the start of formal project 
planning, the scope of the pilot project was significantly reduced. The importance of 
the pilot project was that it gave more information and technical skills to the 
communities involved in ASM, and gave them more options going forward towards 
post-closure to exploit the resource available to them in a more prescribed way.  
7.5 Conclusion 
The description and discussion of ASM along the Ok Tedi proved that although the 
environmental damage to the river is significant, the communities along the river have 
access to an economic resource they did not have before. The influx of settlers and 
immigrants threatens the sustainability of this resource, so the OTMC organisations 
devised a project to regulate and formalise, as well as support existing artisanal miners 
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to improve the activity. This chapter has shown the potential for OTMC organisations 
to collaborate and work together, using both the funds available from compensation 
and benefit streams as well as international organisations to support post-closure 
sustainable livelihood projects in the mine impact area. My surveys showed that there 
was not as much appetite for assistance from the OTMC organisations, and that many 
artisanal miners were happy with subsistence yields from the activity. The ongoing 
support for artisanal miners might be under threat from the relationship between the 
national government and PNGSDP, but the communities are still interested in the 
development of resources.  
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Chapter Eight – Conclusion 
8.1 Conclusions of the research – Ok Tedi Mining Complex and Sustainable 
Development in Western Province  
The original contribution of this thesis has been to provide a framework for 
approaching the challenging and complex conundrums of sustainability and mine 
closure planning in the PNG context. The thesis drew on existing analysis but provided 
fresh insights into the development of policies for the CMCA trust regions, food 
security and artisanal and small-scale mining.  
This thesis posed questions about the role of stakeholder organisations in 
sustainability and mine closure planning for community development. The main theme 
of this thesis was that changes in the prevailing political conditions almost always 
influenced the development priorities of the stakeholder organisations. As was 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, the history of the Ok Tedi mine is not one of 
a mining company in isolation digging for gold and copper, but rather it is just a part of 
a complex and dependent system of organisations, agreements, and legislation. The 
political situation influences the planning for closure, but also the implementation and 
outcomes are determined by the political situation as well. The stakeholder 
organisations work within a tightly restricted boundary of what is possible regarding 
sustainable development in Western Province. The funds for programs, as described in 
Chapter 5, are not a limitation on sustainable development in the CMCA communities. 
However, the mechanism for approving proposals from the villages was assessed as 
lacking transparency from the perspective of communications with communities.  
The communities, as described at length in Chapter 3, constitute a set of 
political organisations. The expansion of the impacted communities from the originally 
defined villages to the CMCA trust regions as a result of both internal changes in 
stakeholder organisations and outside influences was discussed. These communities 
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were shown to have broad and differing concerns leading up to mine closure, but a 
common theme throughout was that community livelihood and regional development 
projects were lacking in their communities. The communities themselves determine 
whether projects, such as food security and agriculture (Chapter 6) and artisanal and 
small-scale mining (Chapter 7), actually meet their supposed sustainable outcomes. 
However, the processes to set up projects and access CMCA trust funds (as well as 
counterpart funding from other stakeholder organisations) needs to be reformed and 
communications made clearer for the communities. Many people in the villages 
complained of not having enough information to apply for projects. Through the case 
studies of agricultural and food security projects in Chapter 6, I established that OTML, 
as a mining company, was not suited to drive development in this sector. The new 
entity of OTFRDP, being dedicated to Community and Livelihood Development (as a 
function of the Community and Regional Development Strategy framework for 
responsibility), is better equipped to respond to the development desires of the CMCA 
communities. Chapter 7 described artisanal and small-scale mining as a viable post-
closure sustainable livelihood for the people between Ningerum and Bultem Bridge. 
The push by stakeholder organisations to legitimise what started as a grassroots 
activity, through regulation and formalisation to reduce growth in the informal 
settlements around Tabubil, was discussed. The outcome of this project was not 
available due to the limitations imposed by the changing stakeholder organisation 
situation post-2012.  
The thesis contributed to the body of literature on PNG mining, joining and 
building on the research of other PNG resource specialists. It provides a different 
perspective on the Ok Tedi mine and OTML from the writing of Stuart Kirsch and 
David Hyndman. It complements the research conducted recently by Alex Golub on 
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Porgera mine, Nick Bainton on Lihir mine, Colin Filer on Panguna mine, and Glenn 
Banks on Porgera and Ok Tedi mines.  
The thesis creates the foundations for a bridge between purely political theory, 
in Historical New Institutionalism (HNI), and the applied politics of sustainability. It 
functions as an analysis of political new institutionalism that fits amongst the 
theoretical works on HNI, serving as an effective case study of an institutional 
complex. The complex, the OTMC, grew and shaped the ways the stakeholder 
organisations approached different aspects of compensation and benefit streams, mine 
closure planning, sustainable livelihood planning, and the organisational 
interrelationships.  
HNI is a powerful tool to understand the nuances of the Ok Tedi mine’s 
seemingly impenetrably complex socio-economic and political situation. The 
constantly evolving nature of the OTMC meant that no single stakeholder organisation 
ever had enough political clout to act as a circuit breaker, as the institutional complex 
influences decisions of the stakeholder organisations and communities in fundamental 
ways.  
The example of the changing Community Mine Continuation Agreement 
process showed that despite the free and prior informed consent in social license to 
operate negotiations, the OTMC agenda from the outset, irrespective of the wishes of 
OTML, was that the mine would continue to operate. The impacted communities did 
not have a genuine choice, as the FRPG, WPA, and respective LLGs had no capacity to 
provide legitimate alternative options for managing ongoing community development. 
This lack of real choice is not the fault of OTML, PNGSDP, OTDF or the impacted 
communities. It is the inevitable confluence of provincial government inadequacy and 
genuinely disadvantaged communities. The absence of progress in the provincial and 
local level governments towards becoming robust and effectual public entities has been 
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shaped by the institutional complex over the history of the Ok Tedi mine. The erosion 
of public trust and confidence in Western Province’s elected officials and appointed 
administrators over the course of the last 40 years mean that communities inevitably 
rely on OTML, PNGSDP, and OTDF to be the safety net. 
By contextualising the decision making of stakeholder organisations under the 
OTMC, the thesis showed that the OTMC ‘structures the political struggle itself’ 
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 6). Nothing at the Ok Tedi mine, and more broadly in North 
Fly District and Western Province, happens outside the context of the OTMC. 
Throughout the CMCA regions and the Preferred Area Districts, the influence of the 
institutional complex is felt by the decisions made relating to policy, planning, and 
implementation of various projects. The end results of these projects are shaped and 
constrained by the OTMC in significant ways by either the conscious or unintended 
results of deliberate political strategies, conflict, and choice (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 
9–10).  
8.2 Possibilities for further research  
There are a number of other possibilities for further research into mine closure and 
sustainability planning at the Ok Tedi mine. This research was only able to engage with 
a small slice of the sustainability program planned by the OTMC stakeholders. A 
significant and important sustainable economic activity that was heavily pushed by 
OTML and then PNGSDP and OTDF was rubber. The scope of my research did not 
extend to non-food cash crops, but it is important to acknowledge the important place 
that rubber has in North Fly District, and the important collaboration between PNGSDP 
and North Fly Rubber Limited  
Another limitation is that I was not able to go to a Non-CMCA area for 
purposes of comparison. All of the villages I visited are under the CMCA trusts or are 
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Mine Area Villages. I was offered the opportunity to take a 10-day cruise down the Fly 
River to sign up a new village to the CMCA in the Kiwaba Trust region but my 
research focus was the North Fly District, so I passed it up, which I now thoroughly 
regret. My interest in, and connection to, Western Province does not end with the 
submission of this thesis, so I hope to be able to conduct research in Non-CMCA parts 
of the province in the future.  
The analysis in this thesis was focussed mainly on the OTMC stakeholder 
organisations of OTML, PNGSDP, OTDF and the CMCA trust regions. There is a lot 
of scope to do further research into provincial and local level governments in Western 
Province, as there is a significant lack of academic research on them. The dynamic of 
politics in Western Province is likely to have changed significantly since my fieldwork 
ended in 2012, as PNGSDP has shrunk to a greatly diminished role in PNG, and OTML 
is now a state-owned enterprise. The relationships between OTML, OTDF, PNGSDP 
and the provincial government are likely to have changed significantly. Going forward, 
analysis of this paradigm shift in the OTMC’s structure is worth scrutinizing through 
rigorous fieldwork-based academic research.  
8.3 Epilogue 
The Ok Tedi mine faces an uncertain future. The present relationship between the 
stakeholder organisations involved in the mine is very different from when this 
research project started. The emergence of OTDF and PNGSDP as credible standalone 
development organisations and the reduction of OTML’s direct involvement in the 
processes of development are important steps towards a sustainable post-closure future. 
The poor governance of Western Province by both provincial organisations, FRPG and 
WPA, is unlikely to change without significant reforms in the provincial government 
system PNG-wide. The role of the National Government in the Ok Tedi mine’s future 
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is more important than ever, as it is now the 100 percent shareholder in the mine. The 
relationship between OTML, PNGSDP, and the National Government is not currently 
working well, with a court case between PNGSDP and the National Government over 
access to the PNGSDP Long Term Fund being played out in Singaporean Courts in 
2014 and OTML not posting a 2013 dividend. The way forward for the National 
Government seems to be to take the Western Province allocated funds and use them for 
current expenditures. If this were to occur, the people of Western Province would 
suffer from the loss of potential development.  
At present (August 2015), the strengthening El Nino is being blamed for a 
shutdown of the Ok Tedi mine. Time can only tell if the mine reopens, or if the 
stripping of cash reserves and workforce restructuring that has occurred since the mine 
became a state-owned enterprise will mean the mine closes using the base case scenario 
laid out in the detailed mine closure plan. If this happens, much of the groundwork laid 
out by the OTMC stakeholder organisations for post-closure sustainability will have 
gone to waste.  
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Appendix I – Plates 
All photos and figures are the authors unless otherwise attributed. 
Plate 2.1 - Looking up the Ok Mani valley 
Plate  3.1 - Ok Tedi at Ningerum 1981. Credit: Ian Hollingsworth 
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Plate 3.2 - People in canoe on Ok Tedi 1981. Credit: Ian Hollingsworth 
Plate 3.3 - Hiri Chief on the Fly River during 1997 drought. Credit: Billy Simon 
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Plate 6.1 – Pineapples on the Ok Ma Road, 2011 
Plate 6.2 - Abraham’s fish farm, Misgalsim Junction, 2010. 
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Plate 7.1 Hillside excavation near Narian village, Misima Island, 2012. 
Plate 7.2 Small ‘hard rock’ tunnels in hillside near Narian Village, Misima Island, 2012. 
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Plate 7.3 Hillside artisanal gold mining excavation near Cook’s Creek Mini Hydro, 
Misima Island, 2012. 
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Plate 7.4 – Artisanal miner using small stream as constant watersource for washing gold 
on an incline table at Bultem Bridge, 2010.  
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Plate 7.5 – Artisanal miner collecting river sediments on the river banks Yuk Creek, 
2011  
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Plate 7.6 Washing sediments on incline table at Ningerum Station, 2011. 
Plate 7.7 Collecting the gold dust to sell., Bultem Bridge, 2011. 
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Plate 7.8– Artisanal miners scraping off soft top sand, Km 115 near Sawmill Flats, 
2011.  
Plate 7.9 – Gold buyer notice near Alice Gravel Pit, 2011. 
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Plate 7.10 – Alice River Alluvial Miners Association leaders Bumbin, 2010. 
Plate 7.11 – Artisanal miners Yuk Creek (With Michael Namalok) 2011. 
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Plate 7.12 Artisanal miners Yuk Creek, 2011. 
Plate 7.13 Artisanal miners and children, Yuk Creek, 2011. 
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Plate 7.14 Artisanal miners from Daru at Ningerum Station, 2011. 
Plate 7.15 Artisanal miners Ningerum Station, 2011. 
294 
Plate 7.16  Artisanal miners, Ningerum Station, 2011. 
Plate 7.17 Artisanal miners, Wurimkanatgo, 2011. 
295 
Plate 7.18 Artisanal miner Yuk Creek, 2011  
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Appendix II – Maps 
Map 3.1 CMCA Trust Regions - source Ok Tedi Mining Limited 
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Map 3.2 Wopkaimin Parishes – source Hyndman 1994b 
Map 3.3 Cultural Map of Tabubil Area - Eggleton 1970 
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Map 3.4 - Ok Tedi Proposed Facilities - Jackson, Emerson and Welsh 1980 
Map 3.5 - Village ownership Ok Tedi - Jackson, Emerson and Welsh 1980 
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Map 3.6 Nupmo Trust Region and Mine Area Villages – Adapted from Ok Tedi Mining 
Limited 
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Map 3.7 Wai-Tri Trust Region and Alice River Trust Region – Adapted from Ok Tedi 
Mining Limited 
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Map 3.8  Tutuwe Trust Region – Adapted from Ok Tedi Mining Limited. 
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Appendix III – Population Tables 
Table 2.1 Fly River Development Trust Villages 
Census Division & Unit  Village Name No. of Villages 
Ningerum 8 
CU006 Boliwogam  
CU008 Bumbin  
CU010 Digam  
CU012 Haidauwogam  
CU019 Walawam  
CU022 Tamaro   
CU027 Wogam  
CU029 Wurimkanatgo 
North Awin 3 
CU006 Hosanai 
CU011 Kwiloknai 
CU018 Tapko 
West Awin 7 
CU001 Bige 
CU006 Hosokomgu 
CU007 Yenkenai 
CU012 Kwiapae 
CU015 Mimingere 
CU021 Wanginai 
CU024 Mendua* 
North Ok Tedi 3 
CU??? Birimkamba 
CU001 Ambaga 
CU002 Kungembit 
South Ok Tedi 7 
CU001 Atkamba 
CU002 Bongubun 
CU003 Dome 
CU004 Ieran 
CU005 Iogi 
CU006 Komokpin 
CU007 Konkonda 
South Awin 1 
CU006 Mepu 
Moian 7 
CU001 Erekta 
CU002 Ulawas 
CU003 Karemgu 
CU004 Kawok 
CU005 Kukujaba 
CU006 Membok 
CU007 Moian 
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Census Division & Unit  Village Name  No. of Villages  
Middle Fly    7  
CU002  Bosset    
CU003  Kaviananga    
CU004  Komovai    
CU005  Kwem     
CU006  Manda    
CU007  Mipan    
CU009  Aimbak    
Saru    11  
CU???  Kawatanga    
CU???  Sapuka    
CU001  Aewe    
CU002  Duru    
CU004  Gwaku    
CU005  Gwibaku    
CU006  Inaporok    
CU007  Kauturu    
CU008  Keru    
CU010  Serki    
CU013  Nakaku    
East Gogodala    15  
CU???  Sialowa    
CU001  Aduru    
CU002  Baramura    
CU005  Dede    
CU006  Dewala    
CU009  Kawiyapo    
CU017  Lewada    
CU018  Mutam    
CU019  Pangona    
CU020  Pedeya    
CU023  Tapila    
CU024  Tirio    
CU026  Urio    
CU027  Waliyama    
CU030  Suame    
East Kiwai    27  
CU001  Aberagerama    
CU002  Agobaro    
CU003  Aibinio    
CU004  Damera    
CU005  Dameratamu    
CU006  Domori    
CU007  Gesoa    
CU008  Iasa    
CU009  Ipisia    
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Census Division & Unit  Village Name  No. of Villages  
CU010  Kename    
CU011  Koavisi    
CU012  Kubira    
CU013  Maduduwo    
CU014  Maipani    
CU015  Oromosapuo    
CU016  Sagasia    
CU017  Sagero    
CU018  Samari    
CU019  Saguwame    
CU020  Sepe    
CU021  Tirere    
CU022  U'uwo    
CU023  Wapaura    
CU024  Wapi    
CU025  Wariobodoro    
CU401  Arato    
CU401  Sagapari    
West Kiwai    7  
CU003  Deware    
CU006  Koabu    
CU008  Madame    
CU010  Parama    
CU011  Severemabu    
CU013  Sui    
CU015  Wedarediamo    
Total   103  
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Table 2.2 Restated Eighth Supplemental Agreement Villages 
District  Region/Tribe Village 
North 
Fly 
North Ok Tedi 
/ Ningerum 
Ankits, Boungabun, Boliwogam, Bumbin, Digam, 
Haidowogam, Karandimok, Kolebon, Kumguit, 
Mongolavuram, Nioksikwi, Okteditau, Tamaro (Ningerum), 
Wogam, Wombon, Wurimkanatgo  
Highway/ 
Awin 
Awin Tamaro, Hosonai, Hosokumugo, Ienkanai, Kwiloknai, 
Mimigiri, Tapko  
Lower Ok 
Tedi / 
Yonggom 
Ambaga, Bige, Birimkamba, Demesuke, Dome, Ieran, Iogi, 
Kawok, Konkonda, Komokpin, Kungembit, Kwiape, 
Miamrae, Senamrae  
Middle 
Fly 
Middle Fly Aiambak, Bosset, Erekta, Karemgo, Kasa, Kaviananga, , 
Komovai, Kuem, Kukujaba, Levame, Manda, Membok, 
Mepu, Moian, Yulawas  
South 
Fly 
South Bank Aduru, Bamura, Daware, Katatai, Koabu, Madame, Mutam, 
Parama, Severemabu, Sui, Tirio #1 (Midiri), Tirio #2, 
Wederehiamo  
Kiwai Islands Aibino, Agobaro, Auti, Demeratamu/Wabada, Gesoa, Iasa, 
Ipisa, Kubira, Oromomsapuro, Sagapari,  
Saguane, Samari, Sepe, Wapa’ura, Wapi  
North Bank Aberagerema, Arato, Damera, Doumori, Kataburi, 
Kawiapo, Kea, Kenedibi, Kename, Koavisi, Maduduwo,  
Maipani, Pagana 1, Pagana 2 (Gaima), Pedaeya 1, Padaeya 
2, Sagero 1, Tire’ere, Urio, Waliyama,  
Waribodoro  
Suki/Gogodala 
(Saru) 
Aewe, Baidowa, Dede (Wasua), Dewara/Dewala, Eniyawa 
(Duru), Gwaku, Kautru, Kiru, Lewada, Pukaduka #1, 
Pukaduka #2, Riti, Sapuka, Serki, Sialowa, Suame  
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Table 3.1 – Non-CMCA villages in Ningerum LLGA and Olsobip LLGA 
LLG Ward Village 1980 1990 2000 
Ningerum 
01 Ambaga 004 Karandimok 44 
03 Tengim 004 Bikim  99 127 104 
024 Tengim  89 310 133 
04 Hukim 013 Hukim  164 210 236 
018 Minipon 95 99 151 
05 Tarakbits 005 Binkawok 88 158 176 
006 Betenok  - - 135 
023 Tarakbits 225 257 250 
Olsobip 
01 Bolongong 002 Bolongong 175 103 
02 Kongabip 006 Kongabip 91 136 96 
03 Laubip  007 Laubip  79 94 154 
402 Olsobip 
Station 
131 229 68 
04 Imigabip 005 Imigabip 484 188 105 
009 Tamtem  35 119 
06 Golgobip 004 Golgobip  331 452 98 
008 Wagambip 18 128 
009 Tunget  87 
07  
Bolibip/Bolivip 
001 Bolivip  305 351 121 
401 Montfort 
Catholic 
Mission  
142 
Total 2356 2664 2450 
Source: National Statistic Office 1980 – 2000 
307 
Table 3.2 - Nupmo Trust CMCA villages   
North Ok Tedi 
(Nupmo)  
1980  1990  2000  2007  2011  
Ankit  -  51  112  111  124  
Boliwogam  95  -  122  171  200  
Boungkim  
(Duombonkim)  
47  -  46  121  149  
Bumbin  81  62  88  117  133  
Derongo  213  -  80  391  439  
Digam  25  39  67  161  258  
Haidowogam  34  85  126  100  119  
Kawentikin  120  323  148  234  262  
Kolebon  72  99  78  265  273  
Korkit  -  106  199  335  353  
Kumguit  56  35  238  167  185  
Ningerum 
Tamaro  
-  -  324  127  140  
Nioksikwi  76  169  145  172  203  
Ok Teditau  32  263  166  149  179  
Walawam^  135  113  136  200  215  
Wogam  153  195  190  390  440  
Wombon  104  108  94  248  318  
Wurimkanatgo  69  80  81  101  137  
Total  1,312  1,726  2,440  3,560  4,127  
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Table 3.3 - Tutuwe Trust CMCA villages 
Highway 1980 1990 2000 2007 2011 
Awin Tamaro - - 136 252 302 
Briompenai  130* 161 225 335 365 
Dande 1  147 120 75 96 186 
Dande 2  - - 131 - 241
Gii  272 299 549 735 838
Gre  274 328 300 745 853
Grehosore  137 171 225 309 325
Grengas  325 315 357 838 1083
Hiorenkia  92 129 138 265 303
Hoponai  68 115 138 231 272
Hosonai  82 135 115 180 214
Hosokumgu  61* 118 80 436 404
Iankenai  137* 391 129 709 880
Ipoknai  91 107 131 154 192
Kasrenai  139 202 233 547 589
Kwiloknai  151 197 238 497 672
Matkomnai  223 314 219 395 530
Menummsore  136 147 183 277 344
Miamsomnai  126 204 196 547 628
Mimigire  124 144 243 161 224
Pampenai  135 188 221 291 519
Rarengre  141 160 245 443 559
Rudmesuk  - - 34 115 134
Sisimakam/  
Apram  
165 219 410 - 639
Tapko  127 189 178 436 551 
Tmindemasuk 289 357 384 688 689 
Tiomnai  224 288 354 565 730 
Tope  35 48 35 126 139 
Wangenai  138 151 178 328 308 
Total  3,969 5,197 6,080 10,755 13,703 
Table 3.4 - Wai Tri Trust CMCA villages 
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Ambaga 194 254 249 208 340 
Atkamba 38 127 437 463 634 
Bige - - 137 145 160 
Birimkamba 57 42 193 
Bongabun 44 46 84 60 78 
Demasuke 86 183 217 
Dome 204 762 812 288 655 
Ieran 78 93 93 124 187 
Iogi 125 392 504 195 279 
Kawok 54 65 100 No census 179 
Komokpin 123 180 259 No census 273 
Konkonda 167 173 122 297 731 
Kungembit 127* 159 124 281 379 
Kungim 483 1587 591 740 1034 
Kwiape 138 143 241 384 422 
Miamrae 122 149 215 394 484 
Putmambin 285 629 
Sarae 90 128 
Senamrae 153 171 293 385 512 
Total 4,564 7,514 
Lower Ok Tedi 1980 1990 2000 2007 2011 
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Table 3.5 - Middle Fly Trust CMCA villages 
Aiambak 340 420 
Bosset 548 688 969^ 1,372 1,398 
Erekta 146 126 130 406 543 
Karemgo 128 277 238 570 883 
Kasa - - - 577 637 
Kavainanga/Obo 465 939 1308^ 1660 1,914 
Komovai  162 173 203 399 403 
Kwem  249 381 352 666 710 
Kukujaba  132 2 206 419 679 
Levame  96 64 118 247 285 
Manda  194 318 450 649 718 
Membok  166 170 131 359 478 
Mepu*  129 - - 530 1003 
Mipan  281 331 408 772 900 
Moian/Iulaua  235 234 286 378 523 
Owa  - - 16 79 105 
Wangawanga  276 432 666^ 632 839 
Yulawas  - 110 134 338 406 
Total  10,939 12,844 
Middle Fly 1980 1990 2000 2007 2011 
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Table 3.6 - Suki Fly Gogo Trust CMCA villages 
Suki Fly Gogo 1980 1990 2000 2007 2011 
Aewe  458 618 249 578 645 
Baidowa  41 112 190 
Dede (Wasua)  446 631 706 2021 2289 
Dewara  272 492 949 990 
Eniyawa (Duru) 379 520 826 786 
Gwaku  136 190 252 416 416 
Kautru  247 291 388 
Kiru  323 393 511 
Lewada  471 349 413 614 735 
Puka Duka #1  607 1115 1184 
Puka Duka #2  184 181 
Riti  337 535 556 
Sapuka 
(Inaporok) 
304 562 716 802 
Serki 184 266 376 532 649 
Sialowa 377 506 579 
Suame 420 654 817 
Total 5,922 10,442 11,718 
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Table 3.7 – Manawete Trust CMCA villages 
Manawete 1980 1990 2000 2007 2011 
Aberegerema  241 408 681 849 1590 
Arato  258 478 590 
Damera 228 254 270 300 451 
Doumori 187 271 443 939 926 
Kabaturi 
(Koavisi) 
67 267 385 629 
Kawiapo 316* 486 639 2023 2425 
Kea 380 708 
Kename 225 372 297 337 528 
Kenedibi 114 486 743 905 
Maduduwo 184* 244 451 621 
Maipani 218 367 824 986 
Padeaya #1 201 330 538 844 
Padeaya #2 - 592 911 
Pagona #1 166 144 244 352 522 
Pagona #2 - 286 419 
Sagero 145 202 152 369 566 
Tire’ere 438* 494 104 1518 1551 
Urio 84 354 399 558 653 
Waliyama 191 447 915 686 
Wariobodoro 146 253 327 518 818 
Total  3084 4363 4897 13,355 17,329 
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Table 3.8 Dudi Trust CMCA Villages 
Dudi 1980 1990 2000 2007 2011 
Aduru 226 305 370 556 568 
Baramura 138 86 246 416 451 
Daware 20 113 165 654 684 
Kadawa 245 369 544 1959 2064 
Katatai 161 239 371 813 1087 
Koabu 149 257 330 713 830 
Madame 159 207 323 528 1175 
Madiri (Tirio #1) 244 171 392 459 628 
Mutam 82 - 202 310 350 
Parama 104 290 438 3929 4473 
Severimabu 286 274 475 1880 1622 
Sui 182 160 402 1494 1556 
Tapila 23 356 215 324 333 
U’uwo 294 254 431 - 1537
Wederehiamo 127 209 305 748 894 
Total 2,440 3,290 5,209 14,992 18,472 
Table 3.9 Kiwaba Trust CMCA Villages 
Kiwaba 1980 1990 2000 2007 2011 
Agobaro 42 38 127 580 918 
Aibinio 86 77 243 362 419 
Buria 392 470 
Gasowa/Gesoa 66 117 331 389 416 
Iasa 49 148 220 837 1093 
Ipisa 84 82 151 1602 1646 
Isumo    710 755 Kubira 71 118 221 622 682 
Oromosapuo 167 112 205 1214 1852 
Sagapari    212 292 Saguane 34 16 6 697 876 
Samari 260 254 298 2588 2369 
Wapau’ra 56 56 - 247 493 
Wapi 170 185 274 301 377 
Total 1085 1203 2076 10,753 12,604 
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Appendix IV – MLE Delegates Meeting 3 Attendance 
Table 2.1- List of Participants and Organisations being involved in the MLE 
Consultation Process (Source: Boeha and Geno 2011)  
 No. Name of Participant Organisation & Representation 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Nigel Parker  
Musje Worrer  
Yaru Pohei  
Michael Ridd  
Ian Sheppard (sick) 
Ok Tedi Management 
Ok Tedi Management 
Ok Tedi Management 
Ok Tedi Management 
Ok Tedi Management 
6 
7 
Ian Middleton  
Leonard Lagisa 
Ok Tedi Fly River Development 
Program  
Ok Tedi Fly River Development 
Program  
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Lalatute Avosa 
Patricia Kila  
Peter Nagai  
Pius Kami  
Michael Kiap  
Flex Louis  
Ande Bob  
PNG Sustainable Program 
PNG Sustainable Program 
PNG Sustainable Program 
PNG Sustainable Program 
PNG Sustainable Program 
PNG Sustainable Program 
PNG Sustainable Program 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
James Topo  
Gabriel Kuna  
Steven Narawen 
John Mosoro  
Stella Brere   
Mineral Resources Authority 
Mineral Resources Authority 
Mineral Resources Authority 
Mineral Resources Authority 
Mineral Resources Authority 
20 Ricks Tanda Department of Environment and 
Conservation  
21 Patrick Kamuot (absent) Department of Mineral Policy and 
Geohazard Management   
22 Timothy Mais Department of Treasury and 
Finance  
23 Bonney Gelu Department of Justice and Attorney 
General  
24 
25 
26 
Monica Lopyiu  
Isaiah Huekmarin 
Natasha Panta  
Department of National Planning & 
Monitoring  
Department of National Planning & 
Monitoring  
Department of National Planning & 
Monitoring  
27 Asher Chillion Allens Arthur Robinson Lawyers 
28 Dr. Jerry Tamate Independent Scientist 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Willie Kokoba (absent) 
Manase Dmonai  
Destin Wanga  
Jimmy Ofaio  
Western and Fly River Provincial 
Government  
Western and Fly River Provincial 
Government  
Western and Fly River Provincial 
Government  
Western and Fly River Provincial 
Government  
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 No.  Name of Participant  Organisation & Representation  
33  Albert Rovi  Churches Representative   
34 
35 
35  
36  
37 
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
Michael Miise  
Allan Kikitam  
Yarang Kurtama (absent)  
Robert Lana  
Yon Buhuyana  
Daniel Wanamp (absent)  
Leo Duba  
Peter Kaumbe  
Kuam Sanewai  
Michael Namalok  
Monty Anwaim  
Jane Wiyawa  
John Ramit  
Kelly Kuriman  
Merikas Timori  
Nia Som  
George Dewon  
Martin Paining Jr  
Andrew Mari  
Jeff Ransley  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations 
Ok Tedi Community Relations  
Ok Tedi Community Relations 
54  Phillipa Carr  Doctor of Philosophy Student – 
Australian  
National University, Canberra  
55  Simon Jaintong  Project Coordinator, Department of 
Mining,  
Autonomous Bougainville 
Government  
  
  
316 
  
TABLE 2.2 -List of Names of Delegates representing Nine CMCA Regions  
 
No. 
Name of Delegate CMCA Region 
1 
2 
3 
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
John Wanim  
Joshua Kaiankim  
Maino Lucas   
Joel Dangim  
Mark Tanoim  
Amos Kiki  
Thomas Uneng  
Timothy John  
Mark Wenis  
Kelly Bineng  
Aniok Kirokim  
Caspar Sokim  
Jerry Musolok (absent)  
Dona Wanim  
Anora Wenis (absent)  
Alice Mumuyong  
Mine Village (Bultem)  
Mine Village (Bultem - Observer)  
Mine Village (Bultem – Observer) 
Mine Villages (Kavorabip)  
Mine Villages (Kavorabip - 
Observer)  
Mine Village (Migalsim)  
Mine Village (Wangbin)  
Mine Village (Wangbin - Observer)  
Mine Village (Wangbin - Observer)  
Mine Village (Finalbin)  
Mine Village (Finalbin - Observer)  
Mine Village (Atemkit - Observer)  
Mine Village (Atemkit  
Mine Village (Women and Youth)  
Mine Village (Women and Youth) 
Mine Village (Women and Youth)   
17  Toby Yakumani  Mt. Fubilan Resource Association 
(Observer)   
18  
19  
20  
21   
Michael Gen  
Penai Napu  
Keri Krori  
Catherine Puse  
Highway  
Highway  
Highway  
Highway (Women and Youth)  
22  
23  
24  
25  
Daniel Atmeyok  
Lalamana Gaegae  
Keop Kowa  
Noni Dukman   
North Ok Tedi  
North Ok Tedi  
North Ok Tedi  
North Ok Tedi (Women and Youth)  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
Ketu Nuri  
Nick Bun  
James Assan  
Moses Oti  
Julieth Hmentori  
Lower Ok Tedi  
Lower Ok Tedi  
Lower Ok Tedi  
Lower Ok Tedi  
Lower Ok Tedi (Women and Youth)  
31  
32  
33  
34  
Richard Zumoi  
George Nambai  
Nelson Ambrose  
Kurina Aioge  
Middle Fly  
Middle Fly  
Middle Fly  
Middle Fly (Women and Youth) 
35  
36  
37  
38  
Dabra Sunakiye  
Makaya Susukia  
Kenny Maba  
Linda Mulake  
Suki Fly Gogo  
Suki Fly Gogo  
Suki Fly Gogo  
Suki Fly Gogo (Women and Youth)  
39  
40  
41  
42  
Ivan Buago  
Dere Wamaro  
Vincent Kearo  
Narei Namaro  
Manawete  
Manawete  
Manawete  
Manawete (Women and Youth)  
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No. 
Name of Delegate CMCA Region 
43 
44 
45 
46  
Gariva David  
Kameng Arawok 
Segewo Kame  
Pahei David  
Kiwaba 
Kiwaba 
Kiwaba 
Kiwaba (Women and Youth) 
47 
48 
49 
50  
Ema Kitari  
Kime Sumai  
Sabadi Kaisi  
Rebecca Marke  
Dudi 
Dudi 
Dudi 
Dudi (Women and Youth) 
TABLE 2.3- List of External Facilitators and Organisation 
No.. Name of external facilitator  Organization 
1 
2 
3 
Martin Brash 
Kori Maraga  
Tom Seta  
Tanorama Limited 
Tanorama Limited 
Tanorama Limited 
Table 2.4- List of External Observers and Organisations 
No. Name  of external observers Organisation 
1 Dr. Beno Boeha Professional Valuers of PNG Ltd 
2 Ila Geno Ila Geno and Associates 
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Table 2.5 - Attendance list for DM3  
 No.  Names  Designation  Organisation/ 
Region  
Present() 
30 Mar  
Present  
()  
31 Mar  
1.  Martin Brash  Facilitator  Tanorama      
2.  Kori Maraga  Facilitator  Tanorama      
3.  Tom Seta  Facilitator  Tanorama      
4.  Dr. Beno 
Boeha  
External Observer        
5.  Mr. Ila Geno  External Observer        
6.  Dr. Jerry  
Tamate  
Independent 
Reviewer  
      
7.  James Topo  MRA Coordinator  Government      
8.  Timothy Mais  Treasury  Government      
9.  Ricks Tanda  DEC  Government      
10  Gelu Bonney  State Solicitor  Government      
11.  Stella Brere  Gender Coordinator-
MRA 
Government      
12.  Gabriel Kuna  MRA  Government      
13.  Steven 
Narawen  
MRA  Government      
14.  Monica 
Lopiyu  
DNPM  Government      
15.  Isaiah  
Huekmarin  
DNPM  Government  x  x  
16.  John Mosoro  MRA  Government      
17.  Natasha Panta  DNPM  Government      
18.  Patricia Kila    PNGSDP      
19.  Ande Bob    PNGSDP      
20.  Pius Kami    PNGSDP      
21.  Lalatute Avosa    PNGSDP      
22.  Peter Nagai    PNGSDP      
23.  Felix Loius    PNGSDP      
24.  Michael Kiap    PNGSDP      
24.  Manase 
Dmonai  
  WP Govt.      
25.  Destin Wangar    WP Govt.      
26.  Jimmy Ufaio    WP Govt.      
27.  Asher Chillion    AR Lawyers      
28.  Jerry Tamate  Independent  
Scientist  
      
29.  Nick Bun  Delegate  LOT Region      
30.  Moses Oti  Delegate  LOT Region      
31.  James Assan  Delegate  LOT Region      
32.  Julie Hmentori  Women’s Delegate.  LOT Regon      
33.  Richard Zumoi  Delegate  Middle Fly      
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 No. Names Designation Organisation/ 
Region  
Present() 
30 Mar 
Present 
()
31 Mar
34. Nelson 
Ambrose 
Delegate Middle Fly   
35. George 
Nambai 
Delegate Middle Fly   
36. Kurina Aioge Women’s Delegate. Middle Fly   
37. Ema Kitari Delegate Dudi   
38. Kime Sumai Delegate Dudi   
39. Sabadi Kaisi Delegate Dudi   
40. Rebecca 
Marke 
Women’sDelegate Dudi   
41. Kamen 
Arawok 
Delegate Kiwaba   
42. Garibah David Delegate Kiwaba   
43. Segewo Kame Delegate Kiwaba   
44. Pahei David Women’s Delegate Kiwaba   
45. Dabra 
Sunakiye 
Delegate Suki Fly 
Gogo 
  
46. Kenny Maba Delegate Suki Fly 
Gogo 
x  
47. Maga Susskia Delegate Suki Fly 
Gogo 
  
48. Linda Mulake Women’s Delegate Suki Fly 
Gogo 
  
49. Ivan Buago Delegate Manawete   
50. Dere Wamaro Delegate Manawete   
51. Vincent Kearo Delegate Manawete   
52. Narei Namaro Women’s Delegate Manawete   
53. Penai Napu Delegate H’way   
54. Keri Krori Delegate H’way   
55. Michael Gen Delegate H’way   
56. Catherine Puse Women’s Delegate H’way   
57. Keop Kowa Delegate NOT   
58. Lalamana 
Gaegae 
Delegate NOT   
59. Daniel 
Atmeyok 
Dekegate NOT   
60. Noni Dukman Women’s Delegate NOT   
61. Thomas Uneng Delegate (Wangbin) Mine Region   
62. Amos Kiki Delegate 
(Migalsim) 
Mine Region x  
63.  Kelly Bineng Delegate (Finalbin) Mine Region   
64. John Wanim Delegate (Bultem) Mine Region   
65. Dona Wanim Women’s Delegate Mine Region   
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 No.  Names Designation Organisation/ 
Region  
Present() 
30 Mar 
Present 
()
31 Mar
66. Anora Wenis Women’s Delegate Mine Region   
67. Alice 
Mumuyong 
Women;s Delegate Mine Region   
68. Nigel Parker Acting CEO OTML   
69. Michael Ridd Environment OTML   
70. Musje Werror Operations OTML   
71. Ian Middleton CEO- OTFRDP OTML   
72. Leonard 
Lagisa 
OTML   
73. Yaru Pohei Manager, CR OTML   
74. Ketu Nuri Delegate LOT   
75. Casper Sokim Community 
Observors 
Mine Region   
76. Mark Wenis Community 
Observors 
Mine Region   
77. Maino Lucas Community 
Observors 
Mine Region   
78. Joshua 
Kamengkim 
Community 
Observors 
Mine Region   
79. Mark Tunoim Community 
Observors 
Mine Region   
80. Anith Kilokim Community 
Observors 
Mine Region   
81. Albert Rovi Church Delegate Church 
Council 
  
82. Joel Dangkim Community 
Observors 
Mine Region x  
83. Tony 
Yakumani 
Community 
Observors 
Mine Region -  
84. Clara Fred Community 
Observors 
Mine Region -  
85. Timothy John Community 
Observors 
Mt.Fubilan 
Resource 
Association 
 - 
Phillipa Carr Australian 
National 
University 
  
Simon Jaintong Autonomous 
Region of  
Bougainville 
  
Total Attendance 80 85 
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 Appendix V – ASM Group Survey Form 
Questions Responses 
Age: Children 
(Under 15) 
Adult 
(15+) 
Elderly (50+) 
Gender: Female Male 
Home Village 
or LLGA:  
Reason for 
Panning: 
How much do  
you get a day, 
and how much  
do you sell it 
for?  
Money used 
for? 
Are you happy 
with the current 
yields?  
Do you think 
gold price you 
receive is fair?  
Any other 
sources of 
income? 
Do you think 
there should be 
more regulation 
of the activity?  
Do you think 
the government, 
PNGSDP or 
OTML should 
do more for 
miners? If so 
what should 
they do?  
Are you part 
of a SSM 
cooperative?  
Any other 
comments? 
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Appendix VI – Figures 
Figure 1.1 Stakeholder organization, legislation, and agreements of the Ok Tedi Mining Complex 
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Figure 3.1 Rainfall Patterns across the North Fly 1970–2010 (Mathews et al 2013
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